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Chapter 1
Helps and Hindrances to the Achievement 
of Cognitive Closure About CCS




Modern day society is increasingly characterized by complex technological 
innovations. New developments, such as climate engineering, nanotechnology, and 
robotics are presented to the world almost on a daily basis. Many of these innovations 
impact to some degree on people’s lives and it is hence not surprising that the 
implementation of complex technologies can generally only succeed with acceptance, 
participation, or support of the general public (e.g., Dütschke, 2011; Markusson, Ishii, & 
Stephens, 2011; Read, Brown, Thorsteinsson, Morgan, & Price, 2013; Terwel, Ter Mors, & 
Daamen, 2012). Taking this influence of the public into account, those involved with the 
implementation of a complex technology often show an interest in the public’s opinion 
on the technology and attempt to inform themselves of people’s viewpoint by means of, 
for instance, opinion polling or interviews.
People are generally willing to declare their “attitude” towards the utilization of a 
complex technology, even when their knowledge of the topic is low, or the formation 
of their attitude towards the topic has not yet been completed (De Best-Waldhober, 
Daamen, & Faaij, 2009; also see Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, & Bennet, 1980; 
Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005). However, such unfinished, open attitudes, or pseudo-
attitudes, are very unstable and therefore hardly predictive of actual levels of support 
for or opposition to the technology in question (e.g., De Best-Waldhober et al., 2009). 
Finishing the formation of an attitude, or forming a “closed attitude”, on a particular 
topic is known as achieving cognitive closure. Attitudes about which people have 
achieved a state of cognitive closure are known to be more stable and more predictive 
of actual behavior than open attitudes. Accordingly, such closed attitudes are also better 
predictors of subsequent support for (acceptance of) versus opposition to (protest 
against) the issue at stake (cf. Bassili, 1996; Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Krosnick & Petty, 
1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). Thus, for the purpose of understanding public opinion 
regarding the implementation of complex or novel technologies, and the unfolding 
thereof, it is of great interest to know which factors relate to the achievement of cognitive 
closure.
Previous research on the achievement of cognitive closure has predominantly 
addressed the role of differences in the degree to which people experience a need for 
closure (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989, 1990; Kruglanski & Webster, 1991, 1996; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994, 1997). This perspective emphasizes that people tend to differ in their 
overall desire for definite answers to different issues (i.e., for cognitive closure) and that 
this desire affects the likelihood that they draw a conclusion about the topic at hand, 
and hold on to this conclusion. Generally speaking, people with a high need for closure 
feel more inclined to achieve closure quickly and to stick with this closure, compared to 
those with a lower need for closure. Thus, research on the need for closure has provided 
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important insights showing that people can differ in their overall tendency to form a 
closed attitude. Nevertheless, there may also be other factors that determine whether 
or not people achieve cognitive closure. Especially when it comes to forming a closed 
attitude about the implementation of a complex technology, people may be restricted in 
their ability to achieve closure—regardless of their basic need or desire for closure. In 
fact, whether people think it will be difficult or easy to achieve closure—in other words; 
whether they feel capable of achieving closure—may be as important as whether they 
want to or feel the need to achieve closure. Indeed, people are likely to be aware of the 
intricate and multi-faceted nature of issues such as the implementation of a complex 
technology, and realize it may not be easy or even feasible to fully grasp or weigh all 
the aspects that might be relevant to deciding on a particular point of view. For many, 
achieving closure on such issues is, as a result, a challenge in itself. Yet, in some cases, 
people do come to a strong and stable viewpoint on the implementation or utilization 
of a complex technology (e.g., Kim, Chun, & Song, 2009; Poortinga, Aoyagi, & Pidgeon, 
2013). It is therefore important to understand the psychological factors that either 
complicate or facilitate the achievement of cognitive closure on complex, technological 
topics. 
The main goal of the current dissertation is to identify psychological factors that 
affect the ease with which people form a closed attitude about the implementation of 
a complex technology. In doing this, I specifically focus on aspects of this process that 
may be addressed in public communications about complex technologies. Increasing our 
understanding of such factors and the ways in which these may either inhibit or facilitate 
the achievement of closure is highly relevant for policy makers who try to inform the 
general public in the best possible way, as well as for those who aim to predict public 
opinion on the introduction of new complex technologies. Being aware of what stands 
in the way of people’s ability to form a closed and definite opinion makes it possible 
to inform people in such a way that is most likely to be helpful to them in making up 
their mind. Thus, rather than examining how people can be persuaded to accept a novel 
technology, I am mainly interested in finding out how they come to the conclusion that 
they have adequate information to form their definite attitude. Hence, in my research I 
focus on factors that determine the extent to which people manage to achieve cognitive 
closure in their opinion, instead of examining the content, or valence of their resulting 
stance. 
To achieve this goal, in the different empirical chapters I address a number 
of psychological factors that complicate or facilitate the achievement of cognitive 
closure about a complex technology. First, I examine whether and how potentially 




complex technology—risk perceptions and negative emotions in particular—hinder the 
achievement of cognitive closure. Second, I empirically assess whether the perceived 
ability to achieve closure actually facilitates the process of making up one’s mind when 
being asked to take a stance on a particular issue. Finally, I examine whether and how 
the ability to achieve closure is determined by characteristics of the information received, 
and how this impacts on people’s impressions about the expertise of the source that will 
provide them with information that may help them form an opinion. 
In this thesis I will focus on the complex technology of carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) as a relevant example of a complex, novel technology. CCS is a climate change 
mitigation technology that is considered important for stabilizing greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere (IPCC, 2007). The technology involves the capture 
of CO2 produced in power plants or other industrial sources, transportation of the 
CO2 to underground storage sites (e.g., depleted oil and gas fields), and long-term 
storage in these sites. As is the case with other complex (energy-related) technologies, 
the public’s opinion can be a decisive factor for the successful implementation of CCS 
(e.g., Markusson et al., 2011; Terwel et al., 2012). As such, CCS is an appropriate subject 
for the examination of the achievement of cognitive closure on the implementation of 
complex technologies. The next section will provide a theoretical background for the 
research conducted in this dissertation. 
Attitude Content versus Attitude State
Much of the research on attitudes and attitude formation in the context of complex 
technologies so far has focused on the content of people’s point of view (e.g., Cass & 
Walker, 2009; Dütschke, 2011). However, as indicated above, the significance of people’s 
attitudes for the implementation of a complex technology is not only determined by 
what people think of the technology (i.e., the content, or positive vs. negative valence 
of their attitude), but also by the state of their attitude, that is; the degree to which 
this point of view is closed and fixed. Yet, little attention has been paid to factors that 
determine the extent to which people form a closed attitude about a complex technology. 
The central outcome I examine in this dissertation on attitude formation about complex 
technologies is hence the degree to which people feel they can, or actually do achieve 
cognitive closure on the complex technology of CCS, rather than examining the valence 
of these attitudes as being in favor of or against the introduction of CCS. 
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Unsettling Thoughts and Feelings in the Context of Complex 
Technologies
Most people are relatively unfamiliar with many of the technological innovations 
in modern society (e.g., De Best-Waldhober et al., 2009). Moreover, even if people are 
aware of a complex technology’s existence, their general knowledge and understanding 
of the technology’s many aspects (e.g., its functionality or application) is oftentimes 
limited or even non-existent. When people are informed of the possible implementation 
of such a relatively unknown and (to them) incomprehensible technology, for instance 
via a public information campaign, it is therefore no surprise that various unsettling 
thoughts and feelings tend to arise (e.g., Pidgeon, Harthorn, & Satterfield, 2011). For 
example, when hearing about political plans to store CO2 underground in a nearby area, 
people may wonder how this might impact them or affect their daily lives. Moreover, 
they may be concerned about a variety of possible outcomes, for instance whether 
the technology will affect their physical health or wonder whether this might reduce 
the value of their property. I argue that such unsettling reactions to the potential 
implementation of a complex technology are likely to impact on the extent to which 
people manage to form a definite, closed attitude on the topic.
In this thesis I specifically focus on risk perceptions and negative emotional 
reactions; thoughts and feelings that people commonly experience in reaction to the 
(potential) implementation of a complex technology. I examine how these reactions 
are related to the achievement of cognitive closure on the topic. The influence of these 
unsettling reactions on the valence of people’s attitudes has already been examined 
and demonstrated extensively in prior research (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, 
& Combs, 1978; Siegrist, 1999; Slovic, 1987, 2010). To extend existing insights, I 
propose that perceiving risks and experiencing negative emotions at the prospect of the 
implementation of a complex technology also affect the level of cognitive closure that 
people achieve in their attitudes on the technology. I examine this question in Chapter 2. 
Risk perception
One of the main areas of concern regarding complex, technological innovations 
tends to be the technology’s potential risks and hazards (e.g., Sharp, Jaccard, & Keith, 
2009). At the same time, however, most people have difficulty finding out precisely what 
these are. Indeed, not only are lay people likely to over- or underestimate risks, but they 
also tend to have trouble understanding the meaning of a change in probability of risks 
(Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Loewenstein, Weber. Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finuncane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). In addition to being difficult to comprehend, the notion of 




some issue, they are more likely to avoid choices or decisions about that particular 
issue altogether (Dhar & Simonson, 2003). To the extent that risk perceptions raise the 
salience of uncertain consequences, they may thus reduce the likelihood that people 
form a closed attitude on the implementation of a complex technology. 
Perceived risks can pertain to a broad range of issues or concerns, from potential 
physical damage (public health hazards) to the question of whether the technology has 
been thoroughly tested (its anticipated effectiveness and safety). This implies, in turn, 
that people may consider a large variety of aspects of a complex technology when trying 
to determine its general risk (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Savadori et al., 2004; Singleton, 
Herzog, & Ansolabehere, 2009; Slovic, 1987, 1992). As such, merely examining people’s 
overall impression of the level of risk associated with a particular technology can only 
provide limited insight into the relation between risk perception and the achievement 
of cognitive closure. Prior research has attempted to disentangle different aspects of 
risk perception by means of a psychometric approach. This revealed that it is possible 
to statistically discern different dimensions of risk perception (e.g., Fischhoff et al., 
1978; Savadori et al., 2004). Thus, prior work has identified two main dimensions; 
one representing the extent to which the risks seem novel and unknown (i.e., lack of 
familiarity), and the other standing for the extent to which the risks’ consequences are 
considered catastrophic and dreadful (i.e., catastrophic potential; Fife-Schaw & Rowe, 
1996; Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987). Studies on the perceived risks of distinct 
technologies, as opposed to people’s general notion of risk, have revealed further 
dimensions representing additional concerns, such as the degree to which people 
believe they will be personally exposed to the risks (e.g., Savadori et al., 2004; Sparks 
& Sheperd, 1994). In the present dissertation, in addition to overall risk perceptions, I 
thus assess specific risks perceived in relation to CCS with the purpose of investigating 
which dimensions of risk perception can be distinguished as relevant in the context of 
this complex technology. In doing this, I aim to understand which specific risk-related 
concerns help explain the level of cognitive closure that people achieve about the distinct 
technology of CCS. 
Negative emotions
Learning about the possible implementation of a new and complex technology 
does not only bring to mind various risk-related concerns; it is also likely to evoke a 
range of negative emotional reactions, such as feelings of anger or fear (e.g., Cass & 
Walker, 2009; Huijts, Midden, & Meijnders, 2007; Lee, Scheufele, & Lewenstein, 2005). 
Previous research has demonstrated that distinct emotions can directly affect the 
judgments and decisions that people make in various ways (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 
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2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001). I posit that the experience of certain emotions may also 
influence the extent to which people manage to achieve cognitive closure about the 
topic under concern. In the present thesis, I aim to discern different types of negative 
emotions that people can experience when they are informed of the implementation 
of CCS as a complex technology. I investigate whether and how distinct (clusters of) 
emotions in turn are associated with the extent to which people manage to achieve 
cognitive closure on the topic.
Indications of which emotions are likely to affect the level of closure that people 
achieve can be derived from the appraisal model of emotions. According to this 
model, there is no fixed connection between specific events and specific emotions 
raised. Instead, the emotions that people experience are thought to be determined by 
their interpretation—or appraisal—of the circumstances that elicit emotions (Moors, 
Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For instance, the same 
event can elicit different emotions depending on whether the outcomes of the situation 
at hand are seen as either certain or uncertain. People may be angry about something 
that will certainly happen, such as the construction of a CO2 storage site near their home. 
However, if the outcome of a particular event is considered to be uncertain (for instance 
when people question whether CO2 might leak from underground storage sites), 
the primary emotion raised may be fear or tension—instead of anger. The appraisal 
model of emotions moreover accounts for the possibility that distinct emotions evoke 
the tendency to perceive new situations or events in line with the appraisal pattern 
associated with that particular emotion; an appraisal tendency (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 
2001). Thus, to the degree that people judge the implementation of complex technology 
as having uncertain results, they are more likely to experience emotions reflecting this 
uncertainty appraisal (e.g., fear or concern). As a consequence, their approach to the 
new situation is likely to be characterized by uncertainty as well. If the task at hand is to 
form an attitude about a novel technology, the experience of uncertainty thus is likely 
to prevent people from confidently deciding on a particular point of view (cf. Dhar & 
Simonson, 2003). This is why I anticipate that emotions evoked by uncertainty appraisals 
are likely to reduce the level of cognitive closure that people achieve.
The Ability to Achieve Closure
I argue that risk perception and the experience of negative emotions can make it 
more difficult for people to achieve cognitive closure on a complex technology. However, 
irrespective of the level of risk that people perceive or the negative emotions that they 
experience, forming an attitude about a complex technology is in itself already an 




genetic modification of food, mainly indicate that members of the general public realize 
their ability to properly evaluate the situation is limited and find it difficult to take a 
stance. Notwithstanding their awareness that a genuine assessment of such complex 
topics is difficult if not impossible for non-experts, it is not uncommon for people to take 
a firm stance or make up their minds about a complex issue of which they know very 
little or have little understanding. This suggests that there are differences among people 
in the ease with which they achieve closure about a complex technology, and that they 
may rely on different cues to develop the feeling that they are able do to so. In the present 
thesis I therefore also examine the perceived ability to achieve closure, and different 
antecedents thereof, as potentially relevant factors in the actual achievement of cognitive 
closure. 
The self-perceived ability to achieve closure has been recognized in the literature 
as a potential determinant of the extent to which people tend to decide on their point 
of view about a given topic (cf. Roets & Soetens, 2010; Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). 
Furthermore, recent research has demonstrated the relevance of the extent to which 
people feel capable of achieving closure for the manner in which they form judgments 
or make their decisions (Kossowska & Bar-Tal, 2013; Kossowska, Dragon, & Bukowski, 
2014). I postulate that the perception that people have of their own ability to form 
a closed attitude also plays a significant role in the actual achievement of cognitive 
closure. In this context, I define the ability to achieve closure as the perceived ability to 
make judgments and decisions confidently and with certainty (cf. Roets & Van Hiel, 
2007; Roets, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2006). Work by Kossowska and colleagues (2014) has 
provided initial evidence suggesting that people’s ability to achieve closure can also be 
determined by external factors, instead of only representing stable individual differences. 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis I elaborate on this possibility. That is, I report research in 
which I have examined whether it is indeed possible to externally induce differences 
in the notion that people have of their own general ability to achieve closure. I further 
assess the extent to which communications that make people have confidence in their 
ability to achieve closure can also instigate actual differences in the level of cognitive 
closure that they achieve in their attitude formation regarding a complex technology.
Perceived source expertise and the ability to achieve closure 
If the ability to achieve closure indeed determines the likelihood that people 
form a closed attitude about a particular topic or issue, in the context of complex 
technologies it is highly relevant to know which factors tend to affect this ability in 
daily life. Prior research on the impact of persuasive communication (for instance in 
product marketing) has shown that information is more convincing (i.e., it has a greater 
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impact on the content of people’s attitudes) when originating from a source that is 
regarded as having high expertise, compared to low expertise (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004; Pornpitakpan, 2004). Building on this prior work, I propose that people should 
feel better able to achieve cognitive closure about the implementation of a complex 
technology when they believe that they are consulting or receiving information from a 
knowledgeable source. I specifically examine whether and how the identity of a source 
and the message that is communicated influence such perceptions of source expertise. 
If these two factors affect people’s impressions of an information source’s relevant 
expertise, they should also impact on ability to achieve closure in this way. This question 
is addressed in Chapter 4. 
When different individuals or stakeholders of a complex technology provide 
information, merely knowing who they are or which body they represent can function 
as an indicator of source expertise (e.g., Reimer, Mata, & Stoecklin, 2004). For instance, 
knowing whether a statement is made by a concerned citizen, a relevant professional, 
or a blogger already gives an idea of whether this source has relevant experience or 
is particularly knowledgeable about the topic in question. As such, the identity of an 
information source may determine people’s perceptions of the source’s expertise, and this 
perceived expertise in turn may affect people’s ability to achieve closure.
In real life, a source of information on a complex topic is more likely to be 
comprised of a collection of individuals, or group of relevant stakeholders, such as 
citizens, or politicians, rather than of one specific individual. Moreover, in particular 
concerning complex topics, it is not necessarily the case that all individuals who 
together constitute a particular information source are in full agreement with each 
other. As a result, when such sources provide information about a complex technology, 
they do not always draw definite conclusions about the issue at stake. For instance, a 
government might report about its investigation of the possibility of drilling for shale gas 
(“fracking”) in the country and communicate that not all of members of the government 
are convinced that this would be a safe and secure endeavor. The question is how a 
message of consensus, compared to non-consensus, colors the perceived expertise of the 
source in question, and thereby also affects the ability to achieve closure, among those 
receiving such information. I argue that an information source that expresses consensus 
about a complex topic will increase perceptions of expertise by evoking the impression 
that individuals draw on a common and objective knowledge base and that they 
“know what they are talking about”. On the other hand, communicating disagreement 
about relevant concerns or conclusions might more easily be interpreted as a sign of 
diminished expertise, since this lack of consensus can, for instance, signal an inability of 




Communication of consensus (vs. non-consensus) may thus influence perceptions of 
source expertise and, as a result, impact on people’s ability to form a closed attitude. 
Overview of Studies and Empirical Findings 
Reported in This Thesis
Risk Perception, Negative Emotions, and the Achievement  
of Cognitive Closure
Chapter 2 focuses on different aspects of risk perception and specific negative 
emotions as impediments to the achievement of cognitive closure. By building on the 
psychometric approach to risk perception and the appraisal model of emotions I aimed 
to gain insight into which specific risk-related concerns and specific negative emotions, 
respectively, are related to the level of closure that people achieve on the implementation 
of a complex technology. A laboratory study assessed risk perceptions and negative 
emotional reactions among individuals after they learned about the implementation of 
carbon capture and storage technology (CCS). These responses were then related to the 
level of cognitive closure that people achieved when trying to determine their attitude 
on the implementation of the complex technology. The study revealed three different 
dimensions underlying people’s risk perception of CCS (1. catastrophic potential, 2. lack 
of control, and 3. lack of familiarity) and two different clusters of negative emotions that 
people experience in response to CCS (1. negative outcome certainty-related emotions 
and 2. negative outcome uncertainty-related emotions). Results showed that the level 
of cognitive closure that people achieved on the implementation of CCS in the first 
place depended on the extent to which they saw the complex technology as risky in 
terms of potentially catastrophic consequences and in the second place on the extent to 
which they regarded the technology’s risks as novel and unfamiliar. Thus, while lack of 
control represented a separate cluster of concerns in people’s risk perceptions, this did 
not relate to their achievement of cognitive closure. In addition, the degree to which 
people experienced negative emotions that are associated with uncertainty (e.g., fear and 
concern) also reliably predicted the level of cognitive closure that people achieved. These 
results thus shed light on why people may have trouble forming a closed attitude when 
they perceive high risks or experience high levels of negative emotion. The particular 
aspects of risk perception and type of negative emotions that turned out to predict the 
formation of closed attitudes have in common that they indicate a sense of uncertainty 
or insecurity. To the extent that this uncertainty carries over to people’s attitude 
formation, it causes them to feel incapable of confidently deciding on their definite point 
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of view. As such, the extent to which people feel able to achieve closure seems to indicate 
the mechanism underlying the effect of risk perception and negative emotions on the 
achievement of cognitive closure. 
An additional aim of this study was to explore whether different communication 
strategies might have an impact on risk perceptions and negative emotions raised. 
Specifically, I examined whether risk perceptions and negative emotions might be 
mitigated by drawing parallels between the novel, complex technology in question 
and other, more familiar technologies. I compared whether the provision of so-called 
analogies in communication on CCS, or variations in the component of CCS that the 
communication addressed (CO2 transport vs. CO2 storage) might affect the level of risk 
that people attributed to the technology, the extent to which they experienced negative 
emotions, or the level of cognitive closure that they achieved. Results indicated that 
neither the use of analogies nor the CCS-component considered were of substantial 
influence on any of these dependent variables. 
The Ability to Achieve Closure
Chapter 3 more explicitly addresses the notion that the (felt) ability to achieve 
closure may be an important antecedent of the actual achievement of closure in the 
context of complex technologies. Two studies were designed to examine whether 
experimentally induced differences in the degree to which people feel able of achieving 
cognitive closure indeed affects the level of closure that they subsequently reach in their 
attitude formation on a complex technology. These studies additionally investigated the 
further implications of forming a “closed” versus a more “open” attitude by examining 
how the achievement of closure impacted on people’s openness to additional information 
on the complex technology in question which was made available to them at a later 
stage. 
Study 3.1 tested whether people who were led to believe that they have a high (vs. 
moderate) ability to achieve closure actually achieved more cognitive closure in their 
attitude formation. Additionally, I examined whether and how the level of cognitive 
closure that people achieved was related to their willingness to consider and take into 
account additional attitude-relevant information. I expected that the ability to achieve 
closure would indirectly influence openness to additional attitude-relevant information 
through cognitive closure achieved. 
To examine these predictions, I developed an experimental procedure to induce 
differences in people’s perception of their own general ability to achieve closure on 
complex topics. This procedure provided research participants with bogus feedback 




complex topics. They subsequently received information about the specific complex topic 
of CCS and were requested to form an attitude towards the topic. Results confirmed 
the hypotheses by demonstrating that experimentally induced differences in the extent 
to which people perceived themselves as able of achieving closure affected the level of 
cognitive closure that they actually reached in their attitude formation. Additionally, 
I established that this had important consequences for their openness to additional 
information on the topic in question. That is, people achieved more cognitive closure in 
their attitudes on CCS both in their self-reports and in their willingness to take a stance 
in a poll when their perceived ability to achieve closure was induced to be high (rather 
than moderate). The achievement of cognitive closure in turn was found to reduce 
people’s subsequent willingness to read and take into account additional information 
that might be relevant to their opinion (i.e., information on CCS). 
Study 3.2 was a follow-up to Study 3.1 and designed to examine the robustness 
of these findings. An additional aim of this study was to investigate the boundary 
conditions of the extent to which cognitive closure achieved made people less open to 
additional attitude-relevant information. Specifically, in this study I compared people’s 
willingness to consider information that is opinionative in nature to their openness 
to more factual information. The design and results of this study were largely similar 
to those of Study 3.1. Again, the extent to which people were led to see themselves as 
capable of making up their mind positively affected the level of cognitive closure that 
they achieved—at least in terms of their self-reported cognitive closure. Additionally, 
I was able to specify the further consequences of the level of cognitive closure that 
people achieved for their openness to subsequent information. By distinguishing 
between different types of information provided, I was able to ascertain that increasing 
the ability to achieve closure indirectly made people less inclined to read and consider 
additional attitude-relevant information, but apparently only when this information was 
opinionative in nature. Their openness to additional factual information did not appear 
to suffer when the ability to achieve closure was enhanced.
Perceptions of Source Expertise and the Ability to Achieve 
Closure
In the final empirical chapter I investigated how communicating about the 
characteristics of a source of information can impact on people’s ability to achieve 
closure. The central argument developed in this chapter is that people experience a 
greater ability to achieve cognitive closure when they believe that they are receiving 
information from a source with high relevant expertise, compared to low expertise. 
I hypothesized that both the identity of an information source and the nature of the 
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communication—namely whether or not this source communicated consensus or 
non-consensus—were likely to affect perceptions of source expertise. To the extent that 
perceptions of source expertise were affected by such communications, this should then 
also influence people’s ability to achieve closure. 
Study 4.1 addressed the effect of source identity by examining how explicitly 
indicating the source of the information provided might affect the ability to achieve 
closure through its implications for perceptions of source expertise. In this study, people 
first read basic information on the complex technology of CCS and learned that they 
would soon receive additional information on the topic. I then manipulated the identity 
of the source of this additional information by explaining that this information was 
provided either by the “Association of Citizens and Sustainability” or the “Association 
of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability”. As predicted, level of expertise that was 
ascribed to the information depended on the source’s identity; people considered 
the Geophysicists to have higher relevant expertise than the Citizens Association. 
Importantly, I established that higher perceived expertise of the information source in 
turn increased people’s ability to achieve closure.
Study 4.2 followed up on this finding and additionally examined whether the 
communication of consensus (vs. non-consensus) might also influence perceptions 
of source expertise and hence impact on the achievement of closure. The design of 
the study orthogonally manipulated the identity of the information source (Citizens 
Association vs. Geophysicists) and the communication of consensus vs. non-consensus 
within this source. Otherwise, the procedure of the study was similar to the procedure 
of Study 4.1. In addition to learning about the identity of the information source, people 
thus also read that members of this information source either agreed or disagreed among 
themselves, before the level of perceived expertise and their ability to achieve closure 
were assessed. Subsequently, and in extension of the previous study, people actually 
received information on CCS that supposedly originated from the information source 
and in which consensus or non-consensus was expressed. Next, I assessed the level 
of cognitive closure that they achieved. Results again provided evidence in line of my 
reasoning that the identity of the source impacts on perceived source expertise, and in 
this way influences the ability to achieve closure. In addition, this study revealed that 
people regard an information source to have more expertise, and therefore feel better 
able to achieve closure, when the source communicates consensus rather than non-
consensus. The added value of communicating consensus primarily emerged when high 





The implementation of most modern day complex technological innovations 
cannot succeed without acceptance of these technologies by the public (e.g., Dütschke, 
2011; Markusson et al., 2011; Read et al., 2013; Terwel et al., 2012). Although people are 
generally willing to declare their attitude towards the utilization of a complex technology, 
these attitudes are often “open” and therefore hardly predictive of actual support for or 
opposition against the technology in question (e.g., De Best-Waldhober et al., 2009). 
Attitudes about which people have achieved a state of cognitive closure (i.e., closed 
attitudes) are on the other hand more predictive of support and opposition than open 
attitudes (cf. Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). Hence, it is important to 
know and understand which factors relate to the achievement of cognitive closure in the 
context of complex technologies. In this thesis I demonstrate how certain psychological 
factors complicate or facilitate the achievement of closure about complex technologies, 
and how these can be induced by communicating to the public in a particular way. 
As such, the research in this thesis has both important theoretical and practical 
implications. 
As mentioned above, most previous research on the achievement of cognitive 
closure has focused on the role of people’s need for closure (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989, 1990; 
Kruglanski & Webster, 1991, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, 1997). The findings 
of the present dissertation indicate that in addition to differences amongst individuals 
in their need for closure, the achievement of closure also depends on their ability to 
achieve closure, that is; how difficult or easy people find it to form a closed attitude in a 
particular situation. Specifically, I established that people feel less able to achieve closure 
to the extent that they perceive more risks and experience more negative emotions at 
the prospect of a complex technology being implemented. I was also able to determine 
which aspects of risk perception and which types of emotions are most likely to have this 
effect, hence clarifying that those who communicate to the general public should pay 
particular attention to the uncertainties associated with complex, novel technologies, and 
to how to reduce these uncertainties. 
I also established that—regardless of the information that is being provided—
people take the perceived expertise of the source providing information as a cue to 
determine their ability to achieve closure. Specifically, results of my research revealed 
that attributing high relevant expertise to an information source that provides 
information on the topic in question actually facilitates the achievement of closure 
on the basis of this information. Moreover, I demonstrated that the conviction that 
a particular source has relevant expertise not only depends on its identity, but is also 
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affected by the extent to which communications emphasize the presence versus absence 
of consensus within this source.
Thus, I was able to establish different factors that are relevant to the notion that 
people can feel more or less capable of achieving closure. Such feelings are important 
because I found that people who feel well able to form a closed attitude in fact do achieve 
more cognitive closure than those who are led to believe that they are not as capable. 
That is, they are more ready to take a stance in an opinion poll and less likely to read or 
consider additional opinionative information that becomes available to them at a later 
stage. These findings together demonstrate that particularly in the domain of complex 
technologies, people’s ability to achieve closure is an important antecedent of the 
achievement of closure and that this explains differences in closure achieved above and 
beyond individual differences in people’s need for closure. 
Theoretical Implications
The results of the research reported in this thesis resonate with prior work on 
the concept of ambivalence; the co-existence of positive and negative evaluations of an 
attitude object. For instance, the relation found in Chapter 2 between the achievement 
of closure and feelings of uncertainty somewhat resembles the (conditional) association 
between ambivalence and uncertainty (e.g., Van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, 
Nordgren, & Van der Pligt, 2009). Moreover, one could argue that people who have 
both positive and negative evaluations of an attitude object, and are hence ambivalent, 
would have more difficulty to deciding on their attitude than those who hold a more 
univalent attitude. Although it is indeed likely that there is a (negative) relation between 
the psychological state of ambivalence and the ability to achieve cognitive closure, it is 
important to note that these two concepts differ from each other. Indeed, they should 
also have an independent effect on the achievement of cognitive closure. The present 
research offers several observations supporting this notion. First, the study in Chapter 
2 shows that while perceiving CCS as risky in terms of catastrophic potential may lead 
people to have a more negative attitude on the technology, it also reduces the chance 
that they achieve closure on this attitude. This indicates that people who have trouble 
achieving closure are not necessarily ambivalent on the topic in question, but can also 
have a strong (univalent) point of view. Moreover, ambivalence only evokes feeling of 
uncertainty when people are pressed to decide on their attitude, while these feelings 
are not experienced when such a forced choice is absent (Van Harreveld et al., 2009). 
Hence, while people who feel ambivalent may have trouble achieving closure when they 
are obliged to “take a side”, they may well form a closed attitude when retaining a more 




of ambivalence and the ability to achieve closure are related, the two concepts do not 
appear to be mutually interchangeable.
The concepts and findings discussed in the present dissertation appear to resemble 
certain ideas and concepts from the elaboration likelihood model (ELM: Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). For one, the ELM and the present research both examine the ways in 
which people try to make up their mind about the topic at hand. The ELM, however, 
primarily concentrates on the evaluation of persuasive arguments and the consequences 
for the valence of an attitude, while the focus of this dissertation is on the state of the 
attitude formed, regardless of its valence. Another apparent resemblance is that, similar 
to cognitive closure, attitude strength used in the ELM pertains to an attitude’s durability 
and impactfulness (Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kruglanski, 
Webster, & Klem). Yet, whereas attitude strength is considered a characteristic that can 
only be deduced from an attitude’s durability and impactfulness, cognitive closure is 
considered a distinct psychological construct that consists of a subjective experience 
with important consequences for attitude durability and impactfulness. Furthermore, 
both ELM and the present research adhere to the notion that the level of cognitive 
closure or the degree of strength that people reach in their attitude is in part determined 
by their ability to do so. Importantly, within the ELM, this ability is an objective ability to 
scrutinize relevant arguments that is determined by the individual’s cognitive capacity 
and relevant knowledge available (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In the ELM framework, a 
high ability allows for processing relevant arguments via the central processing route, 
which involves critical evaluation of such information. Such high effort elaboration 
on arguments will then lead to a relatively strong, well-informed attitude. By contrast, 
the ability to achieve closure is a subjective ability based on people’s perceptions of 
their capacity to come to a definite conclusion and take a stance (cf. Kossowska & Bar-
Tal, 2013). Moreover, unlike in the ELM, the route from this ability to the formation 
of a solid attitude (i.e., the achievement of cognitive closure) does not necessarily 
involve high-level, critical evaluation of information (Kossowska et al., 2014). Most 
importantly, the present research thus that people’s ability to form a solid attitude (i.e., a 
strong attitude or cognitive closure) can be based on subjective experiences, instead of 
objective competencies. This idea is in line with recent research that has highlighted the 
importance of perception and subjective experience for people’s cognitive capabilities 
(e.g., Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, & Alexander, 2010).
Practical Implications
The view of the general public on a complex technology is of great interest to those 
involved in the implementation of many such technologies. However, the public opinion 
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and the way it unfolds can also often be a puzzling phenomenon to these stakeholders. 
For instance, people may take a strong stance while knowing very little about a complex 
technology in question. On the other hand, people can remain undecided in situations 
where a lot of information is available and experts or stakeholders believe that there 
are really very few reasons to cast doubt on the implementation of a technology. The 
findings from this thesis elucidate additional moderating factors that might play a role 
here, and hence help to understand these paradoxical observations. For instance, when 
people receive information from a non-expert source containing a an unambiguous 
(consensual) message, this may cause them to feel quite comfortable deciding on 
their point of view, even when they have little knowledge of the topic in question. 
Conversely, when people somehow consider a technology to be risky, they are less likely 
to be decided on their point of view on the implementation of the technology. In fact, 
feelings of uncertainty and the negative emotions may dominate their responses, making 
them less inclined to take a stance, even if relevant information from expert sources is 
available to them. Situations similar as the ones I examined in this dissertation are quite 
likely to occur in real life, for instance, when lay people overestimate risks or their notion 
of risk is not in line with the views of experts on the topic (cf. Johnson & Tversky, 1983; 
Savadori et al., 2004).
The findings presented in this dissertation do not only add to our understanding 
of public opinion formation on complex technologies. In addition, the experimental 
procedures followed to examine the achievement of cognitive closure about a complex 
technology may be informative to stakeholders and policy makers who communicate 
about (the implementation of) such a technology. Specifically, they demonstrate concrete 
communication strategies that can help create circumstances under which people will 
feel most able to achieve the cognitive closure that is needed for declared opinions to be 
predictive of their actual positions. A first conclusion is that people tend to rely more 
on a source with higher perceived expertise when trying to form a closed attitude on 
complex topic on which they themselves are no experts. The identity of an information 
source is one element of communication on which people base their impression 
of source expertise. It would hence be advisable to make salient the identity of the 
source when providing information from experts to the public. For those who provide 
information on complex topics for the public interest, it is furthermore important to be 
aware of the impact that the content of the message can have on perceptions of source 
expertise. Since agreement among members of an information source is regarded a 
sign of high expertise, it would make sense to communicate about this consensus when 
possible. In situations where such agreement is not or cannot be reached, it appears to 




source’s members. That is, the results from Chapter 4 seem to suggest that the negative 
effects of communicating a lack of consensus on people’s perceptions of source expertise 
and their ability to achieve closure are likely to be less pronounced when people are 
made aware of the expert identity of the source. 
Moreover, in order to help people determine their point of view, it appears to be 
important to tailor communications on complex technologies to specific concerns that 
the general public is likely to have. The findings from Chapter 2 show that particular 
types of concerns are likely to stand in the way of the achievement of closure, namely 
perceiving a technology as risky in terms of potential catastrophic consequences and 
unfamiliarity of the risks, and experiencing uncertainty about the general consequences 
of implementing the complex technology in question. Leaving these concerns 
unaddressed and unsettled will most likely reduce the usefulness of communication on 
a complex technology for making up one’s mind. Therefore, if the state of affairs allows 
for it, presenting the technology as having low risk and providing undisputed (i.e., 
certain) information on the technology’s consequences should increase the chance that 
people establish their point of view. In sum, the results of the present research clarify 
that those who communicate about complex technologies should not only attend to 
factors that influence what people think of a technology. In addition, whilst designing 
such communications one should also consider the effects that information provided has 
on the likelihood that people feel confident and competent in making up their minds—
regardless of what they decide. 
Limitations and Future Directions
The achievement of cognitive closure is generally seen as consisting of a “seizing” 
component, where the formation of an attitude is closed off, and a “freezing” component, 
where the attitude that is acquired is stabilized and held on to (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996). Both the self-report measure and the behavioral measure of cognitive closure 
achieved that were employed for the research in this thesis predominantly addressed the 
“seizing” component of achieving closure. Although a number of items of the self-report 
measure did address the freezing, or crystallization, of people’s attitudes, the current 
studies did not directly address the distinction between these two components, nor did 
they assess whether people actually held on to their acquired attitudes over time. As 
such, the present results do not provide direct evidence that the effects found on the 
achievement of closure also extend to the crystallization of attitudes. Notwithstanding 
this limitation of the present research, it is important to note that there is a strong 
(theoretical) positive link between the seizing and the freezing components of achieving 
closure (cf. Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). Hence, there is good 
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reason to believe that people who initially achieved higher levels of closure as indicated 
by the present measures were also more likely to hold on to their attitudes. Further, the 
present work does offer some evidence suggesting that people are actually less likely to 
be interested in and consider additional information that becomes available to them, 
once they have achieved closure. Arguably, this could be interpreted as an indication that 
they are in the process of “freezing” the attitude they have formed. Nevertheless, future 
research might more explicitly distinguish between these two components of achieving 
cognitive closure.
The results from this dissertation on the self-report measure of cognitive closure 
show that participants often only managed to achieve a moderate level of cognitive 
closure on the topic under consideration (CCS), that is; somewhat under or just above 
the midpoint of the scale. The finding that most participants did not reach high levels of 
cognitive closure on the very complex and relatively novel technology of CCS should not 
come as a complete surprise. After all, not only is CCS a topic difficult to comprehend, 
participants also received only basic information on the topic, making attitude formation 
about the technology even more challenging. Moreover, participants formed a point of 
view on CCS because they were asked to do so, rather than personally motivated by, for 
instance, personal interest in the topic. It is important to note that although participants 
generally only managed to reach an intermediate level of closure at most, this still 
had important consequences for the degree to which they were open to additional 
opinionative information and for the likelihood that they would commit to their attitude 
and take a stance in a poll. The fact that even this modest range of cognitive closure 
achieved had significant consequences suggests that the conclusions drawn in this 
dissertation might actually be understated with regard to the implications of achieving 
cognitive closure. That is, when people do achieve high levels of cognitive closure, this 
may make them even more inclined to commit to their attitude and potentially leave 
them completely closed off to additional opinionative input. Such a situation might arise 
when people have both a high ability to achieve closure and a high need (i.e., motivation) 
for closure. This emphasizes the importance of additional investigations of the 
interaction between the ability to achieve closure and the need for closure (cf. Kossowska 
& Bar-Tal, 2013).
The fact that the research in this dissertation has been carried out with samples 
primarily consisting of Dutch undergraduate students might raise questions regarding 
the broader generalizability of these findings. On the one hand, university students, such 
as the participants in the present studies, may be more used to dealing with complex 
and nuanced information and topics. As a result, they may generally be more confident 




hand, however, one may also argue that the homogeneity of the participant samples that 
were used is likely to suppress the variance observed, and hence offers a conservative 
test of the relations examined. Thus, there is no a priori reason to argue for or against 
the broader applicability of the observed results for other samples or populations. 
Future research is hence required to establish more specifically whether and how the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the effects observed in this thesis might be limited 
by the specific characteristics of our current study samples. 
The studies in this dissertation aim to examine how people form their attitude 
about complex, novel technologies. In all cases, the technology under consideration 
was related to carbon capture and storage (CCS). Nevertheless, there is no reason to 
assume that the observations made are limited to this specific technology. Indeed, in 
principle, similar effects should be likely to occur in the context of other technologies or 
topics with similar levels of complexity that give rise to risk-related concerns, questions 
about the outcome of the situation, or of which people have limited knowledge and 
understanding. Contemporary examples of such issues are future applications of 
nanotechnology—a field that is currently still in development—or large scale public 
policy changes, such as the reform of a national health care insurance system (e.g., 
“Obamacare”). Arguably, similar issues relating to risk perceptions, uncertainty-related 
emotions, the perceived (in-)ability to form a definite opinion, and concerns about the 
expertise of different information sources are likely to play a role here, and should be 
taken into account when communicating about these issues with the aim of enabling the 
general public to form their opinion.
Because this research was the first to address the ability to achieve closure as a 
construct of central theoretical and practical relevance, I focused on demonstrating 
the nature of this construct, and set out to identify aspects of public communications 
that might relate to this ability. Now that different factors that play a role in this context 
have been uncovered and their separate and independent effects have been established, 
future research may further look into the ways they might interact with each other. 
That is, when combining the factors that were examined in different chapters of this 
thesis, it may be possible to uncover moderating effects or boundary conditions of 
effects established here. For instance, a question of interest might be whether the 
positive effect of perceived source expertise on the ability to achieve closure is still 
observed when people believe the technology in question to be very risky or feel very 
concerned and fearful about its implementation. Moreover, on the one hand, research 
in this dissertation suggests that when lack of familiarity is one of the main aspects of 
perceived risks, information revealing that the risks associated with the technology 
are in fact common and familiar should facilitate the ability to achieve closure. On the 
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other hand, however, the effectiveness of such information is likely to depend on the 
identity of the source providing such information. That is, information that helps people 
understand that the risks involved in the complex technology are actually quite limited, 
is more likely to contribute to their ability to achieve closure when it originates from 
knowledgeable stakeholders. Nevertheless, since information communicating low risk 
can be seen as being in the interest of stakeholders aiming to implement the technology, 
people may believe this information to be persuasive in nature. Hence, even if they do 
not question the relevant expertise of the source, the nature of the information provided 
may cause them to call into question its trustworthiness or motives. Previous research 
has shown that lack of such integrity-based trust may lead to psychological reactance 
(De Vries, 2014; Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2009). In sum, now that it has 
been established how important such communication aspects can be, it is relevant to 
further address their more complex and interactive effects in future research, to assess 
how these affect people’s ability to achieve closure. 
Conclusion
The research presented in this dissertation demonstrates that those who aim 
to predict public support for a complex, novel technology cannot simply rely on 
standard opinion polls. In addition it is relevant to assess people’s ability to achieve 
cognitive closure, as a way to anticipate whether such stated opinions will actually be 
predictive of future behavior. The extent to which people feel able to form an attitude 
about a complex technology affects the level of cognitive closure they actually achieve. 
This ability to achieve cognitive closure depends on the perceived risks and negative 
emotions associated with the technology, on characteristics of the information source 
that communicates about the technology, and on the message that is communicated 
by this source. Despite individual differences in people’s need to achieve closure (that 
have been examined in prior research), the ability to achieve closure can be induced 
by external circumstances. The ability to achieve closure is also independent of the 
valence of people’s attitude as being for or against the technology in question. It predicts 
the likelihood that people actually take a stance on the issue under consideration, 
and indirectly impacts on their willingness to receive and consider additional 
information that becomes available. As such, these results provide novel insight into the 
mechanisms underlying the achievement of cognitive closure, as well as aspects of public 




Preceding note on Chapters 2–4
The individual chapters that follow are each written with the intent to submit for 
publication as separate journal articles. They can therefore be read separately and in 
any order. This also implies that readers will notice some overlap between the different 
chapters. The studies reported in the empirical chapters were carried out in the context 
of a joint research project, and these texts have been prepared in close collaboration with 
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Chapter 2
How Risk Perception 
and Negative Emotions Relate to 
the Achievement of Cognitive Closure 
on Complex Technologies
This chapter is based on Koot, C., Ter Mors, E., & Ellemers, N. (2014). 
How risk perception and negative emotions relate to the achievement of cognitive closure on 




Complex technological innovations form a central part of today’s society and 
new innovations are presented to the world almost on a daily basis. Think for example 
of technologies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, such as carbon capture and storage 
(CCS), or recent developments regarding the production of synthetic (in vitro) meat. 
Implementation of such technologies generally cannot succeed without acceptance 
or support by the public (e.g., Dütschke, 2011; Markusson et al., 2011; Read et al., 
2013; Terwel et al., 2012). Anticipating this, those involved in the implementation of a 
complex technology commonly attempt to gain insight into people’s points of view by 
means of, for instance, opinion polls or interviews. People are generally quite willing to 
declare their “attitude” towards the utilization of a complex technology, also when their 
knowledge of the topic is low—or even non-existent—and the formation of their attitude 
has not yet been completed (De Best-Waldhober et al., 2009; also see Bishop et al., 1980; 
Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005). However, such pseudo-attitudes, or open attitudes, 
are very unstable and therefore not a proper reflection of whether people will support 
or oppose the technology in question (e.g., De Best-Waldhober et al., 2009). Closed 
attitudes—attitudes about which people have achieved a state of cognitive closure—are 
on the other hand known to be more stable and more predictive of actual behavior than 
open attitudes (cf. Bassili, 1996; Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986b). Closed attitudes are hence more useful for predicting support for 
versus opposition to the issue at stake. Thus, to understand public opinion regarding the 
implementation of complex or novel technologies, and the unfolding thereof, it is of high 
interest to know which factors relate to the achievement of cognitive closure. 
When people are prompted to think about the implementation of a complex 
technology, for instance by information they receive from the technology’s stakeholders 
or when talking to others about the topic, various thoughts and feelings may arise (e.g., 
Pidgeon et al., 2011). People may find themselves wondering about the effects that 
the technology will have on their lives, or be upset about the amount of money that 
a government is willing to invest in a new technology. Such reactions to the potential 
implementation of a complex technology may in turn affect the extent to which people 
manage to form a definite, closed attitude on the topic—irrespective of whether they 
feel inclined to accept or object to the proposed technology. In the present research, we 
will specifically assess risk perceptions and negative emotional reactions—thoughts and 
feelings that people commonly experience in reaction to the potential implementation 
of a complex technology—to examine how these reactions are related to the achievement 
of cognitive closure on the topic. We will focus on the complex technology of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS); a climate change mitigation technology that is considered 
important for stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (IPCC, 
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2007). The technology involves the capture of CO2 produced in power plants or other 
industrial sources, transportation of the CO2 to underground storage sites (e.g., depleted 
oil and gas fields) and long-term storage in these sites. As is the case with other complex 
(energy-related) technologies, the public’s opinion can be a decisive factor for the 
successful implementation of CCS (e.g., Markusson et al., 2011; Terwel et al., 2012).
Risk Perception 
When informing the public about the plan to implement a novel, complex 
technology, such as nanotechnology or CCS, stakeholders and proponents of the 
technology will generally highlight the benefits and utility of the proposed innovation. 
Concerns of the general public, on the other hand, tend to focus more on the risks that 
are potentially involved with the technology (e.g., Sharp et al., 2009). At the same time, 
people often have difficulty accurately grasping concepts of risk and chance. That is, they 
do not fully understand the implications of a change in probability and are likely to over- 
or underestimate risks (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 
2004). In addition to being difficult to comprehend, the notion of risk entails a level of 
uncertainty. When people experience uncertainty about a decision, they are more likely 
to “opt out” and avoid making up their minds all together (Dhar & Simonson, 2003). 
As such, perceiving risks may only further complicate and obstruct the formation of 
a closed attitude regarding an issue that in itself is already intricate and challenging to 
begin with. We hence anticipate that perceiving a complex technology as risky will lower 
the chance that people form a closed, definite attitude—in other words, that they achieve 
cognitive closure—about the technology.
Anticipating that people have skewed or inflated views of a technology’s risks, 
stakeholders tend to provide correct information about the technology’s risks and safety 
to the public. By making such efforts to redress inflated risk perceptions they may 
facilitate the formation of (closed) attitudes on the technology. Perceived risks, however, 
can pertain to a wide of issues or concerns, which implies that people may consider 
many different aspects of a complex technology when trying to determine its overall risk 
(Fischhoff et al., 1978; Savadori et al., 2004; Singleton et al., 2009; Slovic, 1987, 1992). 
They may, for instance, be preoccupied with the physical harm (i.e., health risks) that a 
technology could induce. Alternatively, people may doubt the extent to which experts 
and stakeholders have actually assessed and taken into account risks that are relevant to 
the general public (e.g., loss of property value) instead of focusing on risks associated 
with the business case alone (e.g., return on industrial investment). Prior work has 
attempted to disentangle different aspects of lay risk perception from a psychometric 




between different dimensions of risk perception (e.g., Fischhoff et al., 1978; Savadori et 
al., 2004). However, this prior work has not compared aspects of risk perception in terms 
of their relevance for the achievement of cognitive closure. Our current aim therefore is 
to establish whether and how specific dimensions of risk perception relate to the level of 
cognitive closure that people achieve in their attitudes. Going beyond the assessment of 
overall risk perceptions allows us to shed more light on which risk-related concerns are 
particularly relevant in this context, and thus should be addressed in communications 
about a complex technology in order to facilitate the achievement of cognitive closure. 
In the present research, in addition to assessing overall risk perception, we will therefore 
also examine specific risks perceived in relation to CCS. Our main aim in doing this is 
to examine which dimensions of risk perception can be discerned in this context, and 
to investigate whether these help understand the level of cognitive closure that people 
achieve about CCS. 
Prior research has revealed that a distinction can generally be made between two 
dimensions of risk perception. These represent the extent to which the risks seem novel 
and unknown on the one hand (i.e., lack of familiarity), and the extent to which their 
consequences are considered catastrophic and dreadful (i.e., catastrophic potential) on 
the other hand (Fife-Schaw & Rowe, 1996; Fischhoff et al, 1978; Slovic, 1987; Tokushige, 
Akimoto, & Tomoda, 2007a). We anticipate these two main aspects of risk perception 
to emerge in the present research as well. Additionally, some studies on the perceived 
risks of distinct technologies have revealed further dimensions, which represent, for 
instance, the degree to which people believe they will be personally exposed to the 
risks or the usefulness of the proposed innovation (e.g., Savadori et al., 2004; Sparks & 
Shepherd, 1994). Because we aim to examine risk perceptions specifically relating to the 
introduction of CCS (rather than assessing more general notions of risk associated with 
technological developments in society), we anticipate that in addition to the two primary 
dimensions of risk perception (lack of familiarity and catastrophic potential) we may 
also find additional relevant concerns associated with people’s risk perception of CCS.
It seems likely that people are hesitant to close off their attitude formation 
when they believe that many of the risks involved with a complex technology are yet 
unfamiliar to them or to stakeholders involved with the technology. Perceptions of 
high risk in terms of a lack of familiarity with these risks may thus form a hindrance 
to the achievement of cognitive closure. On the other hand, risk perception in terms of 
the catastrophic potential that people attribute to a complex technology may also form 
a significant impediment to the achievement of cognitive closure. While the level of 
catastrophic damage that a technology may cause hits close to home, the chance of such 
damage occurring is generally speaking very low. Trying to anticipate the implications of 
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a very small likelihood of occurrence in combination with severe consequences should 
be very difficult for the average person, and may therefore result in inertia regarding the 
achievement of cognitive closure, that is; hamper the formation of a closed attitude.
Negative Emotional Reactions 
The prospect of a new and complex technology being implemented does not 
only bring to mind various risk-related concerns; it is also likely to evoke a range of 
negative emotional reactions (e.g., Cass & Walker, 2009; Huijts et al., 2007; Lee et al., 
2005). Different emotions may, for instance, arise because people have moral objections 
to a technology (e.g., anger or outrage about “tampering with nature”), because they 
perceive the political decision making procedures surrounding the implementation 
of the technology to be unfair (e.g., frustration; cf. Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000), or 
because they are unsure of the impact that a technology may have on their daily lives 
(e.g., worry). 
Previous research has demonstrated that emotion states can directly impact on 
people’s judgment and decision making in various ways (e.g., Lerner & Keltner 2000, 
2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001). For example, trait anxiety has been negatively associated 
with decisiveness (Kimes & Troth, 1974), and research by Lerner and Keltner (2000, 
2001) has revealed that distinct emotions can steer people’s judgments of new situations 
or events. This suggests that the experience of certain emotions may also influence the 
extent to which people manage to achieve cognitive closure about the topic of concern. 
In the present research, we therefore aim to distinguish between different types of 
negative emotions that people can experience when they are invited to think about the 
implementation of CCS. Subsequently, we will investigate whether and how separate 
(clusters of) emotions are associated with the extent to which people form a closed 
attitude regarding the implementation of this technology.
The concern that public opposition can be a significant obstacle to the 
implementation of complex technologies has prompted prior research on emotions in 
this context to focus on how affective responses predict people’s (negative) attitudes 
towards novel technologies. As a result, much attention has been paid to emotions 
that are most salient and directly visible in the context of public opposition or protest 
to a technology (such as anger or disappointment; e.g., Cass & Walker, 2009; Jasper, 
1998). Other relevant emotions, such as concern or tension, tend to be more private 
in the sense that these are less likely to result in overt, behavioral expressions. As a 
consequence, the significance of such emotions for attitude formation about complex 
technologies like CCS may be easily overlooked by both researchers and stakeholders. 




achievement of cognitive closure. 
Indications of which emotions are likely to be of influence on the level of closure 
that people achieve can be found in the appraisal model of emotions. This model posits 
that there is no fixed connection between specific events and specific emotions raised. 
Instead, the emotions that people experience are thought to be determined by their 
interpretation, or appraisal, of the circumstances that elicit emotions (Moors et al., 2013; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For example, depending on whom we hold responsible for 
breaking a window (ourselves or another person), we may either feel guilty (ourselves) 
or angry (another person). Likewise, the same prospect or event can give rise to 
different emotions depending on whether we appraise the outcomes of the situation at 
hand as being either certain or uncertain. Thus, people may be angry about something 
that will certainly happen, such as the construction of a power plant or CO2 storage 
site near their home. However, to the extent that the outcome of a particular event is 
regarded uncertain, the primary emotion raised may be tension—instead of anger. Such 
a situation is likely to occur when people do not know the extent to which a proposed 
course of action may be disadvantageous to them, for example in terms of health hazards 
due to the introduction of nuclear energy.
The appraisal model of emotions additionally accounts for the possibility of a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between emotions experienced and further situational 
appraisals. Research by Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) revealed that distinct emotions 
evoke the tendency to see new situations or events in line with the appraisal pattern of 
that particular emotion; an appraisal tendency. Thus, to the extent that people evaluate 
the implementation of complex technology as having uncertain outcomes, they will 
experience emotions reflecting this uncertainty appraisal (e.g., fear or concern), and, 
as a consequence, their approach to the new situation is likely to be characterized by 
uncertainty as well. If the task at hand is to form an attitude about a novel technology, 
the experience of uncertainty is hence likely to prevent people from confidently deciding 
on a particular point of view (cf. Dhar & Simonson, 2003). In sum, based on the 
appraisal model of emotions and prior research we anticipate the experience of emotions 
that are relating to or indicative of uncertainty appraisals to be particularly likely to 
reduce the level of cognitive closure that people achieve. 
Communication About CCS: the Use of Analogies
Examining the relation between risk perception, negative emotions, and the 
achievement of cognitive closure may provide insights that can be used to design 
communication about CCS and other complex technologies. Specifically, such 
communications may be tailored to affect people’s risk perception and emotions to the 
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extent that they are enabled to achieve closure on the topic. A common way to provide 
information about unknown or novel technologies is to point out how these resemble 
more familiar and existing technologies; providing people with an analogy. This strategy 
is also used by stakeholders involved in the introduction of complex technologies. 
In theory, the provision of an analogy may be an effective way to guide people’s risk 
perception and emotional reactions. Pointing out how the complex, relatively unfamiliar 
technology resembles a technology or phenomenon that is already known might reduce 
the perceived catastrophic potential or lack of familiarity and could curb uncertainty 
and tension arising from the novel technology. As a result, explicit references to more 
familiar analogues when communicating about complex technologies could facilitate the 
formation of a closed attitude about the novel technology. Indeed, research by Tokushige, 
Akimoto, and Tomoda (2007b) and Itaoka and colleagues (2012) suggests that the 
use of a (natural) analogue of CCS may impact people’s risk perception and attitudes 
towards the technology. Importantly, however, it is as yet unknown what this implies for 
our current research question, that is, whether the use of analogies may also affect the 
achievement of cognitive closure. Thus, in addition to examining the relation between 
risk perception, negative emotions, and the achievement of cognitive closure, the present 
research also explores the possibility that the provision of an analogy affects the level of 
cognitive closure that people achieve. 
Study 2
The primary goal of present research was to examine the correlates of cognitive 
closure. That is, we assessed whether the risks that people perceive and the negative 
emotions they experience when they are prompted to think about a complex 
technology—in this case carbon capture and storage (CCS)—lower the likelihood that 
they form a closed, definite attitude about the technology. Additionally, we explored 
whether risk perception, negative emotions, and level of cognitive closure achieved 
depend on the specific CCS component that is addressed (i.e., CO2 transport or 
CO2 storage), or on the way in which it is introduced (with or without drawing an 
analogy). The data for this research were collected in two waves with virtually identical 
research designs and measures. In the first wave (N = 97) we counterbalanced whether 
participants were prompted to think about CO2 transport or about CO2 storage, and 
we systematically varied whether or not a comparison with an analogous technology 
(natural gas transport and natural gas storage, respectively) was drawn. The second 
wave of data collection (N = 122) only addressed CO2 storage and systematically varied 




was drawn. After learning about CO2 transport or CO2 storage (and in the analogy 
conditions after being informed about an analogous technology), participants completed 
a questionnaire containing the dependent variables. The wording of items in the 
questionnaire was adapted to refer to the specific CCS-component under consideration 
(CO2 transport or CO2 storage), but was otherwise identical. Results of both data 
collection waves revealed no systematic effects of analogy use or CCS-component on the 
dependent variables1. Therefore, we decided to aggregate the data collected in these two 
waves for the analysis of the relations between risk perception, negative emotions, and 
level of cognitive closure achieved, which was the main focus of the present research, as 
this larger sample size increased statistical power of the analyses presented. 
Participants
Two hundred nineteen students (57 men and 162 women; Mage = 20.14, SD = 2.82) 
participated in the study (when the two waves of data collection were combined) and 
received a monetary reward or course credit in return. 
Procedure
Both data collection waves were administered as the first study in a set of unrelated 
studies. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to individual cubicles, 
each containing a PC on which the experiment would be conducted. They learned that 
the study concerned a method of reducing CO2 emissions in the atmosphere; carbon 
capture and storage technology (CCS). Participants then read a brief introductory text 
on CCS—largely based on the text previously used by Ter Mors, Weenig, Ellemers, and 
Daamen (2010)—which discussed the relation between CO2 emissions and climate 
change, and contained a description of the three main components of CCS: CO2 capture, 
transport, and storage. Next, participants read that across the entire country inhabitants 
of the Netherlands might have to deal with CCS, as CO2 can be transported via pipelines/
stored underground (the content of the text depended on the CCS-component that 
was addressed) in many locations in the country. Therefore—so it was explained to 
participants—the current study examined people’s views on the implementation and 
safety of CO2 transport via pipelines/CO2 storage in depleted natural gas fields. Next, a text 
followed which contained additional information about the CCS-component in question 
(either CO2 transport or CO2 storage). At this point, some participants also received 
information drawing the comparison with an analogous technology of CO2 transport/
CO2 storage (natural gas transport/natural gas storage, respectively). After reading these 
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CO2 storage in depleted natural gas fields by indicating to what extent they thought the 
implementation of the technology in the Netherlands to be a good idea (1 = a very bad 
idea, 7 = a very good idea). Participants next completed the measures of overall risk 
perception, cognitive closure achieved, negative emotions, and specific risk perceptions. 
Finally, we also included a standard questionnaire assessing individual differences in 
need for closure as a control measure. At the end of the series of studies in which the 
participants took part they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Measures
Overall risk perception 
Participants’ general inclination to perceive the technology under consideration 
(either CO2 transport via pipelines or CO2 storage in depleted natural gas fields) as risky 
or safe was measured with two items. Participants indicated on a 7-point scale to what 
extent they thought the respective CCS-component was safe (1 = very unsafe, 7 = very 
safe, reverse-coded) and to what extent they thought it was risky (1 = not at all risky,  
7 = very risky). An overall risk perception scale was calculated by averaging participants’ 
responses to these two items (α = .81), so that higher scores indicate higher levels of 
overall perceived risk of the respective CCS-component.
Cognitive closure achieved 
We measured the level of cognitive closure that participants achieved in their 
attitude on the respective CCS-component by means of a 13-item questionnaire. These 
items were largely extrapolated from previously existing scales that asses psychological 
factors and processes leading up to a relatively definite decision or judgment; the original 
decisiveness subscale of the original Need For Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994) and the Ability to Achieve Cognitive Structure scale (Bar-Tal, 1994). Participants 
were thus asked to indicate their agreement with 13 statements such as “I am certain of 
my opinion on the implementation of CO2 transport/CO2 storage in the Netherlands”, 
“I feel undecided about my opinion on the implementation of CO2 transport/CO2 
storage in the Netherlands” (reverse-coded), and “My opinion on the implementation 
of CO2 transport/CO2 storage in the Netherlands is fixed” (ranging from 1 = completely 
disagree, to 7 = completely agree). A cognitive closure scale was calculated by averaging 
participants’ responses to the items (α = .88) on which higher scores indicate higher 
levels of cognitive closure achieved. 
Negative emotions
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they experienced specific 




pipelines/CO2 storage in depleted natural gas fields in the Netherlands”, on a scale from 
1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much). The list presented to participants 
contained emotions that are “traditionally” examined in the context of complex 
technologies, such as anger, as well as emotions that are less frequently assessed and 
relate to uncertainty, such as discomfort. In total, the list contained the following 
ten items: concern, disappointment, sadness, discomfort, tension, fear, anger, rage, 
hopelessness, and disgust.2 
Specific risk perceptions
Participants’ specific risk perceptions associated with the proposed technology 
(CCS) were assessed by means of 16 items (7-point Likert scales). Similar to previous 
research on the psychometric properties of lay risk perception, these items addressed 
catastrophic potential of and lack of familiarity with the technology’s risks (e.g., Savadori 
et al., 2004; Tokushige et al., 2007b), and also tapped into, among other things, perceived 
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Prior research on cognitive closure has shown that individuals with a higher 
need for closure may also achieve higher levels of cognitive closure (e.g., Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). To rule out the possibility that relations between risk perception, 
negative emotions, and cognitive closure achieved might be accounted for by individual 
differences in participants’ need for closure, this factor was measured as control variable. 




item need for closure scale developed by Roets and Van Hiel (2011) (α = .82). Higher 
scores on the 7-point scale indicate that the individual in question overall has a higher 




Dimensions of risk perception
We set out to examine whether we might distinguish between different dimensions 
of risk perception. To this end, we performed a principal component analysis with 
varimax rotation on participants’ responses to the 16 specific risk perception items. An 
initial analysis revealed a five-factor structure in which the first three factors, comprising 
12 out of 16 items, were clearly interpretable and statistically consistent. The remaining 
four items (items no. 1, 4, 8, and 9 in Table 2.1) did not clearly relate to any of these three 
main factors, nor did they form reliable additional factors. We therefore excluded these 
items from our final analysis. 
A principal component analysis with varimax rotation on the 12 risk perception 
items that were retained yielded three factors together explaining 54.1% of the variance 
in the individual items. To reflect the content of the items included in each of these 
factors we interpreted the three factors as the following dimensions of risk perception: 1. 
catastrophic potential, 2. lack of control, and 3. lack of familiarity. Catastrophic potential 
represents participants’ concerns regarding the catastrophic implications that the risks 
involved with CCS may have in terms of the extremity and magnitude of anticipated 
consequences. Lack of control captures the extent to which people suspect that risks 
involved with CCS cannot be observed, reduced, or controlled. Lack of familiarity 
indicates the extent to which people believe the risks of CCS to be novel as well as their 
personal lack of familiarity with these risks. For each dimension a composite score was 
computed by averaging participants’ ratings on the highest loading items, as indicated 
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Table 2.2. 
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We also examined whether we might distinguish between different clusters 
of negative emotional reactions to the (potential) implementation of CCS in the 
Netherlands. A principal component analysis on the 10 negative emotion items revealed 
a two-factor solution explaining 68.1% of the variance in the individual items. The factor 
loadings of the specific emotions after varimax rotation are presented in Table 2.3. This 
two-factor division of negative emotions matches a theoretical distinction proposed by 
the appraisal model of emotions (see also Moors et al., 2013). That is, the first cluster 
(Factor 1) represents (negative) emotions in response to certain outcomes (e.g., anger), 
whereas the negative emotions items with high loadings on the second cluster (Factor 
2) all relate to outcome uncertainty (e.g., fear). Henceforth we will refer to the two 
negative emotion clusters as representing: 1. outcome certainty-related emotions (rage, 
anger, sadness, disappointment, disgust, and hopelessness3), and 2. outcome uncertainty-
related emotions (fear, concern, tension, and discomfort). For each cluster, a composite 







indicated in Table 2.3, so that higher scores indicate higher (negative) emotion intensity 
(for mean scores, see Table 2.4).
Table 2.3 
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Attitude Valence
The present research did not focus on the valence of participants’ viewpoints on 
the complex technology in question (CCS). However, attitude valence has been the 
focus of many previous studies in the context of complex technologies. We therefore 
conducted a stepwise multiple regression analysis to check whether and how any of the 
risk perception dimensions and negative emotion clusters might relate to participants’ 
(positive or negative) attitudes towards the implementation of CCS. As might have 
been anticipated, this analysis revealed that participants were more likely to report a 
negative attitude towards the implementation of CCS to the extent that they reported 
more negative outcome certainty related emotions (β = −.34, t = −5.14, p < .001), and 
perceived CCS to have more catastrophic potential (β = −.18, t = −2.75, p = .006). 
Participants’ attitudes towards CCS were, however, not significantly predicted by the risk 
perception dimensions lack of control and lack of familiarity, or by negative outcome 
uncertainty-related emotions. 
Furthermore, we checked whether the measure of cognitive closure achieved was 
related to the measure of attitude valence by computing the correlation between the 
measures. Pearson correlation revealed that there was no significant relation between 




closure achieved gauged a component of people’s attitudes that is different from attitude 
valence.
Relations with Cognitive Closure Achieved 
Correlations
We first computed bivariate Pearson correlations for an initial examination of 
the relations between overall risk perception, the three risk perception dimensions 
(catastrophic potential, lack of control, and lack of familiarity), the two negative 
emotion clusters (outcome certainty-related emotions and outcome uncertainty-related 
emotions), and participants’ level of cognitive closure achieved on the implementation 
of CCS (see Table 2.4). Participants’ overall risk perception concerning CCS correlated 
moderately and negatively with cognitive closure achieved, indicating that the more 
participants perceived CCS as a risky technology overall, the less they achieved cognitive 
closure on the topic. The correlations between the specific risk perception dimensions 
and cognitive closure achieved revealed similar relations; all three dimensions were 
negatively, albeit not equally strongly, related to the achievement of cognitive closure. 
The experience of outcome certainty-related emotions and outcome uncertainty-related 
emotions also correlated negatively with the formation of a closed attitude; this relation 
was somewhat stronger for outcome uncertainty-related emotions.
Multiple regression analysis
A number of the specific dimensions of risk perception and clusters of negative 
emotions revealed significant intercorrelations. This makes it difficult to infer the 
separate and unique relations between each risk perception dimension and each cluster 
of negative emotions on the one hand, and the achievement of cognitive closure on 
the other from these statistics. We therefore conducted a stepwise multiple regression 
analysis to examine more specifically how each risk perception dimension and each 
negative emotion cluster relates to the level of cognitive closure that participants 
achieved on the implementation of CCS. In this analysis the three risk perception 
dimensions (catastrophic potential, lack of control, and lack of familiarity) and the 
two negative emotion clusters (outcome certainty-related and outcome uncertainty-
related emotions) served as predictor variables and cognitive closure achieved served as 
dependent variable. The final model explained 32.2% of the variance (F[3, 215] = 34.19, 
p < .001), and contained three significant predictors of cognitive closure achieved. Level 
of cognitive closure achieved was most clearly predicted by catastrophic potential  
(β = −.26, t = −3.74, p < .001); lack of familiarity followed as the second predictor  
(β = −.27, t = −4.55, p < .001), and outcome uncertainty-related emotions emerged as the 
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third and final significant predictor of cognitive closure achieved (β = −.23, t = −3.48,  
p < .001). Thus, the more participants thought that the implementation of CCS would be 
risky in terms of catastrophic potential, the more they perceived the risks involved with 
CCS to be novel and unfamiliar, and the more they experienced outcome uncertainty-
related emotions (e.g., fear and concern), the less they managed to achieve cognitive 
closure in their attitude on the technology. After inclusion of these three predictors, no 
additional variance in level of cognitive closure achieved could be explained by lack of 
control or outcome certainty-related emotions (βs ≤ .04, ts ≤ 0.64, ps ≥ .526). 
We ran an additional analysis to rule out the possibility that the effects found 
on achievement of cognitive closure could be explained by individual differences in 
participants’ need for closure. For this purpose, we conducted a stepwise multiple 
regression analysis on cognitive closure achieved with the risk perception dimensions 
and negative emotions clusters as independent variables, while controlling for differences 
among participants in their overall need for closure. Individual differences in need for 
closure did not emerge as a significant predictor (ȕ= −.07, t = −1.14, p = .256) in this 
analysis, nor did the inclusion of this additional predictor alter the outcomes of the main 
analysis in which two risk perception dimensions and one negative emotions cluster 
significantly predicted cognitive closure achieved.
Discussion
The present research assessed risk perception and negative emotional reactions 
among individuals who were prompted to think about the implementation of a complex 
technology (carbon capture and storage technology, or CCS). Both risk perception and 
negative emotions were related to the level of cognitive closure that participants achieved 
in their attitude on the implementation of the technology. By distinguishing between 
different dimensions of risk perception and different clusters of negative emotions, we 
were able to uncover which concerns and emotions are most likely to stand in the way of 
achieving cognitive closure. That is, our results revealed that the level of cognitive closure 
that participants achieved on CCS in the first place depended on the extent to which 
they considered the complex technology risky in terms of catastrophic potential and in 
the second place on the extent to which they regarded the technology’s risks as novel 
and unfamiliar. In addition, the extent to which people experienced negative emotions 
that are evoked by outcome uncertainty (e.g., fear and concern) also reliably predicted 
the level of cognitive closure that participants achieved in their attitudes on CCS. We 
furthermore discerned a third dimension of risk perception (lack of control) as well as 




of CCS (outcome certainty-related emotions). However, neither of these two factors 
predicted the achievement of cognitive closure. 
The current research additionally explored whether the use of analogies in 
communication about the complex technology of CCS, or the specific component of 
CCS that was under consideration (CO2 storage or CO2 transport) affected the level 
of risk that people perceived, the extent to which they experienced negative emotions, 
or the level of cognitive closure that they achieved. Results revealed that neither the 
analogies that we provided nor the specific CCS-components we considered impacted 
substantially on the dependent variables examined here. 
Theoretical Implications
Most of the research that has so far examined the achievement of cognitive closure 
has focused on the importance of individual differences in people’s need for closure (e.g., 
Kruglanski, 1990; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, 1997). The 
present research adds to the literature by demonstrating the existence of two previously 
unexamined antecedents of the achievement of cognitive closure, namely perceived risk 
in terms of catastrophic potential and lack of familiarity, and the experience of negative 
outcome uncertainty-related emotions. 
Importantly, we discerned different dimensions of risk perception and clusters of 
negative emotions, which allowed us to go beyond the general impact of risk perception 
or emotional responses on the achievement of cognitive closure. As such, the present 
results help to understand which specific concerns in risk perception and which negative 
emotions stand in the way of forming a closed attitude. Prior efforts to understand 
the antecedents of opposition to or public protest against the implementation of novel 
technologies have primarily addressed the origins of negative attitudes and anger about 
proposed changes. Our current attempt to understand differences in people’s ability to 
achieve cognitive closure has allowed us to uncover that uncertainty about likely risks 
and outcomes (due to novelty and possibly catastrophic outcomes) has an important 
impact on the extent to which people manage to form a closed attitude. Thus, when 
people express reluctance to accept a novel technology this does not necessarily indicate 
that a negative opinion has been formed. Instead, it may just as well reflect the fact that 
they feel so uncertain about the likely outcomes of proposed changes, and about how 
this might affect them, that they feel unable to make up their mind. This finding extends 
existing insights on attitude formation and has important practical implications. 
With respect to negative emotional reactions, it turns out that negative affect is 
particularly likely to impede the achievement of cognitive closure when the emotions 
raised cause people to approach the new situation or task—forming an attitude about 
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a complex technology—with uncertainty. The specific emotions that can incite such 
a state of mind are those which arise when people are unsure of the outcome that the 
present situation—the implementation of a complex technology—will have (e.g., fear 
and tension; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). This further validates our analysis of the 
achievement of closure on complex technologies in terms of uncertainty about likely 
outcomes. Moreover, it extends prior findings on the relevance of emotional reactions 
for attitude formation in the context of complex technologies which to this date has 
primarily focused on emotions that are associated with public resistance and protest, 
namely anger and outrage.
Thus, the more nuanced insight that the present research provides into the relations 
between risk perception, negative emotions, and achievement of cognitive closure also 
sheds light on why people may have trouble forming a closed attitude when they perceive 
high risks or experience high levels of negative emotion. The notion that people can 
differ in the extent to which they feel able to achieve closure has been recognized in 
previous literature and has been supported by recent research (Kossowska et al., 2014; 
Roets & Soetens, 2010; Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). The present data extend these prior 
observations by examining which aspects of risk perception and which specific emotions 
relate to such differences in people’s ability to achieve closure. The particular aspects of 
risk perception and type negative emotions that emerged as predictors of the formation 
of closed attitudes share a common denominator of uncertainty or insecurity. Thus, the 
present data allow us to conclude that if for some reason people experience uncertainty 
at the prospect of a complex technology being implemented, this uncertainty may carry 
over to their attitude formation and cause them to feel incapable of confidently deciding 
on their definite point of view.
In the domain of attitude formation, a lot of attention has been paid to factors 
that impact on the valence of people’s attitudes (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Pornpitakpan, 2004). In addition to valence, the state of an attitude (i.e., the level of 
cognitive closure achieved) has also been shown to be an important component of 
attitude formation, as it determines the stability or volatility of the attitude (cf. Bassili, 
1996; Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). The 
present research demonstrates that the content, or valence, of an attitude and the level of 
closure achieved on the attitude state are two independent factors. This implies that the 
mere fact that something impacts on what people think about a certain topic, does not 
necessarily mean that this point of view will also be solidified as a consequence, or vice 
versa: the extent to which people feel able to form a definite opinion in itself does not 
indicate the likelihood that they will be in favor or against the issue under consideration. 




can diverge from the factors that influence attitude valence. For instance, perceiving 
a technology as having potentially disastrous consequences will cause people to view 
the technology more negatively, but simultaneously decreases the chance that they will 
achieve cognitive closure on this (negative) point of view. When examining factors that 
impact on people’s attitude formation, it is thus important to attend to influences on 
attitude valence as well as on the achievement of cognitive closure. 
With regard to the complex technology of carbon capture and storage (CCS), 
the present research is, to our knowledge, the first to empirically distinguish between 
specific risk perceptions of CCS and relate these to the extent to which people manage to 
make up their minds about the technology (i.e., achieve cognitive closure). In line with 
various prior studies on risk perception, our results revealed two main dimensions of 
risk perception relevant for the perceived risk of CCS: a lack of familiarity of the risks 
and the catastrophic potential of the risks (e.g., Fischhoff et al., 1978). Furthermore, 
resonating with prior studies on risk perception of distinct technologies or other specific 
topics (e.g., Savadori et al., 2004; Sparks & Shepherd, 1994), the present results revealed 
an additional aspect relevant to the perceived risks of CCS. In the present research, this 
third dimension represents a perceived lack of control over the technology’s risks. This 
aspect of risk perception has also been taken into account in prior studies, but tended to 
be seen as indicating lack of familiarity (Fischhoff et al, 1978; Slovic, 1987). Our results 
revealed that lack of control can be seen as a separate dimension of risk perception, and 
in this way underline the subtle, but important, differences between people’s general 
conceptions of risk and the perceived risks of a specific technology. 
Practical Implications
The potential risks of a novel and complex technology often form a major 
public concern and can raise opposition to its implementation. Stakeholders of such 
technologies would therefore do well to gain a better understanding of people’s risk-
related concerns. The risk perceptions and negative emotions that people experience 
in response to a complex technology are often approached as indicators of negative 
attitudes or oppositional behavior to such technologies (e.g., Siegrist, 1999). At 
times, they are even regarded as irrational thoughts and feelings that are in need of 
management (cf., Cass & Walker, 2009). The present results demonstrate, however, that 
this might not be a fruitful approach. It might be more helpful to consider the possibility 
that certain aspects of risk perception and types of emotions represent potentially 
valid worries and concerns, and to be aware that these can hinder the achievement of 
cognitive closure. Hence, it is advisable for stakeholders of complex technologies to 
go beyond seeing perceived risks and negative emotions as a source of trouble among 
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the general public. That is, when risk perceptions indicate concern with catastrophic 
potential and risk familiarity, and negative emotions indicate impressions of outcome 
uncertainty, this can signal indecision about the technology in question in addition 
to predicting future resistance against it. Such reactions may therefore be regarded as 
relevant pieces of information in their own right, primarily indicating that people may 
still feel insufficiently informed about the potential consequences of proposed changes to 
be able to make up their mind. If this is the case, stakeholders would do well to further 
investigate the nature of people’s worries and concerns to be able to address these more 
effectively in public communications. 
To some extent stakeholders of the implementation of a complex technology 
(e.g., a governmental body) seem to realize that this is the case, and often do provide 
information about the technology to the public in order to help people form an opinion 
and determine their point of view. Nevertheless, it is usually less obvious what specific 
concerns people have, or whether these are actually targeted by the information 
provided. The present research indicates that it is important to first examine relevant 
impediments to people’s ability to achieve closure to be able to tailor subsequent 
communications to the specific concerns that the general public is likely to have. 
Communications that fail to do this (i.e., address people’s concerns in communication) 
can in fact evoke reactions that actually hinder the formation of a definite, closed 
attitude. Our results provide pointers for designing such effective communication 
about complex technologies. Regarding risk-related concerns, best practice would be to 
communicate about stakeholders’ awareness of the different potential risks and about 
how the risks of the technology for each of the different stakeholders involved have 
been assessed. Likewise, it would seem important to be very explicit about the specific 
nature of such risks and the potential consequences of an accident or problem with the 
technology. Furthermore, it appears advisable to inform people of established, certain 
facts as much as possible, as a way to limit the emergence of emotions associated with 
outcome uncertainty. 
At this point, we emphasize that the current research is not intended to provide 
policy makers or professional communicators with tools to manipulate or deceive 
the general public, for instance by downplaying possible risks associated with the 
introduction of such novel technologies. In fact, we think our results suggest that such an 
approach in communication about a complex technology is likely to backfire to a point 
where it raises suspicion about the extent to which relevant risks have actually been 
identified, or evokes uncertainty about additional concerns that are not communicated. 
We do propose, however, that adjustment of inflated risk perceptions via communication 




the technology in question. Arguably, enabling people to determine what they actually 
think—even if this makes them conclude they are against the proposed innovation—
is always preferable to the situation where they are expected to make up their mind 
without having the information required to be able to do so. Indeed, pressing people to 
take a stance while they feel unable to achieve cognitive closure is likely to result either 
in (unfounded) resistance, or in the expression of a pseudo-attitude that is not predictive 
of future responses. Likewise, our aim to better understand the achievement of cognitive 
closure should not be seen as implying that achieving maximum closure always is 
the most desired state. To the extent that valid and correct information is available, 
people can benefit from this information to form a clear and definite attitude. However, 
achievement of cognitive closure seems less desirable when the information available 
is insufficient, one-sided, or of low quality. Hence, while we think it is highly relevant 
to distinguish between declared opinions or positional statements that reflect high 
versus low cognitive closure (among others things because of their differential value in 
predicting future behavior), we do not suggest that the achievement of cognitive closure 
is a desired end state in its own right.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present research aimed to assess whether the risks that people perceive and 
the negative emotions they experience when they are informed of complex technology 
reduce the likelihood that they form a closed attitude about the technology. By 
discerning different dimensions of risk perception and different clusters of negative 
emotions, we were able to reveal which aspects of risk perception and negative emotions 
uniquely relate to the achievement of cognitive closure. The main goal of this research 
was to distinguish between specific dimensions of risk perception and clusters of 
emotions and to examine how these relate to the achievement of cognitive closure. We 
therefore did not attempt to directly manipulate the extent to which participants would 
experience particular thoughts or emotions. As a consequence, the setup we chose for 
this study does not allow us to draw definite conclusions about causal relations between 
risk perceptions and emotions on the one hand and the achievement of cognitive closure 
on the other. Now that we have established which factors are of interest and how these 
relate to each other, a relevant follow-up question is to examine whether and how these 
might be influenced with specific manipulations. This would be an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
From an applied perspective it might be relevant to examine whether differences 
in risk perception and emotional reactions, which consequently lead to differences 
in cognitive closure, can be induced by communication on the topic in question. The 
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present results on analogy use in communications about a complex technology remind 
us that such effects may not be easily achieved. Designing such tailored communication 
would hence require careful investigation of relevant factors and elaborate pre-testing to 
ensure its desired effects. 
We have argued above that the negative effect of outcome uncertainty-related 
emotions on the level of cognitive closure achieved can be understood from the appraisal 
model of emotions. The negative emotions that people experience when they appraise 
the current circumstances as having uncertain outcomes (e.g., tension and concern) 
evoke a tendency to see new tasks or situations (i.e., forming an attitude about a complex 
technology) in light of that same uncertainty. In parallel, one might expect outcome 
certainty-related emotions (e.g., anger) to increase the chance that people form a closed 
attitude due to similar appraisal processes. The present data, however, did not reveal such 
an effect. It is possible that this observed null effect occurred because the overall degree 
to which participants reported experiencing these outcome certainty-related emotions 
was relatively low (M = 2.06, SD = 1.12, range: 1.00 to 5.60). Thus, there were few, if any, 
participants who actually indicated experiencing the emotions that might help them to 
achieve cognitive closure. This in itself could have made it difficult to statistically detect 
such a relation, especially if we assume the effect to emerge at higher levels of emotion 
intensity. Alternatively, it is possible that outcome certainty-related emotions simply 
are less relevant for the achievement of closure. Instead, such emotions might primarily 
relate to the content or valence of people’s attitudes, rather than to their ability to achieve 
closure. In fact, our additional analysis of the relation between negative emotions and 
attitude valence suggests this might be the case. 
The current study was conducted in a controlled laboratory setting among a 
student population and in the context of one specific complex technology. This raises 
valid questions about the generalizability of the current findings. In principle, a 
homogeneous sample—as used in the present study—is well suited for the purpose of 
examining the relations between lay risk perception, emotions, and cognitive closure. In 
fact, one may argue that the homogeneity of the sample is likely to suppress the variance 
observed and hence offers a conservative test of the relations examined. Nevertheless, it 
might be interesting to examine whether these same relations are observed in a broader 
sample that is more representative of the general population. Moreover, although the 
present research focused on factors that impact the formation of closed attitudes in the 
specific context of the complex technology of CCS, we have no reason to believe that 
the present findings are limited to this technology. Indeed, based on the theoretical 
argument presented here, and supported by our present data, we would anticipate 




innovations that may raise uncertainty about risky outcomes, such as nanotechnology or 
bioengineering. 
Conclusion
The public opinion can be decisive for the successful implementation of complex 
technologies. It is therefore important to understand under what circumstances people 
are likely to form a clear point of view—to achieve cognitive closure—and which 
factors impede them from making up their mind. In the present research, we revealed 
how risk perception and the experience of negative emotions—two responses that are 
commonly evoked when people are confronted with a complex technology—can reduce 
the level of cognitive closure that people achieve on the topic. The distinction between 
different dimensions of risk perception and different clusters of negative emotions 
moreover revealed which aspects of these responses are of particular importance for the 
achievement of cognitive closure. These results thus demonstrate that risk perception 
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Chapter 3
Antecedents and Consequences 
of Achieving Cognitive Closure: 
The Ability to Achieve Closure, 
and Openness to Additional Information
This chapter is based on Koot, C., Ter Mors, E., Ellemers, N., & Daamen, D. D. L. (2014a). 
Antecedents and consequences of achieving cognitive closure: The ability to achieve closure, and 




Political affairs are affected by people’s votes in elections. Novel technologies, 
such as genetic modification of food, can often only be implemented successfully with 
acceptance from the public. In other words, “what the people think” can be a decisive 
factor for the progress of various public affairs. Politicians and businesses have hence 
taken an interest in public opinions relevant to their decision making and policies. An 
important element to consider in this regard is the extent to which public opinions 
or attitudes towards such topics are “open” or “closed”. Open, unfinished attitudes 
(cf., pseudo attitudes; Converse, 1964, 1970) are highly unstable and easily changed 
by contextual information (e.g., Strack, Schwarz, & Wänke, 1991), and they are thus 
not very predictive of public acceptance of novel policies or technologies. Closed, 
finished attitudes, on the other hand—attitudes about which people have achieved 
cognitive closure—are much more durable and thereby also better predictors of future 
attitudes and behavior (Bassili, 1996; Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). It is hence important to establish which factors facilitate 
the achievement of cognitive closure, and to expand our understanding of the precise 
consequences that follow from the achievement of closure. 
In this chapter we will extend existing knowledge on cognitive closure in two ways. 
First, we examine a novel antecedent of cognitive closure—the ability to achieve closure. 
Second, we investigate the consequences of the achievement of cognitive closure for 
people’s openness to additional attitude-relevant information. Because the achievement 
of cognitive closure is particularly relevant in the context of multi-faceted, public issues, 
we will focus on attitude formation about complex topics in this research.
The Ability to Achieve Closure
Previous research on the achievement of cognitive closure has predominantly 
addressed the role of people’s need for closure (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989, 1990; Kruglanski 
& Webster, 1991, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, 1997). This perspective emphasizes 
that people tend to differ in their desire for a definite answer (i.e., for cognitive closure) 
and that this desire affects the extent to which they draw conclusions and hold on to 
these conclusions (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). While research on the need for closure 
has provided important insights in people’s tendency to form a closed attitude, the 
desire for a definite answer or conclusion may not always be the sole or most relevant 
determinant of the level of cognitive closure that people achieve. That is, even when 
people feel the need to finalize their attitude formation and achieve cognitive closure, 
they may not feel that they are capable of doing so (cf. Kossowska & Bar-Tal, 2013; 
Roets & Soetens, 2010). Particularly when the topic in question is highly complex, 
the sense of being able to make up one’s mind may be an important antecedent of the 
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achievement of cognitive closure. In fact, this perceived ability may be as important for 
the level of closure that is achieved as the felt need to take a stance. We thus postulate 
that the perception that people have of their own ability to form a closed attitude plays a 
significant role in the actual achievement of cognitive closure, and define this ability to 
achieve closure as the perceived ability to make judgments and decisions confidently and 
with certainty (cf. Roets & Van Hiel, 2007; Roets et al., 2006). 
The ability to achieve closure has been recognized in the literature as a potential 
influence on whether or not people actually achieve cognitive closure in their attitude 
formation about a given topic (cf. Roets & Soetens, 2010; Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). 
However, to our knowledge, the assumption of the impact of ability to achieve closure on 
the achievement of cognitive closure has not been explicitly tested until now. Previous 
research has primarily treated the ability to achieve closure as an individual difference 
variable (e.g., Kossowska & Bar-Tal, 2013; Roets & Soetens, 2010). However, a recent 
study provides initial evidence for the idea that the extent to which people feel able to 
achieve closure can also be determined by external, contextual factors (Kossowska et 
al., 2014), similar to the effects of contextual factors on people’s need for closure (e.g., 
Kruglanski & Boyatzi, 2012; Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987). Experimental manipulation 
of people’s ability to achieve closure thus provides a possibility to investigate the role that 
this ability plays in the achievement of cognitive closure. The first goal of the present 
experimental research is therefore to examine whether it is possible to induce differences 
in the notion that people have of their general ability to achieve closure, to the extent 
that this leads to actual differences in the level of cognitive closure that they achieve 
in their attitude formation regarding a specific topic. We predict that the more people 
perceive themselves as well capable of making decisions and forming judgments, the 
more they will achieve cognitive closure in their attitudes on complex topics. 
Consequences of Achieving Cognitive Closure for Openness 
to Additional Information
The second goal of the present research is to extend existing knowledge on the 
consequences of achieving a state of cognitive closure. It is known that variations in 
cognitive closure affect, for instance, the subsequent stability of an attitude (Bassili, 1996; 
Krosnick & Petty, 1995). However, it remains unclear what the implications are of the 
level of cognitive closure that people have achieved for the way in which they respond 
to additional information about the topic in question. In the realm of public opinion in 
particular, it is relevant to know whether and how the achievement of cognitive closure 
affects people’s openness to additional information. For example, if people’s receptivity 




implications for the potential impact of public information campaigns.
To our knowledge, the relation between the level of cognitive closure that people 
have achieved and their openness to additional attitude-relevant information has so 
far not been explicitly examined. One would expect, however, that people who are still 
figuring out their point of view (i.e., who have not yet achieved cognitive closure) display 
an interest in and make use of information that can help them decide where they stand. 
Those who have rounded off their attitude formation (i.e., who have achieved cognitive 
closure), on the other hand, should feel less need for and be less interested in additional 
input. An initial indication for the validity of this reasoning comes from research by 
Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem (1993): Participants in three studies received information 
on a court case and were asked to form an initial judgment. Among participants who 
had received a complete set of information, those with a high, compared to a low 
need for closure subsequently achieved more cognitive closure and were less easily 
persuaded by another person actively advocating a different judgment. This suggests 
that the achievement of closure may reduce people’s openness to new, relevant input. 
Furthermore, prior research has found that people who feel very little ambivalence on 
a topic—a potential indication of cognitive closure—are less interested in and make 
less use of relevant information than those who feel two-sided or ambivalent—which 
suggests a lack of cognitive closure (e.g., Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997; Zhao & Cai, 
2008). We therefore predict that that the more people have achieved cognitive closure, 
the less they are open to additional attitude-relevant information. 
The Present Research 
The goals of the present research are twofold. First, we will examine a novel 
antecedent of cognitive closure—the ability to achieve closure. Second, we will 
investigate the consequences of achieving cognitive closure for people’s openness 
to additional attitude-relevant information. We will pursue these goals in two 
experimental studies, in which we propose and test a causal chain from ability to 
achieve closure through cognitive closure achieved to openness to additional attitude-
relevant information (see Figure 3.1). In both studies, participants will receive bogus 
test feedback which induces the self-image of having either a high or a moderate 
ability to achieve closure on complex topics. Participants will then form an attitude 
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towards the specific complex topic of carbon capture and storage technology (CCS)4, 
after which we assess their level of cognitive closure achieved and their openness to 
additional information on the topic (opinionative information in Study 3.1; opinionative 
information versus factual information in Study 3.2). We test the following hypotheses:
H1. People who are led to believe that they have a high ability to achieve closure 
will achieve more cognitive closure in their attitude formation compared to people who 
are led to believe that they have a moderate ability to achieve closure. 
H2. Level of cognitive closure achieved is inversely related to openness to 
additional attitude-relevant information. This entails that the more people have achieved 
cognitive closure in their attitude formation, the less open they are to additional 
information on the topic.
H3. Ability to achieve closure indirectly influences openness to additional attitude-
























Forty-two social science and humanities students (14 men and 28 women,  
Mage = 21.17, SD = 3.30) from Leiden University participated in this study and were 
randomly assigned to either the high ability to achieve closure (high AAC) condition or 
the moderate ability to achieve closure (moderate AAC) condition. Participants received 
a monetary reward or course credit in return for their participation.
Procedure
This study was the first in a series of unrelated studies. Upon arrival at the 
laboratory, participants were led to individual cubicles, each containing a PC on which 
the study would be conducted. Participants read a brief introductory text to the study, 
describing it as an investigation of people’s judgment and decision making habits and 
opinion formation concerning complex topics. The first part of the study consisted 
of a test that was ostensibly designed to assess participants’ judgment and decision 
making habits. After completing the test, participants were told that their personal 
results from the test had to be computed. In the meantime, participants were introduced 
to the second part of the study, which was described as investigating the processes 
that occur when people form their opinion on a concrete, real-life complex topic; the 
implementation of carbon capture and storage technology (CCS) in the Netherlands. 
Participants learned that they would be asked to form their opinion regarding this 
complex topic. They read a brief introductory text on CCS that provided basic 
information about the technology, which was largely based on the text previously used 
by Ter Mors and colleagues (2010). 
After reading the introductory text, participants received the bogus feedback 
from the test which served as the manipulation of participants’ perceptions of their 
ability to achieve closure (AAC) in the context of complex topics. In both conditions, 
participants were told that they were “judgment and decision making Type A”. In the 
high AAC condition, the feedback described participants as generally making judgments 
and decisions confidently and with certainty. Specifically, participants in this condition 
read that being “Type A” means that, more than others, they tend to make decisions 
and form attitudes about complex topics with confidence and without hesitation. 
Their decisions were described as constant and stable. Participants in the high AAC 
condition were also told that they tend to experience certainty regarding their opinions, 
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and that they display an above average level of decisiveness when forming opinions 
about complex and intricate topics. We suspected that describing participants’ ability 
to achieve closure as low in the second experimental condition (e.g., “you display little 
confidence and certainty when making decisions and forming attitudes”) would be 
perceived negatively and potentially cause participants to object to the validity of the 
test results provided (i.e., cause reactance). We therefore chose to portray participants’ 
ability to achieve closure in the second experimental condition as moderate, which we 
deemed a more appropriate level. Thus, in the moderate AAC condition, the feedback 
described participants’ judgments and decision making in terms of moderate certainty 
and confidence. That is, participants in this condition read that being “Type A” means 
that, more than others, they tend to take decisions not too quickly and try to form their 
opinions about complex topics in a careful manner. They were also told they do not 
commit themselves quickly to one point of view. Participants in the moderate AAC 
condition were furthermore told that they may experience uncertainty regarding their 
opinion, and that their carefulness and cautiousness is above average when forming 
opinions. Finally, participants in both experimental conditions were told that “Type A” 
was a functional decision-style. They also learned that the result of the test has good 
predictive value for many complex decisions that they will have to make in daily life, 
and that the test is often used for assessments in various business sectors. After receiving 
the bogus feedback, participants completed the manipulation checks, and read an 
additional brief text on CCS in which the main argument of CCS-opponents and the 
main argument of CCS-proponents in the Netherlands were described. Participants 
next completed a behavioral measure and a cognitive (self-report) measure that tapped 
into their level of cognitive closure achieved concerning the topic of CCS. Finally, 
participants completed measures of openness to additional information about CCS as 
well as a number of control measures. 
Measures
Manipulation checks. To check whether participants had understood the bogus 
feedback correctly, they were asked to indicate which feedback they had received from 
the test. The first question asked them to indicate which decision making type they were 
according to the feedback (decision Type A, B, C, or D). The second question asked 
participants to indicate whether this implied that they were above or below average in 
their decisiveness (in the high AAC condition) or in their carefulness and cautiousness 
(in the moderate AAC condition).
Control measures. We wanted to rule out the possibility that effects of our 




for closure or self-efficacy, since such differences could contribute to variations in the 
achievement of cognitive closure (e.g., Bandura, 1977; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Thus, need for closure and self-efficacy were assessed as control variables at the end of 
the study (presented to participants as an unrelated study on personality). We assessed 
need for closure using the revised 15-item need for closure scale developed by Roets and 
Van Hiel (2011) (α = .87). Self-efficacy was measured by means of the Dutch adaptation 
of the general self-efficacy scale (Teeuw, Schwarzer, & Jerusalem, 1994), which consists of 
10 items (α = .72). Higher scores on the 7-point scales indicate higher levels of need for 
closure or higher self-efficacy. 
Cognitive closure achieved. We assessed both cognitive and behavioral 
manifestations of the level of cognitive closure that participants had achieved concerning 
their attitude on CCS. Although closure is in the first place a cognitive state, we also 
expected closure to be manifested behaviorally. When people have achieved cognitive 
closure about a certain topic, this means that they believe they have finished their 
attitude formation process and that they feel confident about their attitude. Such 
confidence should then also include feeling comfortable with committing to the finished 
attitude. 
The cognitive measure of cognitive closure achieved consisted of a questionnaire 
which contained 13 items. Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with 
statements regarding their attitude on the implementation of CCS in the Netherlands, 
such as “I am certain of my opinion on the implementation of carbon capture and 
storage technology in the Netherlands”, “I feel undecided about my opinion on 
carbon capture and storage technology” (reverse-coded), and “My opinion on the 
implementation of carbon capture and storage technology in the Netherlands is fixed” 
(ranging from 1 = completely disagree, to 7 = completely agree). A cognitive closure score 
was calculated by averaging participants’ responses to the items (α = .82); higher scores 
on the scale indicate higher levels of cognitive closure achieved.
The behavioral measure of cognitive closure achieved asked participants to 
indicate whether or not they were ready to participate in a poll concerning the 
implementation of CCS in the Netherlands (1 = I am ready to participate; 2 = I am 
not yet ready to participate). The results of this poll would ostensibly be forwarded to 
governmental organizations involved in the implementation of CCS in the Netherlands. 
After indicating whether they were ready to participate, participants who answered 
affirmatively could vote for or against the implementation of CCS in the Netherlands. 
Participants’ choice whether or not to participate in the poll (i.e., commit to their 
attitude) was used as a behavioral measure of cognitive closure achieved, in which 
readiness to participate was considered an indicator of cognitive closure. 
61
3
THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE CLOSURE
Openness to additional information. After participants had completed the 
measures of cognitive closure achieved, we assessed their interest in and use of 
additional information on CCS. 
Interest in additional information. We announced that participants would be 
asked to explain their attitude towards the implementation of CCS in the Netherlands 
in writing for the purpose of providing participants of future studies with these 
explanations. Before they were to write this explanation, participants were presented 
with the opportunity to read additional information on CCS that supposedly originated 
from the internet (e.g., websites, forums, and discussion platforms) and was provided 
by proponents and opponents of CCS. The information was presented by means of a 
computerized information display board, as developed by Ter Mors and colleagues 
(2010). In this information display board, links to fourteen arguments concerning the 
implementation of CCS were presented in a matrix; seven arguments were categorized 
as being provided by proponents of CCS and seven were categorized as being provided 
by opponents. By clicking on a link to an argument, participants could read one or two 
sentences that explained the chosen argument. They could consult as many (or as few) 
arguments as they liked. The number of arguments that participants selected to read 
served as a behavioral indicator of their interest in additional information. 
Use of additional information. After participants had had the opportunity to 
read the additional information on CCS in the information matrix, they were asked to 
indicate their attitude towards the implementation of CCS in the Netherlands (1 = very 
negative, 7 = very positive; overall M = 3.53, SD = 1.40) and to write an explanation of 
this attitude. We used the content of these explanations as an indicator of participants’ 
use of the additional information that they had selected in the information matrix. 
Two independent raters (blind to experimental conditions) counted the number of 
arguments that participants had used to explain their point of view, and classified the 
arguments into two categories: arguments related to the information in the matrix 
(i.e., matrix-related arguments) and “other” arguments (i.e., with content unrelated 
to the information in the matrix). Correspondence between raters was high (91%) 
and differences were resolved through discussion5. Use of the additional information 
was operationalized as the proportion of arguments in participants’ explanation that 
consisted of matrix-related arguments. This proportion was computed by dividing the 
number of matrix-related arguments by the total number of arguments that a participant 








measure thus ranged from 0 (indicating that 0% of a participant’s explanation consisted 
of matrix-related arguments) to 1 (indicating that 100% of a participant’s explanation 
consisted of matrix-related arguments). Because two participants did not provide any 
arguments in their explanations, their score for the information use measure could not 
be computed. As a result, the analyses on this measure as reported below were conducted 
on the data of the remaining 40 participants.
Results
Manipulation checks
All participants (100%) correctly indicated the decision making type they were 
according to the bogus test feedback they had received (decision Type A). Furthermore, 
all participants (100%) correctly indicated that they had scored above average on the 
relevant characteristic (i.e., decisiveness in the high AAC condition, and carefulness 
and cautiousness in the moderate AAC condition). This implies that we were successful 
in inducing the conviction among participants that their ability to achieve closure was 
either high or moderate. 
Control measures
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed that there was no difference between 
participants in the two experimental conditions in self-reported levels of need for 
closure and self-efficacy, Fs(1, 40) ≤ 1.65, ps ≥ .206. Furthermore, when need for 
closure and self-efficacy were added as covariates to our analyses of the effect of the 
AAC manipulation on the measures of cognitive closure achieved, the pattern of results 
did not change. Thus, effects of the experimental manipulation cannot be explained 
by systematic differences between conditions in need for closure and self-efficacy. We 
also checked whether correcting for individual differences in need for closure and 
self-efficacy affected the nature of the relation between cognitive closure achieved and 
openness to additional information. This was not the case. 
Test of hypotheses
To investigate whether our manipulation of ability to achieve closure affected 
cognitive closure achieved, we first performed an ANOVA on the self-report scale of 
cognitive closure achieved. This analysis revealed a significant effect of the experimental 
manipulation, F(1, 40) = 5.95, p = .019, ηp2 = .13. Participants who were led to believe 
that they had a high ability to achieve closure reported to have achieved significantly 
more cognitive closure in their attitudes on CCS (M = 4.13, SD = 0.88) compared to 
participants who were led to believe that they had a moderate ability to achieve closure 
(M = 3.47, SD = 0.87), thereby confirming Hypothesis 1. 
63
3
THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE CLOSURE
A chi-squared test on participants’ responses to the behavioral measure of 
cognitive closure achieved (i.e., the decision of whether or not to partake in the poll on 
CCS) also revealed a marginally significant effect of the experimental manipulation, 
χ2(1) = 3.58, p = .059. Participants who were led to believe that they had a high ability 
to achieve closure were more often inclined to vote in the poll on CCS—and thereby 
commit to their attitude—(70% of participants in this condition decided to cast a vote) 
compared to those who were led to believe that they had a moderate ability to achieve 
closure (41% of participants in this condition decided to cast a vote), indicating a higher 
level of cognitive closure achieved in the former group. These results offer further 
support for Hypothesis 1.
To check whether or not the behavioral measure of cognitive closure achieved 
(i.e., the decision to partake in the poll) was related to the cognitive (self-report) 
measure of cognitive closure achieved—and thus tapped into the same construct—we 
computed the point-biserial correlation between the two measures. Before the analysis 
we reverse-coded the poll measure (1 = not yet ready to participate in the poll; 2 = ready 
to participate in the poll) to facilitate the interpretation of the correlation. Results of the 
analysis indeed showed a significant and positive correlation between the two measures 
of cognitive closure achieved (rpb = .75, p < .001), such that participants who had chosen 
to participate in the poll reported higher levels of closure achieved on CCS, compared to 
participants who had opted not to partake in the poll. 
The second hypothesis stated that level of cognitive closure achieved is inversely 
related to openness to additional attitude-relevant information. To test this hypothesis, 
we conducted linear regression analyses with self-reported level of cognitive closure 
achieved on CCS as predictor variable and interest in and use of additional CCS 
information as dependent variables. Results showed that the more that participants had 
achieved cognitive closure in their attitudes concerning CCS, the fewer arguments they 
selected to read in the CCS information matrix, β = –.39, t(40) = –2.68, p = .011, and the 
less they used this information in their attitude-explanation, β = –.40, t(38) = –2.70,  
p = .0106. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was also supported. 
Next, we followed bootstrapping procedures using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) 
approach (5000 resamples, bias corrected) to examine whether our experimental 











to additional attitude-relevant information through (self-reported) level of closure 
achieved (Hypothesis 3). No total effect of the AAC manipulation on interest in and use 
of additional information on CCS was observed (information interest analysis: B = 0.02, 
p = .993; information use analysis: B = 0.05, p = .651). However, results of the analyses 
indeed showed a significant indirect effect of the AAC manipulation through cognitive 
closure achieved on interest in additional information on CCS (B = –1.55;  
95% CI [–4.05, –0.30]), and on use of additional information on CCS (B = –0.13; 95% 
CI [–0.32, –0.03]), thereby supporting Hypothesis 37. Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 and the results reported above, ability to achieve closure (0 = moderate, 
1 = high) predicted the achievement of cognitive closure on CCS (information interest 
analysis: B = 0.66, p = .019; information use analysis: B = 0.77, p = .0088). In turn level 
of cognitive closure achieved predicted a reduced interest in additional information on 
CCS (B = –2.35, p = .007) and a reduced use of additional information on CCS  
(B = –0.17, p = .002).
Discussion
The results of Study 3.1 offer clear support for all three hypotheses. The results 
corroborate the notion that people’s perceptions of their own general ability to achieve 
cognitive closure can be externally influenced. Moreover, this study demonstrates that 
the perceptions that people have of their ability to achieve closure affect the level of 
cognitive closure that they actually achieve when forming an attitude towards a specific 
complex topic. That is, results of Study 3.1 show that people achieve more closure in 
their attitude formation towards a specific complex topic when they are led to believe 
that their ability to achieve closure is high rather than moderate. 
Furthermore, Study 3.1 shows that the more people achieve cognitive closure, 
the less they are open to additional information on the topic in question. Specifically, 
an increase in level of cognitive closure achieved was found to be negatively related 
to both interest in and use of additional attitude-relevant information. Bootstrapping 
mediation procedures, moreover, demonstrated the predicted indirect effect of ability to 
achieve closure on openness to additional attitude-relevant information through level 
of cognitive closure achieved. Together these findings support our argument that the 









THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE CLOSURE
perceive themselves capable of doing so, with important consequences for their openness 
to additional information. 
Study 3.2
The goal of Study 3.2 was twofold. The first goal was to replicate the results of Study 
3.1; the research design in Study 3.2 was similar to that in the previous study and the 
same hypotheses were tested. The second goal was to shed more light on the negative 
relation between the level of cognitive closure that people achieve and their openness to 
additional attitude-relevant information that was predicted and found in Study 3.1. 
Arguably, the additional information on the attitude topic (i.e., carbon capture and 
storage technology or CCS) in Study 3.1 was opinionative in nature, as it was presented 
to the participants as a compilation of arguments that originated from the internet which 
are used by proponents and opponents of CCS. We hence do not know whether our 
finding in Study 3.1 regarding the negative relation between cognitive closure achieved 
and openness to additional attitude-relevant information only holds for information 
that is opinionative in nature (i.e., information primarily pertaining people’s opinions), 
or may also extend to factual information (i.e., information that primarily concerns 
and discusses facts). This is what we explored in the present study. For this purpose we 
presented participants with the opportunity to read additional opinionative information 
on the topic of CCS as well as additional factual information on CCS.
People are likely to use cues, or heuristics, to help themselves make judgments 
and decisions when they are not particularly involved or interested in the complex topic 
in question (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a). Opinionative information can 
provide such cues, as it overtly presents a possible position on the topic. People who are 
forming their attitude may thus regard others’ opinions as cues and suggestions for their 
own viewpoint. In line with this reasoning, previous research has shown that people who 
are still trying to make sense of a certain topic value others’ opinions highly (Crano & 
Prislin, 2006; Kruglanski, Dechesne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009). Moreover, research on the 
consequences of attitude certainty—a concept related to cognitive closure—has shown 
that the more people feel certain about their attitude, the less easily the content of their 
attitude is influenced by information propagating a specific point of view (Petrocelli, 
Tormala, & Rucker, 2007). This suggests that those who have achieved cognitive closure 
have really closed off their attitude to the viewpoints of others. Thus, those who have 
achieved cognitive closure, and have decided on their attitude, should display less 
interest in additional information that is directive and opinionative in nature than 




in Study 3.1. The question is whether the achievement of cognitive closure is also, and in 
a similar way, related to people’s openness to factual information. Although conclusions 
and viewpoints can be deduced from factual information about complex issues, this 
deduction must be performed by people themselves, which suggests that factual 
information does not provide (easy) heuristics for an attitudinal position. In Study 3.2 
we thus explored the possibility that the negative relation between cognitive closure 
achieved and openness to additional attitude-relevant information in particular holds 
for information that is opinionative in nature and not so much for information that is 
factual in nature.
Method
Participants and design 
Participants were 57 students (25 men and 32 women, Mage = 21.65, SD = 2.47) 
from Leiden University who studied humanities, social sciences, or bio-medical science. 
They were randomly assigned to either the high ability to achieve closure (high AAC) 
condition or the moderate ability to achieve closure (moderate AAC) condition. 
Participants received either a monetary reward or course credit in return for their 
participation.
Procedure 
This study was the first in a series of unrelated studies. The procedure of Study 3.2 
was nearly identical to Study 3.1, the distinction being that the measures of openness to 
additional information were different from those used in Study 3.1. The manipulation 
of ability to achieve closure was identical to that in Study 3.1, and as in Study 3.1 
participants formed an attitude towards the complex topic of carbon capture and storage 
technology (CCS). The introduction to the topic and the information that participants 
received on CCS prior to completing the measures of cognitive closure achieved were 
also identical to that in Study 3.1. 
Measures 
Manipulation checks. To check whether participants had understood the bogus 
test feedback correctly, we used the same two manipulation checks as in Study 3.1. 
Control measures. As in Study 3.1, need for closure and self-efficacy were 
measured as control variables at the end of the study (presented to participants as an 
unrelated study on personality). We employed the same need for closure scale (α = .85) 
and self-efficacy scale (α = .88). 
Cognitive closure achieved. The cognitive (self-report) measure and behavioral 
measure of cognitive closure achieved consisted of the same questionnaire (α = .90) and 
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the same poll measure that we used in Study 3.1. As in Study 3.1, participants first made 
choices regarding the poll, after which they answered the questions in the questionnaire.
Openness to additional information. After participants had completed the 
measures of cognitive closure achieved, we assessed their interest in additional 
opinionative information on CCS and their interest in additional factual information 
on CCS. We asked participants to explain their attitude towards the implementation of 
CCS in the Netherlands in writing, allegedly to be able to provide participants of future 
studies with these explanations. Before they were to write this explanation, participants 
were asked to indicate their interest in reading additional information on CCS. They 
ostensibly would be allowed to read this information before writing the explanation of 
their attitudes. 
Interest in opinionative information. The measure of interest in additional 
opinionative information on CCS consisted of a list of transcripts of 10 fictitious 
television interviews. In order to convey the opinionative nature of the information, 
participants learned that the interviews were conducted with various people who 
expressed their opinions on CCS and related topics. The list of interviews that was 
presented to participants contained descriptions such as “Interview with CEO of a power 
plant” and “Interview with inhabitants of a potential CO2 storage site”. Participants first 
indicated for each interview to what extent they were interested in reading a transcript 
of the interview (1 = not at all interested, 7 = very much interested). Then, participants 
selected the interview transcripts that they wanted to read. We computed two indicators 
of interest in additional opinionative information; first, we averaged the interest 
ratings of the 10 interviews (α = .81) and second, we counted the number of interview 
transcripts that each participant had selected to read. 
Interest in factual information. The measure of interest in additional factual 
information followed the same format as the measure of interest in additional 
opinionative information, only this time the list that was presented to participants 
contained 10 fictitious titles of newspaper articles that allegedly had been published 
in national newspapers. The list contained titles indicating the factual nature of 
the information reported in the articles, such as “Decisions on energy in Western 
Europe”, “Permission for a test of CO2 storage”, and “The role of CO2 in climate issues”. 
Identical to the measure of interest in additional opinionative information, participants 
indicated for each article their interest in reading it (1 = not at all interested, 7 = very 
much interested), after which they selected the articles that they wanted to read. Two 
indicators of interest in factual information were computed; first we averaged the interest 
ratings of the ten articles (α = .75) and second, we counted the number of articles that 




in opinionative information and interest in factual information were completed was 
counterbalanced across participants9. 
Next, the participants learned that the articles and interview transcripts that they 
and the other participants in the study had chosen to read would be assembled, and that 
in the mean time they would continue with the current study and the other studies in the 
session. After these other studies, participants would allegedly have the opportunity to 
read the interview transcripts and the newspaper articles they had selected (if applicable) 
before writing their definite attitude explanation. At this point in the study, participants 
were asked to write a tentative explanation of their view on CCS, which they allegedly 
could adjust at a later point (i.e., after reading the articles and interview transcripts). In 
Study 3.2, this (tentative) explanation supported the cover story of the study but did not 
function as a dependent variable. Next, participants completed the control measures 
which again were presented as an unrelated study on personality. At end of the series 
of studies that participants participated in, they were debriefed and informed that they 
would actually not be provided with the articles and transcripts of interviews they had 




All participants (100%) correctly indicated the decision making type they were 
according to the bogus test feedback they had received (decision Type A). Furthermore, 
all participants (100%) correctly indicated that they had scored above average on the 
relevant characteristic (i.e., decisiveness in the high AAC condition, and carefulness 
and cautiousness in the moderate AAC condition). This implies that we were successful 
in inducing the conviction among participants that their ability to achieve closure was 
either high or moderate. 
Control measures
Replicating the results from Study 3.1—and as intended—Analysis of Variance 
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reported levels of need for closure and self-efficacy, Fs(1, 55) < 1, ps ≥ .684. Furthermore, 
when need for closure and self-efficacy were added as covariates to our analyses of 
the effect of the AAC manipulation on the measures of cognitive closure achieved, the 
pattern of results did not change. Thus, the results of our experimental manipulation 
cannot be explained by and emerged independently of (pre-existing) differences in 
need for closure and self-efficacy. We also checked whether correcting for individual 
differences in need for closure and self-efficacy affected the nature of the relation 
between cognitive closure achieved and openness to additional opinionative and factual 
information. This was not the case. 
Test of hypotheses 
We ran an ANOVA on the cognitive closure self-report scale to test our prediction 
that, compared to participants in the moderate AAC condition, participants in the high 
AAC condition would indicate higher levels of cognitive closure achieved concerning 
the implementation of CCS in the Netherlands (Hypothesis 1). As in Study 3.1, results 
confirmed that participants who were led to believe that they had a high ability to 
achieve closure reported to have achieved significantly higher levels of cognitive closure 
on the topic of CCS (M = 4.52, SD = 1.01) than participants who were led to believe that 
they had a moderate ability to achieve closure (M = 3.90, SD = 1.05), F(1, 55) = 5.06,  
p = .028, ηp2 = .08. A chi-squared test on participants’ responses to the behavioral 
measure of cognitive closure achieved did not reveal a significant effect of the 
experimental manipulation of ability to achieve closure, however. That is, unlike in Study 
3.1, results revealed no difference between the high AAC condition and the moderate 
AAC condition in participants’ inclination to participate in the poll on CCS, χ2(1) = 0.34, 
p = .561.
To check whether, as in Study 3.1, the behavioral measure of cognitive closure 
achieved (i.e., the decision to partake in the poll) was related to the cognitive (self-
report) measure of closure achieved—and thus tapped into the same construct—we 
computed the point-biserial correlation between the two measures. Before the analysis 
we reverse-coded the poll measure (1 = not yet ready to participate in the poll; 2 = ready 
to participate in the poll) to facilitate the interpretation of the correlation. Consistent with 
our reasoning, and with the results from Study 3.1, the poll-measure was significantly 
and positively related to the self-report measure of cognitive closure achieved  
(rpb = .51, p < .001), such that participants who had chosen to participate in the poll 
reported higher levels of closure achieved on CCS compared to participants who had 
decided not to partake in the poll.




closure achieved is inversely related to openness to additional attitude-relevant 
information. Hypothesis 3 predicted an indirect effect of ability to achieve closure (AAC) 
on openness to additional attitude-relevant information through (self-reported) level of 
cognitive closure achieved. We furthermore explored the possibility that Hypotheses 2 
and 3 would specifically apply to additional information that is opinionative in nature 
(i.e., the type of information that was offered in Study 3.1), and not so much for factual 
information.
We first report results for openness to additional opinionative information. As a 
test of Hypothesis 2, we conducted linear regression analyses with self-reported level 
of cognitive closure achieved as predictor variable, and interest in interview transcripts 
and number of interview transcripts selected to read as dependent variables. Results 
revealed that the more participants had achieved cognitive closure in their attitudes 
concerning CCS, the less interested they were in reading the interview transcripts on 
CCS, β = –.24, t(55) = –1.86, p = .068, and the fewer interview transcripts on CCS they 
selected to read, β = –.29, t(55) = –2.20, p = .032. This is consistent with our rationale 
and with the results from Study 3.1. We then followed bootstrapping procedures using 
Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) approach (5000 resamples, bias-corrected) to examine 
whether the manipulation of ability to achieve closure (AAC) had an indirect effect on 
openness to additional opinionative information through self-reported level of cognitive 
closure achieved (Hypothesis 3). No total effect of the AAC manipulation on interest in 
interview transcripts on CCS and number of interview transcripts selected was observed 
(information interest analysis: B = 0.34, p = .207; information selection analysis;  
B = 0.14, p = .802). However, results of the analyses did show a significant indirect effect 
of the AAC manipulation on interest in interview transcripts on CCS (B = –0.18;  
95% CI [–0.48, –0.04]) as well as on selection of interview transcripts on CCS (B = –0.39; 
95% CI [–0.99, –0.05]) through cognitive closure achieved. Consistent with Hypotheses 
1 and 2 and with the previously reported results, ability to achieve closure (0 = moderate, 
1 = high) induced the achievement of cognitive closure on CCS (B = 0.61, p = .029). In 
turn, level of cognitive closure achieved predicted a reduction in interest in the interview 
transcripts on CCS (B = –0.30, p = .020) and a reduction in the number of interview 
transcripts that participants selected to read (B = –0.64, p = .021). Thus, as in Study 
3.1 and as predicted in Hypotheses 2 and 3, we found an inverse relationship between 
cognitive closure achieved and openness to additional attitude-relevant (opinionative) 
information, as well as an indirect effect of our AAC manipulation on openness to 
additional attitude-relevant (opinionative) information through cognitive closure 
achieved.
We then conducted identical analyses for openness to additional factual 
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information. We first performed linear regression analyses with self-reported level of 
cognitive closure achieved as predictor variable and interest in newspaper articles and 
number of articles selected to read as dependent variables. Level of cognitive closure 
achieved on CCS did not emerge as a reliable predictor of interest in newspaper articles 
on CCS, β = –.15, t(55) = –1.11, p = .271, or the number of newspaper articles on CCS 
selected, β = .06, t(55) = 0.46, p = .649, as anticipated. The absence of a relation between 
cognitive closure achieved and openness to additional factual information excluded 
the possibility of an indirect effect of the AAC manipulation on openness to additional 
factual information through level of cognitive closure achieved. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3.2 largely replicate and extend those of the first study, and 
offer further support for all three hypotheses. The results show that the extent to which 
people see themselves as capable of making up their mind positively affects the level of 
cognitive closure that they manage to achieve. As in Study 3.1, we found a clear relation 
between the cognitive (i.e., self-report) measure of cognitive closure achieved and the 
behavioral measure of the same construct (i.e., readiness to participate in a poll). In 
Study 3.1, however, participants in the high AAC condition reported more closure 
achieved and were somewhat more often willing to commit to their attitude (i.e., to 
participate in the poll) than those in the moderate AAC condition. The results of Study 
3.2, on the other hand, only revealed an effect of our AAC manipulation on the cognitive 
measure of cognitive closure achieved, and not on the behavioral measure. 
Study 3.2 further replicates and extends the results of the previous study 
by showing that the level of cognitive closure that people achieve is specifically 
consequential for their openness to additional attitude-relevant information that 
is opinionative in nature and not so much for their openness to additional factual 
information. Consistent with the results from Study 3.1, we found that the more people 
have achieved cognitive closure concerning a specific complex topic, the less they are 
open to additional information that is opinionative and that may thus direct or guide 
them in forming a definite attitude. Furthermore, we again found an indirect effect of 
our manipulation of ability to achieve closure on additional opinionative information 





The public’s opinion can be a decisive factor in the progress of various public 
affairs, such as the implementation of governmental policies or of novel technologies. 
It is hence important to understand under which circumstances people will form their 
definite attitude—or achieve cognitive closure—as well as what the precise psychological 
consequences are of forming such a closed attitude. The present research therefore first, 
examined a novel antecedent of cognitive closure—the perceived ability to achieve 
closure—and second, investigated the consequences of achieving cognitive closure for 
people’s openness to additional attitude-relevant information. 
In the two experimental studies reported here, we manipulated participants’ 
perceptions of their own ability to achieve closure by providing them with false feedback 
from a test that ostensibly assessed their judgment and decision making habits regarding 
complex topics. Next, participants formed an attitude towards a specific complex topic. 
Our results demonstrate that the extent to which people perceive themselves as able 
to achieve closure affects the level of cognitive closure that they actually achieve in 
their attitude formation, with important consequences for their openness to additional 
information on the topic in question. That is to say, the present research shows that 
people who are led to believe that they are well capable of making up their mind about 
complex topics actually form a more closed attitude about a specific complex topic 
than people who view themselves as less able to do so. As a result of this higher level 
of cognitive closure achieved, people are less open to additional attitude-relevant 
information that is opinionative in nature and contains other people’s viewpoints and 
opinions. People’s openness to factual information, on the other hand, appears to be 
unaffected by the level of cognitive closure that they achieve. Notably, the effects found 
in the present research emerged independently of individual differences in need for 
closure and self-efficacy, highlighting the importance of the ability to achieve closure in 
attitude formation.
 Together the present findings support our argument that people’s perceived ability 
to achieve closure is an important antecedent of the achievement of cognitive closure. 
Furthermore, our results demonstrate that the level of cognitive closure that people have 
achieved is inversely related to their openness to additional opinionative information 
about the topic in question. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Research on cognitive closure has so far primarily focused on the need to achieve 
closure as a precursor of the achievement of closure, while the ability to achieve closure 
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has only been recognized as a potential antecedent (cf. Roets & Soetens, 2010; Roets & 
Van Hiel, 2007). Our findings extend the existing literature on cognitive closure (e.g., 
Kruglanski et al., 2009; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, 1997) 
by demonstrating that not only the felt need to achieve closure, but also the extent to 
which people perceive themselves as able to achieve closure is an important influence 
on the level of cognitive closure that people achieve. Importantly, the ability to achieve 
closure appears to be independent of people’s need for closure. This implies that there 
may be circumstances under which people find themselves in a conflicting state with 
regard to their attitude formation: they may experience a need to finalize their attitude 
formation on a specific topic, while at the same time feeling incapable of doing so (cf. 
Kossowska et al., 2014). 
We emphasize that the ability to achieve closure is subjective in nature, that is; 
the ability to achieve closure reflects the image that people have of their own capacity 
to make up their minds. Importantly, this approach differs from research on cognitive 
or mental ability, such as research on ego depletion, which generally considers people’s 
mental strength or capacity to perform a certain act as an objective (and finite) source 
or force (e.g., Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012; Vohs et al., 2008). The subjective 
nature of the ability to achieve closure implies that people may feel (un)able to perform 
a certain cognitive act independently of their relevant knowledge, intellect, or cognitive 
resources. This may explain the phenomenon that people sometimes take a definite 
stance on a topic that they actually do not understand well or about which they know 
very little. 
The present studies demonstrate that the image that people have of their own 
ability to form a definite, closed attitude is not stable and that it can be influenced by 
external factors—in our case by bogus test feedback. The external influence on people’s 
ability to achieve closure in the present studies was artificial (cf. Kossowska et al., 2014). 
However, there may very well be circumstances in everyday life that affect whether 
or not people feel able to make up their minds. It may, for instance, matter who is 
providing the information on a specific complex topic (i.e., characteristics of the source 
of information). That is, people may feel more capable of achieving cognitive closure on 
the basis of expert information than on the basis of information that originates from a 
non-expert source (cf. source expertise effects in persuasion: Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Pornpitakpan, 2004). Examining real-life influences on people’s ability to achieve closure 
would further increase our understanding of when and why people form their definite 
attitudes about complex public issues. Future research along these lines might provide 
communicators with tools that encourage people to form a final viewpoint, or achieve 




We must note that although achieving closure is an important aspect of people’s 
attitude formation, it is not necessarily a positive outcome. Ideally, people are thoroughly 
and well informed before forming a definite, closed attitude. However, we know that 
many frequently base their points of view on low quality, false, or limited information 
(e.g., Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). This was also to some 
extent the case in the current research, as a substantial part of participants reported 
to have achieved a high level of cognitive closure after having received relatively little 
information on the complex topic in question (basic information on carbon capture 
and storage technology). In addition, our findings reveal that level of cognitive closure 
achieved has important consequences for people’s openness to additional opinionative 
information on the topic in question. Specifically, the more that people have finalized 
their attitude formation, the less they are open to information that possibly discusses 
or propagates an alternative viewpoint. This means that having a closed attitude can 
be a hindrance when new arguments—which potentially offer reasons to reconsider 
one’s position—become available. For instance, a politician will experience difficulty 
informing the public about the reasons motivating a specific policy when the public has 
already decided where they stand. Our results, on the other hand, reveal that people’s 
openness to factual information is likely to remain constant, regardless of the level of 
cognitive closure that people have achieved. This suggests that in situations in which 
relevant knowledge is still being developed, for instance in the case of a fairly novel, 
complex technology like carbon capture and storage, it may be helpful to present newly 
available knowledge as facts rather than as arguments supporting a specific viewpoint, 
since receptivity to factual information will be equal for those who have and those who 
have not yet made up their mind. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
In this research we manipulated ability to achieve closure by means of bogus test 
feedback. To avoid reactance to the feedback, participants’ ability to achieve closure was 
either described as high or moderate, but not low. We would argue that similar findings 
as in the present research can be obtained with a manipulation of ability to achieve 
closure that induces the perception that people’s ability to achieve closure is high versus 
low. For instance, presenting research participants with a leading questionnaire (Libby 
& Eibach, 2002) may prove to be an effective, reactance-free method to experimentally 
induce high and low levels of ability to achieve closure. Similarly, Kossowska and 
colleagues (2014) have in recent research induced a sense of (relatively) low ability to 
achieve closure among participants by having them try to complete unsolvable tasks. 
Although cognitive closure is in the first place a cognitive state, in our studies we 
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also expected closure to be manifested in behavior. We consistently found a significant 
effect of our manipulation of ability to achieve closure in the predicted direction on 
cognitive manifestations of closure achieved (i.e., the self-report measure). However, for 
the behavioral measure of closure achieved (i.e., the binary poll measure) the results were 
mixed. That is, we found a marginally statistically significant effect of the experimental 
manipulation in the predicted direction on this measure in Study 3.1, but no such 
effect in Study 3.2. It is unlikely that this can be explained by a lack of validity of the 
behavioral measure, since in both studies we found a clear relation between the cognitive 
and behavioral measure of closure achieved. Our inability to establish a robust effect 
on the behavioral measure may be explained by the low sensitivity of the binary, fairly 
crude poll measure that we employed. We can imagine that a more sensitive behavioral 
measure of cognitive closure (e.g., with a continuous scale of measurement) might 
reveal a more robust effect of ability to achieve closure on behavioral manifestations of 
cognitive closure. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to see if achieving cognitive closure not 
only leads to less openness to additional opinionative information—an intrapersonal 
consequence—but also to increases people’s inclination to propagate their viewpoint 
among others—an interpersonal consequence. People often rely on and are influenced 
by other people’s views when forming their attitudes and making up their minds (Crano 
& Prislin, 2006; Kruglanski et al., 2009). An attitude that is expressed more frequently 
has, as a consequence, a larger potential impact on others’ viewpoints than attitudes that 
are voiced less often. If it is indeed the case that closed attitudes are more likely to be 
expressed, the impact of cognitive closure (and ability to achieve closure) in the realm 
of public opinion is even greater than already known. Exploring these issues would be a 
useful direction for future research. 
Conclusion
We conclude that people’s perceptions of their ability to achieve closure are an 
important antecedent of the extent to which they achieve cognitive closure regarding 
specific complex topics. In turn, the achievement of cognitive closure reduces people’s 
openness to additional attitude-relevant information that is opinionative in nature. The 
present research thus contributes to the existing literature on antecedents as well as 
consequences of the achievement of cognitive closure, and highlights the importance of 
ability to achieve closure in the realm of attitude formation.

Chapter 4
It Seems Like They Know What They’re 
Talking About: How Perceptions 
of Source Expertise Affect the Ability 
to Achieve Cognitive Closure
This chapter is based on Koot, C., Ter Mors, E., Ellemers, N., & Daamen, D. D. L. (2014c). 
Facilitation of attitude formation through communication: How perceived source expertise 
enhances the ability to achieve cognitive closure about complex environmental topics.




Closed attitudes—attitudes about which people have achieved a state of 
cognitive closure—are known to be more stable and predictive of actual behavior than 
“unfinished” or open attitudes (cf. Bassili, 1996; Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Krosnick & 
Petty, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). As a consequence, such closed, definite attitudes 
are also more predictive of people’s support for or opposition to policies, projects, 
or other enterprises that affect them or are otherwise relevant to them. For example, 
people’s current attitudes on nuclear energy are more indicative of their future support 
for a government’s plan to increase the production of nuclear energy if the attitudes 
are closed, compared to when they are unfinished and open. It is hence important 
to understand the factors that lead people to achieve a state of cognitive closure. The 
present research investigates how one such antecedent of cognitive closure—the ability 
to achieve closure—is determined in the context of information provision about a 
complex, publicly relevant topic. We examine the importance of the level of expertise 
that people ascribe to a source of information for their ability to achieve cognitive 
closure on a complex topic. Specifically, we will examine whether and how the identity of 
a source and the communication of consensus influence people’s perceptions of source 
expertise, and as such impact on the ability to achieve closure. 
The Ability to Achieve Cognitive Closure 
Research on precursors of cognitive closure has so far primarily focused on 
people’s need for closure (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2009; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, 1997). This research has uncovered that people tend to 
differ from each other in the extent to which they feel compelled to reach and maintain 
a state of closure, or are comfortable to retain a more open, undecided view of different 
issues. More recent work, however, has also started paying attention to the idea that 
people differ in their ability to achieve cognitive closure, i.e., whether they manage to 
make up their mind and decide what they think, or feel unable to do so (e.g., Kossowska 
& Bar-Tal, 2013; Roets & Soetens, 2010; Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). 
In our prior research we demonstrated that the extent to which people feel able to 
achieve closure is an important antecedent of the actual achievement of cognitive closure 
in the context of complex topics (Koot, Ter Mors, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2014a). In this 
work, we define the ability to achieve closure as the perceived ability to make judgments 
and decisions confidently and with certainty (cf. Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). We developed 
an experimental procedure to manipulate the extent to which participants believed 
they were able to achieve closure. In two experimental studies using this manipulation, 
participants were invited to form an attitude on the complex, environmental topic of 
carbon capture and storage technology (CCS). Participants who were led to believe 
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that their ability to achieve closure was relatively high actually achieved more cognitive 
closure in their attitudes towards CCS—as indicated in a self-report measure as well as 
a behavioral measure (taking a stance in an opinion poll). This research thus revealed 
that people’s ability to achieve closure influences the level of cognitive closure that they 
achieve and demonstrated that the extent to which people feel able to achieve closure 
can also be determined by external factors, instead of representing a stable individual 
difference factor (see also Kossowska et al., 2014). Only a few studies so far have 
manipulated the ability to achieve closure, and have done so by employing relatively 
artificial experimental procedures. Now that it has been established that external 
factors in principle can affect whether or not people feel capable of making up their 
mind, the next question is which factors tend to have such effects in daily life. In the 
case of decision making about complex topics, a pertinent complication when trying to 
form one’s opinion is that multiple parties are available to provide potentially relevant 
information. In judging the value of such information, we know that people tend to refer 
to source characteristics as useful cues (e.g., Bohner, & Dickel, 2011). In the present 
research, we examine whether the perceived expertise of an information source relates to 
people’s ability to form a closed attitude on complex topics. 
Perceived Source Expertise and the Ability to Achieve 
Closure
The public discourse in today’s society is increasingly characterized by highly 
complex issues, such as international political conflicts and the threat of climate change. 
Due to the complex nature of such topics, many people will feel incapable of forming a 
definite attitude about them, or of achieving cognitive closure. In order to advance the 
attitude formation process, people can consult information on the topic in question. 
However, given the extensive supply of information that is available these days, not all 
information will be equally helpful for the formation of a closed attitude. In this study 
we propose that people feel particularly strengthened in their ability to make up their 
mind about complex issues when they believe that they are consulting or receiving 
information from a knowledgeable source. That is, people should feel more comfortable 
forming their attitude on the basis of information from a source that they believe to be 
an expert, rather than a lay source. Prior research (for instance in product marketing) 
has shown that identical information seems more convincing when originating from 
a source that is regarded as having high expertise, compared to low expertise (e.g., 
Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Pornpitakpan, 2004). That is, persuasive communication has 
a greater impact on the content of people’s attitudes when they believe that information 




on this prior research to examine whether a parallel effect of perceived source expertise 
can be observed for the confidence people have in their ability to achieve closure. We 
propose that people feel better able to achieve cognitive closure on the basis of a piece 
of information when they perceive the information source to have high, rather than low, 
relevant expertise. 
Source Identity and Consensus as Cues of Source Expertise
If perceived source expertise is indeed important for people’s ability to achieve 
closure, then this raises the question of what determines people’s impressions of source 
expertise. In the present research, we propose two determinants of perceptions of source 
expertise, namely who is providing the information (source identity) and what message is 
being communicated (consensus vs. non-consensus).  
To start with the importance of who is providing the information; we argue that 
people may consider the identity of an information source to gain a sense of its expertise. 
That is, when different individuals or stakeholders provide information, merely knowing 
who they are or which body they represent can already provide an indication of the 
source’s knowledgeability (e.g., Reimer et al., 2004). For instance, knowing whether 
a statement is made by a random person in the street, a relevant professional, or a 
journalist already indicates the likelihood that this source has relevant expertise about 
the topic in question. Which of these parties is most likely to offer expert information 
further depends on the issue under consideration. When receiving information on the 
effectiveness of vaccinations for instance, knowing that this information was provided 
by a professor of immunology will lead people to infer high source expertise, as an 
academic title in a relevant field suggests that years of high-level education, training, and 
professional experience are contained in the information provided. This is less likely to 
be the case, however, when another parent in the playground proclaims his or her beliefs 
about potential side effects of immunization, as this most probably reflects idiosyncratic 
views, very limited case observations or unwarranted hearsay. We therefore predict that 
relevant features indicating the identity of an information source determine people’s 
perceptions of the source’s expertise. Furthermore, we predict that when people attribute 
high expertise to a source on the basis of its identity, this should lead them to feel better 
able to achieve closure compared to when they believe the source to have low relevant 
expertise. 
Second, we argue that for perceptions of source expertise it may not only matter 
who provides the information, but that it is also important what message the information 
source communicates. Prior research has tended to consider sources of information 
either as being represented by a particular individual, or as a unified entity, representing 
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a single particular stance or opinion. In real life, however, a source of information is 
more likely to constitute of a collection of individuals, or group of relevant stakeholders, 
such as professionals, citizens, politicians, or businesses. Moreover, in particular in 
the case of complex and multi-faceted topics, it is not self-evident that all individuals 
who together constitute a particular information source are in full agreement with 
each other, or focus on the same information aspects. As a result, when such sources 
provide information about complex topics, they do not always draw definite conclusions 
about the issue at stake. They may, for instance, indicate concern about current 
developments without providing explicit guidelines about what should be done instead. 
For example, an organization involved with the fight against global warming can provide 
information about different technologies that have been developed to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, while explaining that there are conflicting views on which of these 
technologies can be best employed. In view of our current research interest, the question 
is how such (lack of) consensus affects the perceived expertise of the source in question 
among those receiving such information, and how such a message as a consequence 
affects their ability to achieve closure on the topic. In highly complex situations, even 
experts do not necessarily agree about each aspect of the issue in question and lack of 
consensus may simply reflect a very careful and nuanced consideration of the complex 
nature of the topic. However, we anticipate that communicating disagreement about 
relevant concerns or conclusions will generally tend to be interpreted as a sign of low 
expertise—for instance when this disagreement is seen to reveal that not everyone is 
equally aware of relevant facts. If this is the case, an information source that expresses 
consensus about a complex topic might more easily evoke the impression that 
individuals draw on a common and objective knowledge base and that they “know 
what they are talking about”. Expressions of consensus may thus be taken as a proxy of 
high source expertise. We therefore predict that people perceive higher source expertise 
when an information source communicates consensus rather than non-consensus. 
Furthermore we predict that when people attribute high expertise to a source that 
communicates consensus, this should lead them to feel better able to achieve closure 
compared to when an information source communicates disagreement—resulting in a 
reduction of perceived expertise. Thus, we argue that perceptions of source expertise do 
not only depend on the identity of the source or its objective level of expertise, but is also 
likely to vary depending on the content of the source’s communication. 
Finally, in examining the impact of source identity as well as level of consensus 
communicated, we will explore the possibility that the impact of communicating 
(non-)consensus on perceived expertise also depends on the identity of the source. 




when high expertise is already clearly implied in the identity of the source. Thus, 
communication of consensus might particularly increase the perceived expertise of a 
source (and increase people’s ability to achieve closure) whose expertise seems to be low 
on the basis of its identity. For instance, when private citizens who have no particular 
knowledgeability on climate change all agree that in their garden plants come into bloom 
earlier every year, this may suggest some shared expertise based on lay observations, 
even if their observations are inaccurate or remain unverified. 
The Present Research 
We examine the importance of perceptions of source expertise for people’s 
ability to achieve cognitive closure about complex topics in two experimental studies. 
Specifically, we assess whether and how the identity of the information source and 
the communication of (non-)consensus affect perceived source expertise. Moreover, 
we investigate how these effects on perceptions of source expertise in turn influence 
people’s ability to achieve closure. The studies will be conducted in the context of the 
complex environmental topic of carbon capture and storage technology (CCS); a climate 
change mitigation technology that is considered important for stabilizing greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere (IPCC, 2007)10. In both studies, the identity of the 
information source is manipulated by explaining to participants that they are to receive 
information on CCS from either the “Association of Citizens and Sustainability” or the 
“Association of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability”. In Study 4.2, we additionally 
manipulate source consensus by explaining that the members of the information source 
either agree or disagree among themselves regarding the consequences of CCS for the 
environment. The level of source expertise that participants perceive and the extent to 
which they feel able to achieve closure are measured in both studies as central outcome 
variables. Additionally, in Study 4.2, participants are actually provided with information 
on CCS that allegedly originates from the information source and in which consensus 
or non-consensus is communicated. In this study we then also measure the extent to 
which participants achieve cognitive closure in their attitude formation towards the 
implementation of CCS with both a self-report and a behavioral measure. We test the 
following hypotheses:
H1. We argue that people will perceive an association of relevant professionals to 
have higher expertise on CCS than an association of citizens, and that this higher level 
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topic of CCS. As a result, we predict that source identity will indirectly influence ability 
to achieve closure through perceived source expertise.
H2. We argue that people will perceive an information source that communicates 
consensus to have higher expertise than a source that communicates non-consensus, 
and that this higher level of perceived expertise in turn increases people’s ability to 
achieve closure on the complex topic of CCS. We thus predict that source consensus will 
indirectly influence ability to achieve closure through perceived source expertise.
Additionally, we will explore whether or not the indirect effect of consensus on 
ability to achieve closure, as predicted in Hypothesis 2, applies equally to both types of 
sources examined (relevant professionals vs. citizens). We anticipate that the added value 
of consensus as an indicator of expertise may be particularly evident in the case of a lay 
source (citizens). 
Study 4.1
The aim of Study 4.1 was to test our prediction that the identity of an information 
source affects perceptions of source expertise, and in this way indirectly influences 
people’s ability to achieve closure on a complex topic (Hypothesis 1). Initial support for 
this hypothesis was found in a preliminary study that was set up, among other things, to 
explore the effects of source identity on perceived source expertise and ability to achieve 
closure. In this preliminary study we used a similar setup and an identical source identity 
manipulation as in Study 4.1, but were unable to achieve random allocation to conditions 
because data for the two source identity conditions were collected separately and several 
months apart from each other. Nevertheless, data from this preliminary study revealed 
that university students (N = 89) perceived higher levels of source expertise (α = .92, 
F[1, 87] = 23.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .21) and perceived themselves to be better able to achieve 
closure on CCS (α = .68, F[1, 87] = 7.53, p = .007, ηp2 = .08) when anticipating to receive 
information from Geophysicists than from the Citizens Association. Further, perceived 
source expertise was found to mediate the effect of source identity on ability to achieve 
closure in this sample (indirect effect B = 0.23, 95% CI [0.06, 0.49]; c’ path B = 0.28,  
p = .175). These data provide initial support for Hypothesis 1, and for the effectiveness 
of the source identity manipulation and experimental procedure we developed to 







Seventy social science and humanities undergraduate students (19 men and 
51 women, Mage = 20.90, SD = 3.58) from Leiden University participated in this 
experimental study and were randomly assigned to either one of the source identity 
conditions (the Citizens Association condition or the Geophysicists condition). 
Participants received a monetary reward or course credit in return for their 
participation. 
Procedure
The study was the first in a series of unrelated studies. Upon arrival at the 
laboratory, participants were led to individual cubicles, each containing a PC on which 
the study would be conducted. Participants first read an introductory text on climate 
change and carbon dioxide capture and storage technology (CCS). They then learned 
that CCS would possibly be implemented in the west of the Netherlands, which is the 
region where the participants lived, or to which they were tied in other ways, and where 
Leiden University is located. The study was introduced as a study on the attitudes of 
inhabitants of the west of the Netherlands towards the potential implementation of 
CCS in this region. Next, participants were told that before they were to report their 
attitudes on the implementation of CCS, they would receive more information on 
the topic. Participants learned that there are various bodies and organizations that 
provide information on CCS and that they would receive information from one of these 
sources. They also learned that not every participant would receive information from 
the same source and that some information sources might appeal more than others. As 
a manipulation of source identity, participants were either told that they would receive 
information from “the Association of Citizens and Sustainability” or that they would 
receive information from “the Association of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability”. 
Both these information sources were fictitious.
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Participants in the Geophysicists condition, on the other hand, read:
ΖQ \RXU FDVH WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW FDUERQ FDSWXUH DQG VWRUDJH








Participants then completed the manipulation check of the source identity 
manipulation and completed measures of perceived source expertise and ability to 
achieve closure. At the end of the series of studies in which the participants took part, 
participants were thanked and debriefed. They also learned that they would not receive 
additional information on CCS. 
Measures 
Depending on experimental condition, participants either answered questions 
relating to (information from) the Association of Citizens and Sustainability or relating 
to (information from) the Association of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability. For 
reasons of legibility, we refer to both associations using the term “the information source” 
in our presentation of the dependent variables below. 
Manipulation check. To check whether participants had correctly understood 
the identity of the information source, they were asked the following question: “Is the 
information that you are about to read about carbon capture and storage technology 
provided by the information source?” (1 = yes; 2 = no). 
Perceived source expertise. The level of expertise that the participants ascribed 
to the information source was measured using a 4-item questionnaire. Participants 
were asked to indicate their agreement with the following statements: “I think that 
the members of the information source know a lot about carbon capture and storage 
technology”, “I think that the members of the information source are knowledgeable 
about carbon capture and storage technology”, “I think that the information source is a 
specialist in the area of carbon capture and storage technology”, and “I think that the 
information source has expertise in the area of carbon capture and storage technology” 
(1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree). A perceived source expertise scale was 
calculated by averaging participants’ responses to the items (α = .93).
Ability to achieve closure. Participants’ perception regarding their ability to 




were asked to indicate their agreement with the following statements: “I think that I can 
form a clear opinion on the implementation of carbon capture and storage technology in 
the west of the Netherlands on the basis of the information of the information source”, “I 
expect that after reading the information of the information source I will be certain of my 
opinion on the implementation of carbon capture and storage technology in the west of 
the Netherlands”, “I expect that after reading the information of the information source 
my opinion on the implementation of carbon capture and storage technology in the west 
of the Netherlands will be fixed”, and “I think that after reading the information of the 
information source I will still have a need for extra information about carbon capture and 
storage technology” (reverse-coded) (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree). An 
ability to achieve closure score was calculated by averaging participants’ responses to the 
items (α = .66).
Results
Manipulation check 
We screened the data for incorrect answers to the manipulation check. Two of 
the 70 participants had incorrectly understood the identity of the information source. 
We excluded these cases from the analyses reported below; accordingly, the analyses 
reported below were performed on the data of 68 participants. Inclusion of all cases did 
not change the pattern of results.
Perceived source expertise
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant effect of source identity 
on perceived source expertise, F(1, 66) = 57.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .47. As predicted, and 
consistent with the results of the preliminary study, participants in the Geophysicists 
condition ascribed higher levels of expertise to the information source (M = 5.66,  
SD = 0.62) compared to participants in the Citizens Association condition (M = 3.89,  
SD = 1.21).
Ability to achieve closure
ANOVA revealed a marginally significant effect of source identity on ability to 
achieve closure in the predicted direction, F(1, 66) = 3.07, p = .085, ηp2 = .04. That 
is—replicating the results of our preliminary study—participants in the Geophysicists 
condition felt better able to achieve closure in their attitudes on CCS (M = 3.61,  
SD = 0.92) compared to participants in the Citizens Association condition (M = 3.21,  
SD = 0.95). 
87
4
PERCEPTIONS OF SOURCE EXPERTISE 
Mediation analysis 
We followed a bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008: 5000 resamples, 
bias corrected) to examine whether or not perceived source expertise mediated the effect 
of source identity on ability to achieve closure. The results indeed revealed a significant 
indirect effect of the source identity manipulation (0 = Citizens Association,  
1 = Geophysicists) on ability to achieve closure through perceived source expertise  
(B = 0.65, 95% CI [0.31, 1.11]; c’ path B = –0.24, p = .411), thereby providing additional 
support for Hypothesis 1. 
Discussion
Results of Study 4.1 provide support for our argument that when people believe an 
information source to have high expertise, they consider themselves to be more capable 
of forming a closed attitude than when they perceive the source to have low expertise 
on the topic in question. Specifically, we found that level of expertise that participants 
ascribed to the information depended on the identity of the source, and that perceived 
expertise in turn affected people’s ability to achieve closure. Providing support for 
Hypothesis 1, and consistent with the results of the preliminary study, participants 
perceived the Geophysicists to have higher relevant expertise than the Citizens 
Association, and as a consequence, participants felt better able to achieve closure on CCS 
when anticipating information from the Geophysicists.
Study 4.2
The goals of Study 4.2 were the following; First, we set out to replicate the results 
of Study 4.1 on the indirect effect of source identity on ability to achieve closure through 
perceived source expertise (Hypothesis 1). The second goal was to extend these results 
by examining our further prediction that the communication of consensus (versus non-
consensus) by an information source increases people’s perceptions of source expertise 
and in this way enhances their ability to achieve closure (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we 
explored whether or not the indirect effect of consensus on ability to achieve closure 
through perceived source expertise, as predicted in Hypothesis 2, applies regardless of 
the base rate level of source expertise implied in its identity (i.e., the Citizens Association 
and the Geophysicists). 
The design of Study 4.2 was similar to the design of Study 4.1. As in the previous 
study, we varied the identity of the information source from which participants 
expected to receive information on carbon capture and storage technology (CCS); the 




and Sustainability. In the present study, we also varied the level of consensus in the 
source, in a 2 × 2 design. That is, participants additionally learned that there was 
agreement or disagreement among members of the information source regarding the 
consequences of CCS for the environment. Participants then completed the central 
outcome measures of perceived source expertise and ability to achieve closure. Next, 
in another extension of Study 4.1, participants actually received information on CCS 
that ostensibly originated from the information source and in which consensus or 
non-consensus was communicated. After participants had read this information, we 
measured the extent to which they actually achieved cognitive closure in their attitude 
towards the implementation of CCS. We know from our own previous research (Koot et 
al., 2014a) that ability to achieve closure affects the level of cognitive closure that people 
achieve in their actual attitude formation. Hence, we anticipated that the source identity 
manipulation and the consensus manipulation would not only affect (self-perceived) 
ability to achieve closure, but also in a similar way would influence the level of closure 
that participants actually achieved when attempting to form an opinion about the topic. 
Finally, in extension of Study 4.1 we included control measures in the present study 
to rule out a number of potential alternative explanations for the observed patterns. 
Specifically, we checked whether individual differences in general need to achieve 
closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) or in overall self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 2006) 




Eighty-six social science and humanities undergraduate students (22 men 
and 64 women, Mage = 20.76) from Leiden University participated in Study 4.2 and 
were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 (source identity: Citizens 
Association vs. Geophysicists) × 2 (consensus: consensus vs. non-consensus) between-
participants factorial design. Participants received a monetary reward or course credit in 
return for their participation.
Procedure
Study 4.2 was the first in a series of unrelated studies. The study followed the 
same procedure as Study 4.1 up to the point where the source identity manipulation 
was introduced. The source identity manipulation—Citizens Association versus 
Geophysicists—was identical to the manipulation in Study 4.1. However, instead of the 
last sentence of the manipulation (“The information source has listed information about 
89
4
PERCEPTIONS OF SOURCE EXPERTISE 
aspects and characteristics of carbon capture and storage technology in the west of the 
Netherlands that in their view are the most important.”), the consensus manipulation 
was introduced. Depending on experimental condition, participants read (manipulated 
information in italics):
The Association of Citizens and Sustainability/the Association of Dutch 
Geophysicists and SustainabilityKDVOLVWHGZKDWLQWKHLUYLHZDUHWKHPRVW
LPSRUWDQWFRQVHTXHQFHVRIFDUERQFDSWXUHDQGVWRUDJHWHFKQRORJ\IRU
WKHHQYLURQPHQW<RXDUHDERXW WR UHDG WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQ ΖW LVJRRG WR
NQRZWKDW WKHPHPEHUVRI the Association of Citizens and Sustainability/
the Association of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability agree/disagree 
DPRQJWKHPVHOYHVDERXWWKHQHWH΍HFWRIFDUERQFDSWXUHDQGVWRUDJH
WHFKQRORJ\IRUWKHHQYLURQPHQWΖQRWKHUZRUGVWKHPHPEHUVall draw 
the same conclusion/do not all draw the same conclusion.7KLVDOVRDSSHDUV
IURPWKH LQIRUPDWLRQRI the Association of Citizens and Sustainability/the 
Association of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability
Participants then completed manipulation checks of source identity and consensus 
and they completed measures of the central outcome variables of perceived source 
expertise and ability to achieve closure. Next, in extension of Study 4.1, participants 
read information on CCS that allegedly originated from the announced source (Citizens 
Association or Geophysicists) and in which (non-)consensus was expressed. In all 
experimental conditions, the information from the source consisted of the same two 
arguments that were based on the CCS argument map by Van Egmond and Hekkert 
(2012); one argument reasoning why the effects of CCS for the environment would be 
positive and one argument reasoning why the effects would be negative. In the consensus 
condition, members of the source agreed on the net effect of CCS for the environment. 
The conclusion of the source on this topic was counterbalanced (i.e., an overall positive 
effect of CCS for the environment or an overall negative effect). Half of the participants 
in the consensus condition read (manipulated information in italics):
7KHPHPEHUVRIthe Association of Citizens and Sustainability/the Association 
of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability DJUHH DPRQJ WKHPVHOYHV
DERXW WKHQHWH΍HFWRIFDUERQFDSWXUHDQGVWRUDJH WHFKQRORJ\ IRU WKH
HQYLURQPHQW 7KLV LV ZKDW WKH\ KDYH WR VD\ DERXW LW Ȋ7KH PHPEHUV










The other half of the participants in the consensus condition read (manipulated 
information in italics): 
7KHPHPEHUVRIthe Association of Citizens and Sustainability/the Association 
of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability DJUHHDPRQJWKHPVHOYHVDERXWWKH
QHWH΍HFWRIFDUERQFDSWXUHDQGVWRUDJHWHFKQRORJ\IRUWKHHQYLURQPHQW
7KLVLVZKDWWKH\KDYHWRVD\DERXWLWȊ7KHPHPEHUVRIRXUDVVRFLDWLRQ
WKLQN WKDW WKHH΍HFWRIFDUERQFDSWXUHDQGVWRUDJH WHFKQRORJ\ IRU WKH





In the non-consensus condition, on the other hand, members of the source disagreed on 
the net effect of CCS for the environment. The same two arguments as in the consensus 
condition were used, and the order in which they were presented was counterbalanced. 
Half of the participants in the non-consensus condition read (manipulated information 
in italics):
7KHPHPEHUVRIthe Association of Citizens and Sustainability/the Association 
of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability GLVDJUHH DPRQJ WKHPVHOYHV
DERXW WKHQHWH΍HFWRIFDUERQFDSWXUHDQGVWRUDJH WHFKQRORJ\ IRU WKH
HQYLURQPHQW 7KLV LVZKDW WKH\ KDYH WR VD\ DERXW LW Ȋ6RPHPHPEHUV
RIRXU DVVRFLDWLRQ WKLQN WKDW WKHH΍HFWRI FDUERQ FDSWXUHDQG VWRUDJH
WHFKQRORJ\IRUWKHHQYLURQPHQWLVSRVLWLYHVLQFHWKHWHFKQRORJ\UHGXFHV
&22HPLVVLRQVDQGWKHUHE\ȴJKWVFOLPDWHFKDQJH2WKHUVȴQGWKDW WKLV




The other half of the participants in the non-consensus condition read (manipulated 
information in italics):
7KHPHPEHUVRIthe Association of Citizens and Sustainability/the Association 
of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability GLVDJUHH DPRQJ WKHPVHOYHV
DERXW WKHQHWH΍HFWRIFDUERQFDSWXUHDQGVWRUDJH WHFKQRORJ\ IRU WKH
HQYLURQPHQW 7KLV LVZKDW WKH\ KDYH WR VD\ DERXW LW Ȋ6RPHPHPEHUV
RIRXU DVVRFLDWLRQ WKLQN WKDW WKHH΍HFWRI FDUERQ FDSWXUHDQG VWRUDJH
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After reading the information on CCS, participants indicated their attitude toward the 
implementation of CCS in the west of the Netherlands11 (1 = very negative, 7 = very 
positive; overall M = 3.80, SD = 1.05) and completed a cognitive (self-report) measure 
and behavioral measure of cognitive closure achieved concerning the topic of CCS, an 
additional manipulation check of source consensus, and a number of control measures.12 
At the end of the series of studies in which the participants took part, they were thanked 
and debriefed.
Measures
 Manipulation checks. We employed the same source identity manipulation 
check as in Study 4.1 to check whether participants had understood the source identity 
manipulation correctly. To check whether participants had understood the consensus 
manipulation correctly, prior to reading the information from the information source 
they were asked to indicate whether members of the information source agree or 
disagree among themselves concerning the net effect of the implementation of carbon 
capture and storage technology for the environment (1 = they disagree among themselves; 
2 = they agree among themselves). Moreover, at the end of the study—that is, after 
reading the information ostensibly provided by the source in question and completing 
the measures of cognitive closure achieved—participants were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they thought that the members of the information source disagreed or 
agreed among each other about the net effect of carbon capture and storage technology 
for the environment (1 = disagreed completely, 7 = agreed completely). 
Control measures. We wanted to rule out the possibility that effects of our 
experimental manipulations might be accounted for by individual differences between 
participants in their overall need for closure or self-efficacy (c.f. Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). We therefore assessed these two factors as control variables after completing 
the actual study, presenting these measures to participants as an unrelated study on 
personality differences. We measured need for closure using the revised 15-item need 
for closure scale developed by Roets and Van Hiel (2011) (α = .80). Self-efficacy was 
measured by means of the Dutch adaptation of the general self-efficacy scale (Teeuw 
et al., 1994), which consists of 10 items (α = .81). Higher scores on the 7-point scales 
indicate higher levels of need for closure or higher levels of self-efficacy. 










same items as in Study 4.1 (α = .93). 
Ability to achieve closure. Ability to achieve closure was measured with the same 
items as in Study 4.1 (α = .84).
Cognitive closure achieved. Following the attitude measure, participants’ 
cognitive closure regarding their attitude on CCS was measured using a cognitive (self-
report) measure as well as a behavioral measure, which were both virtually identical 
to those used in our previous research on cognitive closure (Koot et al., 2014a). First, 
participants indicated their agreement with 13 statements regarding their attitude on the 
implementation of CCS, such as “I am certain of my opinion on the implementation of 
carbon capture and storage technology in the west of the Netherlands”, “I feel undecided 
about my opinion on carbon capture and storage technology” (reverse-coded), and “My 
opinion on the implementation of carbon capture and storage technology in the west 
of the Netherlands is fixed” (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree). A cognitive 
closure scale was calculated by averaging participants’ responses to the items (α = .81), 
on which higher scores indicate higher levels of cognitive closure achieved. 
We then assessed cognitive closure achieved with a behavioral measure, which 
involved asking participants to decide whether or not they were ready to participate in 
a poll concerning the implementation of CCS in the west of the Netherlands (1 = I am 
ready to participate; 2 = I am not yet ready to participate). The results of this poll would 
ostensibly be forwarded to governmental organizations involved in the implementation 
of CCS in the west of the Netherlands. After indicating whether or not they were ready 
to participate, participants who answered affirmatively could choose to vote for or 
against the implementation of CCS. Participants’ decision whether or not to participate 
in the poll (i.e., commit to their attitude) was used as a behavioral measure of cognitive 
closure achieved, in which the decision to participate in the poll was regarded an 
indicator of cognitive closure. 
Results
Descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, and percentages) for the 










































5HDGLQHVVWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQSROO    
Manipulation checks
We screened the data for incorrect answers to the factual manipulation checks 
of source identity and consensus (i.e., the checks that took place prior to reading the 
information on CCS from the information source). Ten participants answered one 
of the manipulation check questions incorrectly. This means that these participants 
had incorrectly understood the identity of the information source or had incorrectly 
understood that the members of the information source (dis)agreed among themselves 
(none of the participants answered both questions incorrectly). We excluded these cases 
from the analyses below. Thus, the analyses reported below were conducted on the data 
of 76 participants. Inclusion of all cases did not change the pattern of results.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the remaining participants’ perceptions of 
the level of (dis)agreement among members of the information source (assessed after 
completion of the study) further confirmed that participants in the consensus condition 
clearly perceived higher consensus among source members (M = 6.23, SD = 1.56) than 
participants in the non-consensus condition (M = 2.54, SD = 1.61), F(1, 72) = 98.68,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .58. There was no main effect of source identity on this measure,  
F(1, 72) < 1, p = .757, nor an interaction between source identity and consensus,  
F(1, 72) < 1, p = .818, confirming that we were able to manipulate perceived source 
consensus independently from source identity.
Control measures 




source identity and consensus on need for closure or on self-efficacy, Fs(1, 72) ≤ 1.80, 
ps ≥ .184. Furthermore, including need for closure and self-efficacy as covariates in 
subsequent analyses did not change the pattern of results reported below. Thus, effects 
of our experimental manipulations on participants’ responses cannot be ascribed to 
differences between conditions in need for closure or self-efficacy. 
Perceived source expertise
We conducted a 2 × 2 ANOVA with source identity and consensus as independent 
variables and perceived source expertise as the dependent variable. As in Study 4.1, and 
as predicted in Hypothesis 1, results showed a significant main effect of source identity, 
F(1, 72) = 44.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .38, where participants in the Geophysicists condition 
ascribed higher levels of expertise to the information source (M = 5.49, SD = 0.80) than 
participants in the Citizens Association condition (M = 3.96, SD = 1.24). The analysis 
further revealed the predicted main effect of consensus, F(1, 72) = 5.04, p = .028,  
ηp2 = .07, where participants in the consensus condition perceived significantly higher 
levels of source expertise (M = 4.88, SD = 1.27) compared to those in the non-consensus 
condition (M = 4.47, SD = 1.31). There was no significant interaction effect of source 
identity and consensus on perceived source expertise, F(1, 72) < 1, p = .405. 
Ability to achieve closure
We submitted participants’ perceptions concerning their ability to achieve 
closure on CCS to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with source identity and consensus as independent 
variables. Consistent with our prediction (Hypothesis 1), and replicating the results 
of Study 4.1, the analysis revealed a significant main effect of source identity, F(1, 72) 
= 4.08, p = .047, ηp2 = .05, such that participants in the Geophysicists condition felt 
better able to form a closed attitude on CCS (M = 3.47, SD = 1.03) than participants 
in the Citizens Association condition (M = 3.02, SD = 1.15). Furthermore, the analysis 
revealed a marginally significant main effect of consensus on ability to achieve closure, 
with the pattern of means revealing differences in the predicted direction (Hypothesis 
2), F(1, 72) = 3.30, p = .073, ηp2 = .04. That is, participants in the consensus condition 
felt (marginally) better able to form a closed attitude on CCS (M = 3.44, SD = 1.16) 
than participants in the non-consensus condition (M = 3.01, SD = 1.04). There was no 
significant interaction effect between source identity and consensus on ability to achieve 
closure, F(1, 72) = 2.57, p = .113. 
Mediation analyses
We followed a bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008: 5000 resamples, 
bias corrected, controlling for consensus) to test our prediction that perceived source 
expertise would mediate the effect of source identity on ability to achieve closure. 
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Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and corroborating the results of Study 4.1, the analysis 
showed a significant indirect effect of the source identity manipulation  
(0 =Geophysicists, 1 = Citizens Association) on ability to achieve closure through 
perceived source expertise, B = −0.70, 95% CI (−1.08, −0.38); c’ path B = 0.21, p = .464. 
This means that to the extent that people perceive an association of Geophysicists to have 
higher expertise on CCS than a Citizens’ association, this higher level of source expertise 
in turn increases their ability to achieve closure on CCS. 
We followed another bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008: 5000 
resamples, bias corrected, controlling for source identity) to test our second hypothesis 
that perceived source expertise would also mediate the effect of consensus on ability to 
achieve closure. Results confirmed our prediction and revealed a significant indirect 
effect of the consensus manipulation (0 = consensus, 1 = non-consensus) on ability to 
achieve closure through perceived source expertise, B = −0.24, 95% CI (−0.51, −0.05); 
c’ path B = –0.23, p = .340, thereby providing support for Hypothesis 2. That is, these 
results show that to the extent that the communication of consensus (versus non-
consensus) increases people’s perceptions of source expertise, this higher level of source 
expertise in turn increases people’s ability to achieve closure on CCS.
Cognitive closure achieved
To test whether the source identity manipulation and consensus manipulation 
also affected the level of cognitive closure that participants actually achieved, we first 
conducted a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the self-report measure of closure achieved. Results of the 
analysis revealed no main effect of source identity, F(1, 72) < 1, p = .397, but did reveal a 
significant main effect of consensus, F(1, 72) = 9.35, p = .003, ηp2 = .11. This main effect 
was qualified by a significant interaction between source identity and consensus,  
F(1, 72) = 8.77, p = .004, ηp2 = .11. Additional analyses of simple main effects revealed 
that in the case of the Citizens Association, participants reported significantly higher 
levels of cognitive closure achieved when members of the source had communicated 
consensus (M = 3.90, SD = 0.81) compared to when they had communicated 
disagreement (i.e., non-consensus) (M = 2.90, SD = 0.60), B = 1.00, t = 4.36, p <.001. 
In the case of the Geophysicists, however, the communication of consensus versus 
non-consensus did not further increase the level of cognitive closure that participants 
achieved (M = 3.27, SD = 0.79, and M = 3.25, SD = 0.64, respectively), B = 0.02, t = 0.07, 
p = .947. 
We also tested whether source identity and consensus affected the behavioral 
manifestation of cognitive closure achieved by conducting a 2 × 2 binary logistic 




cognitive closure achieved. Results of the analysis revealed no main effect of source 
identity (B = −1.07, Wald[1] = 1.83, p = .176), but did show a main effect of consensus 
(B = −2.17, Wald[1] = 7.89, p = .005). In line with the self-report measure of cognitive 
closure achieved, this main effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction 
effect of source identity and consensus (B = 1.75, Wald[1] = 2.89, p = .089). Separate 
chi-squared tests for the two source identity conditions revealed that in the Citizens 
Association condition, participants were more likely to participate in the poll when 
the source had communicated consensus (64% decided to cast a vote) compared to 
non-consensus (17% decided to cast a vote), χ2(1) = 8.94, p = .003. In the Geophysicists 
condition, on the other hand, communication of (non-)consensus did not affect 
participants readiness to participate in the poll; 47% of participants in the consensus 
condition decided to cast a vote versus 37% in the non-consensus condition, χ2(1) = 0.39, 
p = .535. 
Additional analyses
At first sight, it may seem inconsistent that we find two main effects on perceived 
expertise and ability to achieve closure (as predicted), while our measures of cognitive 
closure achieved reveal an interaction between these two manipulations. We conducted 
some additional analyses to better understand this apparent discrepancy between our 
observations on different measures. The ANOVAs we conducted to examine support 
for our predicted effects on perceived source expertise and ability to achieve closure did 
not reveal statistically significant interaction effects of source identity and consensus. 
However, further inspection of the mean scores (see Table 4.1) does suggest that that 
the effect of consensus on these measures primarily emerged in the Citizens Association 
condition—reflecting a pattern similar to what we observed in the two measures of 
closure achieved. We further explored this possibility by conducting separate ANOVAs 
to examine the effect of the consensus manipulation on perceived source expertise and 
ability to achieve closure for each of the two source identity conditions. The results of 
these additional analyses confirm that the added value of communicating consensus 
for perceived source expertise and ability to achieve closure primarily emerges when 
the expertise of the source is not clearly implied in its identity. That is, participants who 
anticipated to receive information from the Citizens Association perceived (marginally) 
higher levels of source expertise and felt significantly better able to achieve closure on 
CCS when this source communicated consensus (Mexpertise = 4.28, SDexpertise = 1.29;  
Mability = 3.40, SDability = 1.16) compared to non-consensus (Mexpertise = 3.56, SDexpertise = 1.07; 
Mability = 2.56, SDability = 1.00) (perceived source expertise: F[1, 38] = 3.66, p = .063,  
ηp2 = .09; ability to achieve closure: F[1, 38] = 5.96, p = .019, ηp2 = .14). However, 
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there was no evidence of an added value of communicating (non-)consensus when 
participants anticipated to receive information from the Geophysicists. That is, 
participants did not appear to perceive higher source expertise or feel better able to 
achieve closure when the Geophysicists communicated consensus (Mexpertise = 5.66, 
SDexpertise = 0.72; Mability = 3.50, SDability = 1.19) versus non-consensus (Mexpertise = 5.33, 
SDexpertise = 0.85; Mability = 3.45, SDability = 0.90) (perceived source expertise:  
F[1, 34] = 1.59, p = .216; ability to achieve closure: F[1, 38] < 1, p = .881). Moreover, 
when we conducted separate bootstrapping analyses for each of the two source identity 
conditions (Preacher & Hayes 2008: 5000 resamples, bias corrected) this revealed that 
perceived expertise mediated the effect of the source consensus manipulation  
(0 = consensus, 1 = non-consensus) on ability to achieve closure in the Citizens 
Association condition (B = –0.31; 95% CI [–0.76, –0.03]; c’ path B = –0.54, p = .107). 
Again, no such indirect effect occurred in the Geophysicists condition (B = –0.13; 
95% CI [–0.47, 0.03]; c’ path B = 0.10, p = .770). Taken together, these additional 
analyses consistently suggest that the communication of consensus primarily increases 
perceptions of source expertise—and thus increases the ability to achieve closure—when 
the identity of the source does not (already) contain clear cues to indicate high expertise 
(e.g., in the case of a lay information source).
Discussion
In sum, the results of Study 4.2 replicate and extend those of the first study, 
and offer support both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. The findings again show the 
importance of perceived source expertise for people’s ability to achieve closure on 
complex topics, and demonstrate that both source identity and communication of 
consensus can contribute to perceptions of source expertise. As in Study 4.1, we found 
that the identity of an information source influences perceptions of source expertise, 
and that higher levels of perceived source expertise in turn increase people’s ability 
to form a closed attitude on a complex topic. Moreover, Study 4.2 extends the results 
of the previous study by demonstrating that for perceptions of source expertise, and 
thereby for people’s ability to achieve closure, it is not only important who is providing 
the information, but also what message is being communicated. That is, we found that 
people regard an information source to have more expertise, and therefore feel better 
able to achieve closure, when it communicates consensus rather than non-consensus. 
Notably, the effects observed in the present research emerged independently of 
individual differences in need for closure or self-efficacy. This allows us to rule out such 
differences as alternative explanations for our findings and suggests that people’s ability 




existing variations in people’s individual needs and abilities relevant to the formation 
of a closed attitude. Finally, although the effects of source identity and consensus occur 
independently of one another as predicted, results on cognitive closure achieved and 
additional analyses suggest that that the added value of communicating consensus 
primarily emerges for sources with a non-expert identity. 
General Discussion
Compared to open, “unfinished” attitudes, closed attitudes are better predictors 
of people’s future attitudes and behavior (cf. Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986b). As such, closed attitudes—attitudes on which people have achieved a state 
of cognitive closure—are also better predictors of people’s support or opposition to a 
complex technology. Recent research has demonstrated that experimental manipulations 
of the extent to which people feel that they are able to achieve closure determine the level 
of cognitive closure that they actually achieve in their attitude formation concerning 
complex topics (Koot et al., 2014a). It is therefore important to examine which real-life 
factors impact on people’s ability to achieve closure. To examine this, we connected to 
existing insights on the importance of communication and the provision of information 
for the formation of attitudes. Specifically, we examined the impact of the level of 
expertise that people perceive an information source to have on their ability to form a 
closed attitude on complex topics. 
Results of the two experimental studies reported here consistently show that 
when people believe a source of information to have high, compared to low, expertise 
on the complex topic in question, they feel better able to form a closed attitude on the 
basis of the information provided by this source. Our results furthermore demonstrate 
that perceived source expertise not only depends on who is communicating, but is also 
affected by the message communicated by this source. That is, people attribute higher 
expertise to an information source that has an expert identity (i.e., geophysicists) 
compared to a non-expert identity (i.e., a citizens association). Likewise, a source that 
communicates consensus, rather than non-consensus, is seen as having more expertise 
on the topic in question. Perceptions of source expertise are relevant, because these 
subsequently increase the perceived ability to form a closed attitude on the complex 
topic in question. These effects were also visible in the extent to which people actually 
achieve cognitive closure in their attitude on a complex topic.
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Theoretical Implications
The present research contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Results 
of two studies demonstrate that perceptions of the expertise of a particular source of 
information impact on people’s ability to achieve closure on the basis of information 
provided by this source. A few studies so far have demonstrated that people’s ability to 
achieve closure is susceptible to external influences. However, these have all employed 
relatively artificial manipulations (e.g., bogus feedback from a personality test; Koot 
et al., 2014a) to induce such differences. To our knowledge, the current research is 
the first to reveal how experiences that are more likely to emerge in real life settings 
may determine people’s ability to make up their mind. In this way, the present results 
corroborate and extend emerging evidence that the ability to achieve closure not 
only indicates how individuals differ from each other, but is also a factor that can be 
influenced situationally, independently of such more stable individual differences. 
The effect of perceived source expertise we observed on the ability to achieve closure 
moreover extends previous findings from research on persuasion. That is, prior work has 
shown that information has a stronger impact on the content of people’s attitudes (i.e., is 
more persuasive) when they believe that the information source has high, compared to 
low, relevant expertise (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Pornpitakpan, 2004). We have 
complemented these insights by showing that perceived source expertise also affects the 
likelihood that people feel confident that they are able to form an attitude on the topic in 
question. As such, the present data again underline the significance of source expertise, 
and especially perceptions thereof, for the realm of attitude formation, but do this in a 
different way than in prior research.
In the present research, we established that people form an impression about the 
expertise of a particular source of information on the basis of its identity. At first sight, 
this may seem self-evident, and indeed, there are several studies in which source identity 
and source expertise are treated as interchangeable concepts (e.g., Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 
2002; Clark, Wegener, Habashi, & Evans, 2012; Mackie & Worth, 1989). Notwithstanding 
this prior work and the relation we observed between source identity and perceived 
expertise, the current research also demonstrates that the level of expertise that people 
attribute to a particular information source is not fixed. Instead, we demonstrated that 
the perceived level of expertise of a given source is also affected by the content of its 
message (cf. Reimer et al., 2004)—in this case the level of consensus communicated 
by the source. Of course, this could not be revealed in prior studies where the level of 
consensus remained unspecified or was held constant. However, we found that if an 




of disagreeing), people take this as a cue of high source expertise. Interestingly, our 
results seem to suggest that the added value of explicitly communicating consensus 
is particularly relevant for sources whose identities suggest low relevant expertise. 
By contrast, being informed about the level of consensus is less relevant for people’s 
perceptions of a source that already is considered expert on the basis of its identity. 
Our present findings also resonate with prior work on person perception (Cuddy, 
Glick, & Beninger, 2011; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). This research established that 
there is an asymmetry in the impact of explicit information that is provided about 
particular individuals, depending on pre-existing expectations that other people 
have about their competence. Specifically, when someone is expected to be relatively 
incompetent, any display of competence is seen as indicating the “true level” of 
competence, and is taken as evidence that the individual actually is more competent 
than was anticipated. By contrast, when someone is expected to be generally competent, 
a disappointing performance is not seen as very informative, as it tends be attributed 
to lack of care or motivation rather than being seen as diagnostic of the true ability of 
the individual in question. As a result, the knowledge of competent or incompetent 
behaviors has much less of an impact on the overall impression of someone who is a 
priori expected to be competent. Likewise, in our research the communication of (non-)
consensus was less impactful in the case of an expert source. This parallel between 
prior work on person perception and individual impression formation and the present 
research on attitude formation and the ability to achieve closure suggests that there may 
be a more general asymmetry in the perceived value of explicit information, depending 
on pre-existing expectations people have. Future research may further explore this 
possibility, to examine whether a broader underlying mechanism may account for a 
larger corpus of findings from different literatures.
Practical Implications
The present findings have a number of very concrete and practical implications. 
They may be of particular interest for stakeholders involved in complex issues or projects 
that affect the public, such as a government planning the implementation of a novel 
technology or policy. Public opinion can be a decisive factor in the progress of political 
decision making or for the implementation of decisions already made. The present 
research helps understand under which circumstances people will feel most able of 
achieving the cognitive closure that is needed for declared opinions to be indicative of 
people’s actual points of view. This is not to suggest, however, that the achievement of 
closure should be a goal in itself. In fact, there may be conditions under which it would 
be more appropriate to keep an open mind, for instance because crucial information 
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(e.g., about long-term effects of a technology) is not yet available. Ideally, individuals 
are thoroughly and well informed before forming their definite, closed attitude. If high 
quality and complete information can be provided, encouraging people to achieve 
closure may be appropriate. However, as long as the available information is of low 
quality, still incomplete, or possibly even false, there is little benefit in assessing people’s 
stated opinions, or in encouraging them to achieve closure (cf. Lewandowsky et al., 
2012). Communicators and opinion pollsters do well to take this into account when 
deciding whether and how to assess “public opinion” to gauge support for particular 
policies or activities. 
Our results indicate that people take into account the expertise of a particular 
source when evaluating the usefulness of the information provided by this source. That 
is, receiving information from a source with higher perceived expertise causes people 
to feel strengthened in forming a closed attitude on complex topic, on which they 
themselves are no experts. This can be a comforting thought for those who strive to 
communicate high quality information to the general public and are confronted with 
the current reality in which abundant information of varying quality is available to the 
public (e.g., on the internet). The present research suggests that people who try to form 
an opinion will tend to filter and select information, depending on the identity of the 
source of this information. When informing the public on the basis of valid information 
from experts, it would thus make sense to explicitly state the identity of the information 
source. Emphasizing the expert identity should raise perceptions of source expertise and 
as such increase the extent to which people feel capable of forming their closed, definite 
attitude on the basis of the information provided. 
Those who provide information on complex topics for the public interest should 
furthermore beware of the impact that seemingly innocuous statements embedded in 
the content of the message can have. Specifically, it may be important for members of 
an information source to draw a joint conclusion when possible, and if this is the case, 
to explicitly communicate such agreement. Indeed, our results suggest that people will 
take such consensus as indicating high knowledgeability of the source on the topic in 
question. Of course, in the case of many complex issues, such as the question of climate 
change, it may not always be possible to reach agreement about all relevant aspects. If 
this is the case, withholding the fact that there is an unresolved (scientific) debate on a 
public affair from the public would be irresponsible. At the same time, it is important 
to be aware of the possible impact that disclosure about such disagreement may have, 
and to take into account the possibility that it undermines perceptions of expertise. 
Knowing this may be the case makes it even more pressing to be explicit about people’s 




statements that are made. Indeed, the results from the present work seem to suggest that 
the negative effects of communicating lack of consensus are likely to be less pronounced 
when people are made aware of the expert identity of the source. This makes it all the 
more important to make salient the expert identity of an information source when the 
state of affairs of the topic in question (e.g., the development of nanotechnology) does 
not yet allow for the communication of consensus. That is, knowing that information is 
coming from experts will make people feel reasonably able to decide on their point of 
view on the basis of this information, despite the lack of consensus on the topic. 
By contrast, the communication of consensus can increase people’s reliance 
on information provided by a non-expert source. People may feel ready to make up 
their mind when a source with a lay status conveys a concordant conclusion, even 
when the actual quality of this information is unclear. The potential impact of non-
experts communicating a strong and unanimous message should therefore not be 
underestimated by those charged with communicating about complex scientific and 
public projects. Parties that providing a podium for the debate on complex issues, such 
as the implementation of a novel technology, should be mindful of giving voice to lay 
parties that provide inaccurate information but nevertheless communicate a strong and 
unanimous message. 
Limitations and Future Directions
We have interpreted the present results as indicating that the communication of 
(non-)consensus mainly affects perceived source expertise and ability to achieve closure 
when such confidence cannot be derived from the identity of the source. Nevertheless, 
we acknowledge that the present data are not conclusive on this point. Instead, they may 
reflect the specific nature of the manipulation we used to convey (lack of) consensus. 
That is, while we indicated that there was disagreement on what can be concluded about 
the net consequences of CCS for the environment, there was no sign of disagreement 
about the underlying facts. This form of disagreement may not have seemed very 
strong or problematic. Indeed, on the basis of the present work, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that a stronger level of disagreement might also undermine people’s reliance 
on information provided by an expert source. We conducted an auxiliary study to 
explore this possibility (Koot, Ter Mors, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2014b). In this study, 
members of “the Association of Dutch Geophysicists and Sustainability” were said to 
agree or disagree about the facts underlying their stance towards CCS. In support of 
our current interpretation of the present findings, and similar to what we observed in 
Study 4.2, this stronger manipulation of (lack of) consensus did not affect perceived 
source expertise to such an extent that it lead to a significant decrease in people’s ability 
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to achieve closure on the topic. Thus, despite the limitations of the present methodology, 
the available evidence actually suggests that an expert identity is quite a robust indicator 
of high expertise. Additional research can further address this question and more 
systematically establish the boundary conditions for this effect.
Now that we have established the relevance of communicating about source 
identity and consensus, future research might also address additional factors in 
communication that possibly impact on perceived expertise and subsequently the ability 
to achieve closure. For instance, people may be less impressed with information from 
one information source (i.e., perceive lower source expertise and feel less able to achieve 
closure) when they realize that there is also information available from sources with 
higher levels of expertise, compared to when they are unaware of such information. 
Exploring these issues would be a useful direction for future research. 
When trying to ascertain the broader implications of our current findings, we 
acknowledge that the particular nature of our sample may have played a role in the 
responses we observed. Participants in the current research were Dutch university 
students. These are likely to deviate from a random sample of the general public in a 
number of ways. First, they may be more used to and hence overall more confident to 
form opinions on the basis of partial or inconsistent information. Indeed, as part of 
their academic training, they are prepared to deal with scientific nuance and to weigh 
the positions of experts advocating diverging points of view. This may have made our 
participants relatively unmoved by the communication of (non-)consensus in the case of 
an expert source. At the same time, one may argue that a more representative sample of 
the general population is likely to be more impressed with the expertise of geophysicists 
than university students who are used to interact with and question different types of 
experts. All in all, we acknowledge the specific nature of our sample, and future research 
might establish the broader applicability of these findings. Nevertheless, it is not self-
evident whether or how the nature of our sample should have biased our results. 
In a similar vein, it might be of interest to investigate the relation between source 
identity, perceived source expertise, and the ability to achieve closure in national 
contexts that differ in their overall level of scientific skepticism. In the Netherlands the 
general public has a relatively high level of trust in science (KNAW, 2013). It might be 
relevant to establish whether such overall differences also affect the sensitivity of the 
general public to additional or alternative indicators of potentially relevant expertise. 
For instance, in countries where people have less trust in science, communication 
of consensus by a source with a non-expert identity may be especially influential. 
Conversely, communicating lack of consensus among scientists might be more harmful 




think this does not invalidate the implications of the present research, it might be of 
interest to gain further insight in how different a priori levels of perceived expertise of 
different types of sources affect the impact of further information provided.
Conclusion
Results from two studies lead us to conclude that the level of expertise that people 
perceive an information source to have is an important determinant of how capable they 
feel of forming a closed attitude on complex topics. The identity of an information source 
emerges as an important determinant of people’s impressions of the source’s expertise. 
However, the level of expertise that people ascribe to a particular source is not fixed. 
When a source communicates consensus about the topic in question people perceive 
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Appendix
Design, Stimulus Materials, 
and Results of the Two Distinct 




Data Collection Wave I
In the first data collection wave we explored whether communicating an analogy 
of CCS would reduce participants’ risk perception of and negative emotional reactions 
to the implementation of CCS, and whether this would lead to an increase in the level 
of cognitive closure they achieved on the topic. To ensure that the effects would not 
differ depending on CCS-component, we counterbalanced whether participants were 
prompted to think about CO2 storage or about CO2 transport. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 97 students (33 men and 64 women; 
Mage = 20.32, SD = 2.99) who were randomly assigned to either one of the conditions of 
the 2 (CCS-component: CO2 transport vs. CO2 storage) × 2 (analogy use: analogy vs. 
no-analogy) design. They received either a monetary reward or course credit in return 
for their participation.
Procedure. The study was the first in a set of unrelated studies. The procedure and 
measures of this data collection wave were as described in the main text of Chapter 2. 
Depending on CCS-component condition, participants read information about CO2 
transport or CO2 storage, and depending on analogy condition, this information did 
or did not include an analogy of the relevant CCS-component. Participants in the CO2 
transport condition (analogy and no-analogy) read the following information:
&22FDQEHWUDQVSRUWHGYLDSLSHOLQHVVKLSVRUWDQNHUWUXFNV7KHPDQQHU
RI WUDQVSRUW WKDW LV VHOHFWHG GHSHQGV RQ PDQ\ DVSHFWV VXFK DV WKH
DPRXQWRI&22DQGWKHWUDQVSRUWGLVWDQFHWRWKHORFDWLRQZKHUHWKH&22 




Those in the CO2 transport-analogy condition then also read:
&22 WUDQVSRUW YLD SLSHOLQHV LV FRPSDUDEOH WR WUDQVSRUW RI QDWXUDO JDV
ZKHUHQDWXUDOJDVLVWUDQVSRUWHGYLDSLSHOLQHVWRSURYLGHKRXVHKROGVDQG
EXVLQHVVHVZLWKJDV
Participants in the CO2 storage condition (analogy and no-analogy) read the following 
information about the CCS-component:
&22 FDQEHVWRUHG LQGHSOHWHGQDWXUDOJDVȴHOGV LQGHSOHWHGRLOȴHOGV
DQGLQVRFDOOHGDTXLIHUVZDWHUEHDULQJOD\HUV3ULRUWRWKHVHOHFWLRQRI
&22VWRUDJHORFDWLRQVLQYHVWLJDWLRQVDUHFDUULHGRXWDIWHUZKLFKWKHPRVW
VXLWDEOH ORFDWLRQ LV VHOHFWHG 'HSOHWHG QDWXUDO JDV ȴHOGV DUH WKHPRVW




WKH&22 WKDWKDVEHHQFDSWXUHG LW LVȴUVWFRPSUHVVHG7KH&22 LVWKHQ
LQVHUWHGLQWRWKHGHSOHWHGQDWXUDOJDVȴHOGYLDDQLQMHFWLRQZHOOZKHUHLW
LVVWRUHG
In the CO2 storage-analogy condition participants then also read:
&22 VWRUDJH LQGHSOHWHGQDWXUDOJDVȴHOGV LV FRPSDUDEOH WR VWRUDJHRI




To explore whether participants´ general risk perception, specific risk perceptions, 
negative emotional reactions, and their achievement of cognitive closure were affected 
by the use of an analogy or differed depending on CCS-component (CO2 transport or 
CO2 storage), we conducted Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with analogy use and CCS-
component as independent variables. 
Results revealed no significant main or interaction effects of analogy use and 
CCS-component on general risk perception, Fs(1, 93) ≤ 3.08, ps ≥ .083, or on any of 
the specific risk perception dimensions (catastrophic potential, lack of control, and lack 
of familiarity), Fs(1, 93) ≤ 3.22, ps ≥ .076. Participants’ negative emotional reactions to 
CCS also remained largely unaffected by analogy use and CCS-component. Analogy use 
and CCS-component had neither main nor interaction effects on outcome uncertainty-
related emotions, Fs(1, 93) ≤ 1.59, ps ≥ .210. Results showed only a main effect of 
analogy use on outcome certainty-related emotions; participants who learned about a 
natural gas analogue of CCS experienced these emotions more intensely (M = 2.45,  
SD = 1.36) than those who did not learn about an analogous technology (M = 1.91,  
SD = 0.92), F(1, 93) = 5.19, p = .025, ηp2 = .05. There was no main effect of CCS-
component or interaction effect of analogy use and CCS-component on outcome 
certainty-related emotions, Fs(1, 93) < 1, ps ≥ .585. Finally, the level of cognitive 
closure that participants achieved did differ depending on the CCS-component under 
consideration; participants who were asked to form an attitude on CO2 transport 
achieved more cognitive closure (M = 3.94, SD = 1.13) than those who formed an 
attitude on CO2 storage (M = 3.50, SD = 1.05), F(1, 93) = 4.02, p = .048, ηp2 = .04. There 
was no main effect of analogy use or an interaction effect of analogy use and CCS-




Data Collection Wave II
In the second data collection wave we focused on CO2 storage only. In this wave, 
we did not only systematically vary whether participants learned about an analogous 
technology of CO2 storage, but also whether this analogy contained information that 
alluded to the safety of the analogous technology. In this way, we aimed to explore 
whether communicating information that contained an analogy of CO2 storage as 
well as safety-related information about the analogue would reduce participants’ risk 
perception and negative emotional reactions to the implementation of the technology. 
Such reductions would then possibly lead to an increase in the level of cognitive closure 
that people achieved on the topic. Contrary to the first data collection wave, participants 
in the analogy conditions first learned about the analogy, and then read further 
information on the CCS-component. 
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 122 students (24 men and 98 women; 
Mage = 20.00, SD = 2.69) who were randomly assigned to either one of three experimental 
conditions (analogy with safety information vs. analogy without safety information vs. 
no analogy). They received either a monetary reward or course credit in return for their 
participation.
Procedure. The study was the first in a set of unrelated studies. The procedure and 
measures of this data collection wave were as described in the main text of Chapter 2. 
Depending on experimental condition, participants read information about CO2 storage 
that did or did not include an analogy. Specifically, participants in the “analogy with 
safety information” condition and the “analogy without safety information” condition 
first learned about a technology that is analogous to CO2 storage in depleted natural 
gas fields; storage of natural gas in depleted natural gas fields. The text on the analogy 
in the “analogy with safety information” condition additionally contained information 
that alluded to the safety of the analogous technology. Participants in the “no analogy” 
condition did not learn about an analogy. Thus, the complete text on CO2 storage in 
depleted natural gas fields in the “analogy with safety information” read as follows:
6RPHSDUWVRI WKH&22 FDSWXUH WUDQVSRUW DQG VWRUDJH WHFKQRORJ\DUH
FRPSDUDEOHWRDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJWHFKQRORJLHV)RULQVWDQFHVWRUDJHRI&22 
LQGHSOHWHGQDWXUDOJDVȴHOGVLVFRPSDUDEOHWRWKHVWRUDJHRIQDWXUDOJDV
LQ WKHVH W\SHVRIȴHOGV6WRUDJHRIQDWXUDOJDV LQGHSOHWHGQDWXUDOJDV
ȴHOGVWDNHVSODFHWRHQDEOHH΍HFWLYHUHVSRQVHVWRSHDNVLQJDVGHPDQG
LQ ZLQWHU 8QGHUJURXQG VWRUDJH RI QDWXUDO JDV LV D WULHG DQG WHVWHG
PHWKRGDQGKDVEHHQWDNLQJSODFHVLQFHWKHVRQVHYHUDOORFDWLRQV







&22 FDQ EH VWRUHG LQ GL΍HUHQW ZD\V 'HSOHWHG QDWXUDO JDV ȴHOGV DUH
WKHPRVWOLNHO\VWRUDJHORFDWLRQIRU&22LQWKH1HWKHUODQGV3ULRUWRWKH
VHOHFWLRQRI&22 VWRUDJH ORFDWLRQV LQYHVWLJDWLRQV DUH FDUULHGRXW DIWHU
ZKLFKWKHPRVWVXLWDEOHORFDWLRQIRUVWRUDJHRIWKH&22LVVHOHFWHG7REH
DEOHWRVWRUHWKH&22LWLVJDWKHUHGDWWKHGHSOHWHGQDWXUDOJDVȴHOG7KH




Participants in the “analogy without safety information” read the following text: 
6RPHSDUWVRI WKH&22 FDSWXUH WUDQVSRUW DQG VWRUDJH WHFKQRORJ\DUH
FRPSDUDEOHWRDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJWHFKQRORJLHV)RULQVWDQFHVWRUDJHRI&22 
LQGHSOHWHGQDWXUDOJDVȴHOGVLVFRPSDUDEOHWRWKHVWRUDJHRIQDWXUDOJDV




&22 FDQ EH VWRUHG LQ GL΍HUHQW ZD\V 'HSOHWHG QDWXUDO JDV ȴHOGV DUH
WKHPRVWOLNHO\VWRUDJHORFDWLRQIRU&22LQWKH1HWKHUODQGV3ULRUWRWKH
VHOHFWLRQRI&22 VWRUDJH ORFDWLRQV LQYHVWLJDWLRQV DUH FDUULHGRXW DIWHU
ZKLFKWKHPRVWVXLWDEOHORFDWLRQIRUVWRUDJHRIWKH&22LVVHOHFWHG7REH
DEOHWRVWRUHWKH&22LWLVJDWKHUHGDWWKHGHSOHWHGQDWXUDOJDVȴHOG7KH




And, finally, the information on CO2 storage in depleted natural gas fields in the “no 
analogy” condition read: 
&22 FDQ EH VWRUHG LQ GL΍HUHQW ZD\V 'HSOHWHG QDWXUDO JDV ȴHOGV DUH
WKHPRVWOLNHO\VWRUDJHORFDWLRQIRU&22LQWKH1HWKHUODQGV3ULRUWRWKH









To explore whether participants´ general risk perception, specific risk perceptions, 
negative emotional reactions, and achievement of cognitive closure were affected by 
the use of an analogy that either did or did not include safety-related information, we 
conducted Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Results revealed no significant differences 
between the three experimental conditions on general risk perception, the three risk 
perception dimensions, negative outcome uncertainty-related emotions, or level of 
cognitive closure achieved Fs(1, 119) ≤ 2.54, ps ≥ .083. Thus, communication about a 
natural gas analogue of CO2 storage (including or excluding safety information) did not 
affect these measures. Participants in the three conditions, however, did differ in the 
extent to which they experienced outcome certainty-related emotions, F(1, 119) = 3.85, 
p = .024, ηp2 = .06. Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that participants in the “analogy 
without safety information” condition experienced less outcome certainty-related 
emotions (e.g., anger, disappointment) (M = 1.77, SD = 0.86), than participants in the 
“analogy with safety information” condition (M = 2.33, SD = 1.09, p = .051) or the “no 
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Samenvatting
Technologische ontwikkelingen spelen in toenemende mate een belangrijke rol in de 
hedendaagse samenleving. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan de invloed die de smartphone heeft 
op onze manier van communiceren, of de wijze waarop ons voedsel tegenwoordig 
wordt geproduceerd (mechanisch, geautomatiseerd) in vergelijking met enkele decennia 
terug. Met grote regelmaat worden er nieuwe innovaties met diverse toepassingen 
geïntroduceerd, zoals duurzame methodes om energie op te wekken. In veel gevallen 
houdt toepassing van zo’n nieuwe, complexe technologie in dat burgers in aanraking 
komen met de technologie. Soms heeft een technologie zelfs directe invloed op het 
dagelijks leven. Als gevolg hiervan is de invoering van een complexe technologie 
doorgaans alleen mogelijk als zij door het publiek geaccepteerd wordt, zoals we 
tegenwoordig onder andere zien met het gebruik van elektrische auto’s. De publieke 
opinie kan dus een doorslaggevende factor zijn voor de grootschalige inzet van een 
nieuwe technologische ontwikkeling. Gezien deze invloed van het publiek is het 
interessant en relevant voor partijen die betrokken zijn het invoeren van een complexe 
technologie (bv. beleidsmakers) om een beeld te krijgen van de publieke opinie over de 
technologie in kwestie, bijvoorbeeld door middel van opiniepeilingen. De standpunten, 
of attitudes, die mensen geven tijdens dit soort metingen zijn echter vaak “open”. Dat 
wil zeggen dat het vormen van de attitude nog niet klaar is of de gegeven attitude 
gebaseerd is op weinig tot geen kennis over het betreffende onderwerp. Dergelijke 
“open”, onvoltooide attitudes hebben weinig betekenis; het zijn geen goede voorspellers 
van toekomstige standpunten of van daaraan gerelateerd gedrag (zoals wel of niet 
protesteren tegen de invoering van een bepaalde complexe technologie). Echter, als 
mensen het vormen van hun attitude welhebben afgerond – en deze dus is “afgesloten” 
– is deze attitude daarentegen een goede voorspeller van hun toekomstige standpunt 
en gedrag. Inzicht in welke factoren verbonden zijn aan het vormen van een afgesloten 
attitude kan daarom bijdragen aan een beter begrip van publieke opinievorming over de 
implementatie van nieuwe, complexe technologieën. De vraag is dus wanneer mensen 
hun attitudevorming afronden, wat ook wel bekend is als het bereiken van een staat van 
“cognitieve afsluiting” (cognitive closure).
Voorgaand onderzoek naar factoren die bepalen of mensen een staat van 
cognitieve afsluiting bereiken heeft zich voornamelijk gericht op de persoonlijke 
behoefte aan cognitieve afsluiting (need for closure). Mensen verschillen onderling en 
per situatie in hun behoefte om ergens snel een conclusie over te trekken of iets zeker 
te weten, dus om cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken. Een sterkere behoefte hieraan zorgt 
er in het algemeen voor dat mensen ook sneller en in hogere mate cognitieve afsluiting 
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bereiken over het onderwerp in kwestie. Echter, het is aannemelijk dat er ook andere 
factoren zijn die bepalen of mensen wel of niet deze mentale staat bereiken. Vooral in het 
geval van een ingewikkeld onderwerp als de invoering van een complexe technologie, 
zoals nanotechnologie, is het goed mogelijk dat mensen maar beperkt in staat zijn een 
afgesloten attitude te vormen, ongeacht hun persoonlijke behoefte om een dergelijke 
attitude te vormen. Mensen zijn zich waarschijnlijk vaak bewust van de complexiteit 
van onderwerpen zoals de inzet van technologische innovaties en kunnen daardoor het 
idee hebben dat hun vermogen om hierover een afgesloten attitude te vormen beperkt 
is. Als gevolg hiervan is het voor de meesten vaak erg lastig om een staat van cognitieve 
afsluiting te bereiken. Er zijn echter gevallen waarin mensen wel tot een definitief 
standpunt komen en hun attitudevorming over de inzet van een complexe technologie 
afsluiten. Het is daarom belangrijk om te begrijpen welke psychologische factoren ervoor 
zorgen dat mensen het moeilijker of makkelijker vinden om een staat van cognitieve 
afsluiting te bereiken over complexe technologische onderwerpen. 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is het identificeren van psychologische factoren 
die het vormen van een gesloten attitude, of het bereiken van cognitieve afsluiting, 
over de invoering van een complexe technologie bevorderen of verhinderen. Ik 
richt me hierbij op factoren die geadresseerd kunnen worden in of door middel van 
publieke informatievoorziening over complexe technologieën. Een beter begrip van 
dergelijke factoren en de manier waarop zij het vormen van een afgesloten mening 
vergemakkelijken of belemmeren is uiterst relevant voor beleidsmakers die burgers 
op een zo goed mogelijke manier willen informeren. Door op de hoogte te zijn van 
welke factoren het vormen van een definitieve, afgesloten attitude compliceren of 
vergemakkelijken is het mogelijk om mensen op een dusdanige manier van informatie te 
voorzien dat zij een staat van cognitieve afsluiting kunnen bereiken. 
Hoewel de mate waarin mensen cognitieve afsluiting bereiken belangrijke 
consequenties heeft, is het bereiken van deze staat niet in alle gevallen wenselijk. Daar 
waar goede en complete informatie over het onderwerp in kwestie beschikbaar is, is het 
in principe geen probleem wanneer mensen op basis van deze informatie een definitieve, 
afgesloten attitude vormen. Als de beschikbare informatie echter onvolledig of van 
lage kwaliteit is, doet men er goed aan om het afsluiten van de attitudevorming uit te 
stellen. In Hoofdstuk 1 geef ik een overzicht van de theoretische achtergrond en van de 
resultaten van de drie onderzoekslijnen in dit proefschrift. Ook worden de theoretische 
en praktische implicaties van mijn bevindingen besproken. In Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek 
ik of en hoe mogelijk onrustbarende gedachtes en gevoelens, die zich vaak voordoen 
in reactie op de invoering van een complexe technologie, het bereiken van cognitieve 
afsluiting in de weg staan. Ik richt me hierbij specifiek op het waarnemen van risico’s en 
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het ervaren van negatieve emoties. In Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik of het waargenomen 
eigen vermogen om cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken het vormen van een definitieve, 
afgesloten attitude kan bevorderen. In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik of en hoe het vermogen 
om cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken over een complexe technologie beïnvloed wordt 
door kenmerken van de informatie die mensen hierover ontvangen. Ik kijk hierbij 
specifiek naar de rol van de mate van deskundigheid (expertise) die mensen toeschrijven 
aan een informatiebron. 
Het onderzoek dat ik in dit proefschrift presenteer bestaat uit experimentele 
studies; hierin zijn één of meerdere elementen van de studie gevarieerd (bv. de identiteit 
van een informatiebron) waarna er door middel van vragen en gedragsmaten onderzocht 
is wat de gevolgen zijn van deze variaties voor de gedachten (ofwel cognities), gevoelens 
en het gedrag van de deelnemers van de studies. De vragen die in de huidige studies 
gesteld zijn en de gedragsmaten die zijn afgenomen richten zich hoofdzakelijk op 
de mate waarin deelnemers een staat van cognitieve afsluiting hebben bereikt over 
een complexe technologie. Een voorbeeld van een gedragsmaat is de keuze van een 
deelnemer om wel of niet mee te doen aan een opiniepeiling over de invoering van een 
complexe technologie. De keuze om mee te doen geeft in dit geval aan dat de deelnemer 
een zekere mate van cognitieve afsluiting heeft bereikt. 
De complexe technologie waarover de deelnemers van de studies in dit 
proefschrift een attitude vormen is CO2-afvang en -opslag technologie. Deze technologie 
is ook wel bekend als CCS, naar de Engelse term carbon capture and storage. Het doel 
van CCS is om de uitstoot van het broeikasgas CO2 in de atmosfeer te verminderen en 
hiermee opwarming van de aarde tegen te gaan. Dit gebeurt door CO2 af te vangen dat 
vrijkomt bij verbranding van fossiele brandstoffen, bijvoorbeeld in energiecentrales, en 
deze vervolgens te transporteren naar een ondergrondse opslagplek. In Nederland zijn 
lege aardgasvelden hier het meest geschikt voor. Het afgevangen CO2 wordt vervolgens 
samengeperst en permanent, diep onder de grond opgeslagen. Net als in het geval 
van vele andere complexe technologieën kan de publieke opinie bepalend zijn voor de 
succesvolle invoering van CCS. Dat is onder andere gebleken toen in 2010 de plannen 
voor een CCS-demonstratieproject in de gemeente Barendrecht werden geschrapt 
wegens een gebrek aan draagvlak voor deze plannen onder de bevolking. CCS is 
daarmee een geschikt onderwerp om het vormen van afgesloten attitudes over complexe 
technologieën te onderzoeken.
In Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift richt ik mij op de risico’s die mensen 
waarnemen en de negatieve emoties die ze ervaren wanneer ze geconfronteerd worden 
met de invoering van een complexe technologie zoals CCS. Specifiek onderzoek ik of 
en hoe deze veel voorkomende reacties het vormen van een afgesloten attitude in de 
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weg staan. Risico perceptie en negatieve emoties worden zowel in de literatuur als in 
de praktijk gezien als belangrijke bronnen van protest tegen de invoering van complexe 
technologieën. Ik stel echter dat deze reacties ook van invloed kunnen zijn op de mate 
van cognitieve afsluiting die mensen bereiken. Dat wil zeggen; het waarnemen van 
risico’s en het ervaren van negatieve emoties kunnen het vormen van een afgesloten 
attitude verhinderen. De resultaten van dit onderzoek laten zien dat hoe meer mensen 
CCS als riskant zien in termen van rampzalige consequenties (“als er iets mis gaat, dan 
heeft dat heel ernstige gevolgen”), in termen van de bekendheid van risico’s (“in hoeverre 
zijn we op de hoogte van wat er allemaal mis kan gaan?”) en hoe meer ze emoties 
ervaren die onzekerheid aangeven (bv. angst en bezorgdheid), des te minder ze hun 
attitude over CCS zullen afsluiten. Onzekerheid is een gemene deler van deze vormen 
van risicoperceptie en het soort negatieve emoties die het bereiken van cognitieve 
afsluiting in de weg blijken te staan. De onzekerheid die mensen voelen wanneer ze 
deze risico’s waarnemen of negatieve emoties ervaren zou overgedragen kunnen worden 
op het attitudevormingsproces, met als gevolg dat zij zich niet goed in staat voelen om 
cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken. De mate waarin mensen zichzelf capabel achten om 
een afgesloten attitude te vormen zou op zijn beurt een verklaring kunnen zijn voor het 
feit dat sommigen er meer, en anderen er minder in slagen om een staat van cognitieve 
afsluiting te bereiken. 
  In Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik de vraag of de mate waarin mensen het idee 
hebben dat ze een staat van cognitieve afsluiting kunnen bereiken inderdaad beïnvloedt 
of ze daadwerkelijk een afgesloten attitude vormen over de invoering van een complexe 
technologie zoals CCS. Het beeld dat mensen hebben van zichzelf met betrekking tot het 
kunnen vormen van een afgesloten attitude wordt ook wel het “vermogen om cognitieve 
afsluiting te bereiken” genoemd. In twee studies varieerde ik het vermogen van 
deelnemers om cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken door ze een fictieve persoonlijkheidstest 
te laten maken en ze vervolgens een valse uitslag van deze test te geven. De ene helft van 
de deelnemers kreeg te horen dat hun vermogen om cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken 
over complexe onderwerpen groot was, terwijl de andere helft van de deelnemers 
werd verteld dat hun vermogen op dit gebied als gemiddeld was. Hierna werden alle 
deelnemers gevraagd om hun attitude te vormen over een specifiek complex onderwerp, 
namelijk de invoering van CCS in Nederland. Vervolgens werd de mate waarin ze een 
afgesloten attitude hadden gevormd gemeten door middel van een vragenlijst en een 
gedragsmaat. Ten slotte werd er gemeten in hoeverre de deelnemers nog open stonden 
voor aanvullende informatie over de invoering van CCS in Nederland. In de eerste 
studie werd dit gedaan door vast te stellen hoeveel aanvullende informatie de deelnemers 
besloten te lezen en hoeveel van deze informatie ze gebruikten om hun standpunt te 
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onderbouwen wanneer hierom gevraagd werd. In de tweede studie werd het openstaan 
voor aanvullende informatie gemeten door de deelnemers een lijst met interviews 
over CCS aan te bieden (“geopinieerde” informatie) en een lijst met krantenartikelen 
over CCS (feitelijke informatie). De deelnemers gaven vervolgens hun interesse in de 
informatie aan en kozen de interviews en artikelen die ze zouden willen lezen. 
Beide studies lieten zien dat deelnemers die de indruk hadden gekregen dat 
ze een groot vermogen hadden om cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken inderdaad een 
meer afgesloten attitude vormden dan mensen die te horen hadden gekregen dat hun 
vermogen hiertoe gemiddeld was. Dit betekent dat mensen die zichzelf beter in staat 
achten om een afgesloten attitude te vormen hier ook beter in slagen dan mensen die 
het beeld van zichzelf hebben dat ze hier minder vaardig in zijn. Dit toont aan dat het 
ervaren vermogen om cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken inderdaad een bepalende factor is 
voor of mensen wel of niet een afgesloten attitude zullen vormen. De resultaten toonden 
verder aan dat hoe meer mensen hun attitudevorming over de complexe technologie in 
kwestie hebben afgerond, des te minder zij open staan voor aanvullende informatie. Dit 
verband tussen het afsluiten van een attitude en openstaan voor aanvullende informatie 
lijkt echter alleen te gelden wanneer de informatie gerelateerd is aan de standpunten 
van anderen (geopinieerde informatie) en niet voor feitelijke informatie. Geslotenheid 
voor nieuwe, geopinieerde informatie kan problematisch zijn, bijvoorbeeld wanneer een 
beleidsmaker zijn of haar redenen voor het uitvoeren een project duidelijk wil maken 
aan het publiek. De resultaten suggereren echter dat een dergelijk probleem zich minder 
snel zal voordoen wanneer er nadruk wordt gelegd op de feiten waarmee de argumenten 
onderbouwd worden. In een dergelijke situatie zouden mensen met een afgesloten 
attitude waarschijnlijk in dezelfde mate open staan voor geopinieerde informatie als 
mensen die minder vergevorderd zijn in hun attitudevorming.
In Hoofdstuk 4 laat ik zien dat het vermogen van mensen om een staat 
van cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken niet alleen beïnvloed kan worden door 
middel van experimentele, kunstmatige methodes (bv. valse uitslag van een fictieve 
persoonlijkheidstest), maar ook door factoren uit het dagelijks leven, zoals kenmerken 
van communicatie over de invoering van een complexe technologie. Ik richt me hierbij 
in het bijzonder op hoe de expertise die mensen toeschrijven aan een informatiebron 
kan bepalen in hoeverre zij in staat zijn om een afgesloten mening te vormen op basis 
van de informatie van de bron. Het huidige onderzoek laat zien dat mensen beter een 
afgesloten attitude over de invoering van CCS kunnen vormen wanneer zij denken 
dat ze informatie ontvangen van een bron die zeer deskundig is op het gebied van de 
technologie. Het blijkt dat mensen hun indruk van de expertise van een informatiebron 
baseren op de identiteit van de bron. Dit betekent dat mensen het idee hebben dat 
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ze beter in staat zijn om een definitieve, afgesloten attitude te vormen op basis van 
informatie van bepaalde bronnen (bv. een wetenschappelijke vereniging) dan van 
andere (bv. een burgerorganisatie). Echter, dit betekent niet dat deze waargenomen 
expertise van een bron in alle situaties hetzelfde is; de indruk die mensen hebben van 
de deskundigheid van een informatiebron blijkt ook af te hangen van de boodschap 
die de bron communiceert. Wanneer de leden van een informatiebron aangeven dat 
ze het onderling eens zijn, in plaats van oneens, over het onderwerp in kwestie (in dit 
onderzoek de gevolgen van CCS voor het milieu), nemen mensen meer bronexpertise 
waar. Dit heeft als gevolg dat mensen zich ook beter in staat voelen om een afgesloten 
attitude te vormen wanneer een bron aangeeft dat haar leden het onderling eens zijn, 
en dat er dus consensus is in plaats van onenigheid. Dit effect van het communiceren 
van consensus (versus onenigheid) op waargenomen bronexpertise en het vermogen 
om een afgesloten attitude te vormen lijkt niet even sterk te zijn voor alle bronnen. 
Met name wanneer de identiteit van de bron in kwestie geen reden is om aan te nemen 
dat men met experts te maken heeft – zoals in het geval van een burgervereniging die 
informatie geeft over een complexe technologie als CCS – lijkt het communiceren van 
consensus of onenigheid gevolgen te hebben. Wanneer de identiteit van de bron echter 
al hoge expertise aangeeft, zoals in het geval van een wetenschappelijke vereniging, 
lijkt de vraag of de leden het onderling eens of oneens zijn echter minder van belang te 
zijn voor de indruk die mensen hebben van de bronexpertise. Dit betekent dat bij het 
communiceren van informatie die afkomstig is van deskundigen het belangrijk is om de 
expert-identiteit van de bron te benadrukken. Op deze manier kan worden voorkomen 
dat de boodschap die gecommuniceerd wordt afdoet aan de waargenomen bronexpertise 
en daarmee ook dat het vermogen van de ontvangers van deze informatie om een 
afgesloten attitude te vormen vermindert. Tegelijkertijd tonen deze bevindingen aan dat 
men niet moet onderschatten in welke mate informatie van niet-experts kan bijdragen 
aan het vermogen van het publiek een staat van cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken over het 
onderwerp in kwestie, vooral als deze niet-experts aangeven het met elkaar eens te zijn. 
Conclusie
Dit proefschrift toont aan dat het belangrijk is om oog te hebben voor het 
vermogen van mensen om een staat van cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken. Dit geldt 
zowel wanneer men publieke opinievorming over complexe technologieën beter wil 
begrijpen als wanneer men de publieke opinievorming wil ondersteunen middels 
informatievoorziening. Het vermogen om cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken blijkt 
namelijk bepalend te zijn voor de mate waarin mensen een afgesloten attitude vormen. 
Het afsluiten van attitude heeft belangrijke consequenties voor de stabiliteit van deze 
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attitude en de openheid van mensen voor aanvullende, geopinieerde informatie over 
het onderwerp in kwestie. Het vermogen om cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken is niet 
alleen een individueel kenmerk. Het kan ook beïnvloed worden door externe factoren en 
omstandigheden, onafhankelijk van de behoefte aan cognitieve afsluiting. Dit vermogen 
hangt af van kenmerken van de informatiebron die over de complexe technologie 
communiceert en van de boodschap die de bron gecommuniceerd. Het vermogen om 
cognitieve afsluiting te bereiken, of om een afgesloten attitude te vormen, blijkt tevens af 
te hangen van de risico’s die mensen waarnemen en de negatieve emoties die ze ervaren 
als ze met de invoering van de technologie geconfronteerd worden. Zodoende geven de 
resultaten uit dit proefschrift nieuwe inzichten in de mechanismes die onderliggend zijn 
aan het vormen van definitieve, afgesloten attitudes. Naast deze bijdrage aan de literatuur 
hebben de huidige bevindingen ook praktische implicaties door handvaten te bieden 
voor het ontwikkelen van communicatiestrategieën die mensen kunnen helpen bij het 
bereiken van een staat van cognitieve afsluiting.
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hebben. De vrienden waarmee je nog op het schoolplein hebt gestaan kunnen tijdens een 
promotietraject een aangenaam ontnuchterende werking op je hebben. Amber, met jou 
kan ik met een gezonde dosis zelfspot alles bespreken. Marijke, wij begrijpen elkaar met 
een half woord. Onze vriendschap is mij ontzettend dierbaar.
Tijdens mijn promotie staan straks twee bijzondere paranimfen naast me. 
Gerdien; je was mijn eerste kamergenoot en ik geloof echt de allerbeste die ik ooit zal 
hebben. Dank je wel voor de onvergetelijke gezelligheid, steun en hilariteit. Susanne, ik 
136 MAKING UP YOUR MIND ABOUT A COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY
heb veel bewondering voor de manier waarop je tegen de wind in en zonder te klagen 
je doelen nastreeft. Dat jij als grote zus straks mijn paranimf bent is een eer. Het is voor 
mij heel waardevol dat we deze belangrijke momenten in het leven zo met elkaar kunnen 
delen. Liesbeth en Gerard, het doet me goed dat we de afgelopen jaren steeds meer in 
elkaars leven zijn. Papa en mama, ik prijs mezelf gelukkig met ouders die mij altijd alle 
mogelijkheden en ruimte hebben gegeven om me te ontwikkelen en doen wat ik graag 
wil. Het warme nest dat jullie ons bieden, inclusief de uitgebreide gesprekken aan de 
eettafel, hebben sterk bijgedragen wie ik ben, maar ook waar ik nu terecht ben gekomen. 
Mam, jij hebt me geleerd om altijd plezier te hebben in het leven, ook in de kleine 
dingen, en trouw te zijn aan mijn gevoel. Pap, op jouw bijstand en enthousiasme kan ik 
altijd rekenen. Dank dat je je liefde voor kennis en redeneren aan mij hebt overgedragen. 
Tot slot, lieve Jarno, het voltooien van dit project was een stuk moeilijker geweest zonder 
jouw hulp, je steun, en je vermogen om mij rust te geven wanneer ik dat het hardst nodig 
heb. Maar bovenal help je mij te groeien als mens. Ik kijk ernaar uit om verder samen 
van het leven te genieten. 
137DANKWOORD
138 MAKING UP YOUR MIND ABOUT A COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY
139CURRICULUM VITAE
Curriculum Vitae
Charlotte Koot was born in Nijmegen on April 3rd, 1986. 
She grew up in Dordrecht where she graduated from 
the Johan de Witt Gymnasium in 2004. After doing 
volunteer work in Northern Ghana and traveling 
the country, she started studying Social Sciences 
at University College Roosevelt in Middelburg 
in 2005. As part of her studies she went on 
exchange to the University of California, Davis 
(USA). Charlotte obtained her bachelor’s degree in 
2008 (summa cum laude). In 2010, she obtained her 
Research Master’s degree in Social Psychology (cum laude) 
from the VU University Amsterdam. For her master’s thesis she conducted research 
under supervision of Dr. David Amodio at New York University (USA). In August 2010, 
Charlotte started a PhD project at Leiden University within the CATO-2; the Dutch 
national research program on carbon dioxide capture and storage technology (CCS). 
This project was supervised by Prof. Dr. Naomi Ellemers and Dr. Emma ter Mors and 
resulted in the present dissertation. Charlotte currently lives in Amsterdam.
140 MAKING UP YOUR MIND ABOUT A COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY




 $QQHPDULH+LHPVWUDFairness in Paper and Video Resume Screening
 *HUW-DQ/HOLHYHOGEmotions in Negotiations: The Role of Communicated Anger 
and Disappointment
 6DDU0ROOHQFitting in or Breaking Free? On Health Behavior, Social Norms and 
Conformity
 .DULQ0HQQLQJDExploring Learning Abstinence Theory: A new theoretical 
perspective on continued abstinence in smoking cessation
 -HVVLH.RHQPrepare and Pursue: Routes to suitable (re-)employment
 0DULHNH5RVNHVMotivated creativity: A conservation of energy approach
 &ODLUH0DULH=HGHOLXVInvestigating Consciousness in Reward Pursuit
 $QRXNYDQGHU:HLGHQWhen You Think You Know What You’re Doing: 
Experiencing Self-Agency Over Intended and Unintended Outcomes







 -DQD1LHPDQQFeedback Is the Breakfast of Champions, but It Can Be Hard to 
Digest: A Psychological Perspective on Feedback Seeking and Receiving
 6HUHQD'RHVAt the heart of egalitarianism: How morality framing shapes Whites’ 
responses to social inequality
 5RP\YDQGHU/HHMoral Motivation Within Groups
 0HOY\Q+DPVWUD Self-Regulation in a Social Environment
 &KDQWDOGHQ'DDVΖQWKHKHDWRIWKHPRPHQW7KHH΍HFWRILPSXOVLYHDQGUHȵHFWLYH
states on sexual risk decisions
 .HOO\&REH\Female Physiology Meets Psychology: Menstrual Cycle and 
&RQWUDFHSWLYH3LOO(΍HFWV
 (OOHQYDQGHU:HU΍Growing environmental self-identity
 /LVH-DQVReconciling individuality with social solidarity: Forming social identity 
from the bottom up
 5XWKYDQ9HHOHQΖQWHJUDWLQJΖDQG:H&RJQLWLYH5RXWHVWR6RFLDOΖGHQWLȴFDWLRQ
 /RWWLH%XOOHQVHaving second thoughts: consequences of decision reversibility
142 MAKING UP YOUR MIND ABOUT A COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY
 'DQLHO6OLJWHThe functionality of creativity
 0DULMQ6WRN(DWLQJE\WKH1RUP7KHΖQȵXHQFHRI6RFLDO1RUPVRQ<RXQJ3HRSOHȇV
Eating Behavior
 0LFKªOOH%DOMaking Sense of Injustice: Benign and Derogatory Reactions to 
Innocent Victims
 1LFROHWWD'LPLWURYD5HWKLQNLQJHUURUV+RZHUURUKDQGOLQJVWUDWHJ\D΍HFWVRXU
thoughts and others’ thoughts about us
 1DPNMH.RXGHQEXUJConversational Flow: The Emergence and Regulation of 
Solidarity through social interaction
 7KRPDV6LWVHUPredicting sales performance: Strengthening the personality – job 
performance linkage
 *RGD3HUODYLFLXWHGoal-driven evaluations of sustainable products
 6DLG6KDIDΖQWKHH\HVRIRWKHUVThe role of honor concerns in explaining and 
preventing insult-elicited aggression
 )HOLFHYDQ1XQVSHHWNeural correlates of the motivation to be moral
 $QQH)HWVMH6OXLVTowards a virtuous society: Virtues as potential instruments to 
enhance
 *HUGLHQGH9ULHV Pitfalls in the Communication about CO2 Capture and Storage
 7KHFOD%UDNHO7KHH΍HFWVRIVRFLDOFRPSDULVRQLQIRUPDWLRQRQFDQFHUVXUYLYRUVȇ
TXDOLW\RIOLIH$ȴHOGH[SHULPHQWDOLQWHUYHQWLRQDSSURDFK
 +DQV0DULHQUnderstanding and Motivating Human Control: Outcome and 
Reward Information in Action
 'DQLHO$OLQNPublic Trust: Expectancies, Beliefs, and Behavior
 /LQGD'DSKQH0XXVVHV+RZΖQWHUQHWXVHPD\D΍HFWRXUUHODWLRQVKLSV
Characteristics of Internet use and personal and relational wellbeing
 +LOOLH$DOGHULQJ3DURFKLDODQGXQLYHUVDOFRRSHUDWLRQLQLQWHUJURXSFRQȵLFWV
 0DUWLMQ.HL]HUDo norms matter? The role of normative considerations as 
predictors of pro-environmental behavior
 0DDUWMH(OVKRXWVengeance
 6HYDO*¾QGHPLUThe Minority Glass Ceiling Hypothesis: Exploring Reasons and 
Remedies for the Underrepresentation of Racial-ethnic Minorities in Leadership 
Positions
 'DJPDU%HXGHNHUOn regulatory focus and performance in organizational 
environments
 &KDUORWWH.RRWMaking up your mind about a complex technology: An 
investigation into factors that help or hinder the achievement of cognitive closure 
about CCS
143KURT LEWIN INSTITUTE DISSERTATION SERIES
Many of the technological innovations introduced into modern society have a clear 
impact on people’s daily lives. As a consequence, public opinion is often a decisive 
factor for the successful implementation of a complex technology. The research in this 
dissertation examines psychological factors that affect the ease with which people form 
a definite view, or achieve cognitive closure, on complex technologies. Attitudes on 
which people have achieved cognitive closure are of interest as they are more stable and 
better predictors of people’s behavior (e.g., protesting a complex technology) than open, 
unfinished attitudes. The studies in this dissertation focus on attitude formation about the 
complex technology of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS). Results show that the 
extent to which people feel able to form an attitude about a complex technology affects 
the level of cognitive closure they actually achieve. People’s ability to achieve cognitive 
closure depends on the risks they perceive and negative emotions they experience in 
association with the technology as well as on characteristics of communication about 
the technology. Together these findings add to the understanding of public opinion 
regarding the implementation of complex technologies and provide 
novel insight into the mechanisms underlying the achievement of 
cognitive closure.
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